The DOI matches its Crossref record; 50 of the 50 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Regulatory Capture: A Review
Abstract
This article reviews both the theoretical and empirical literatures on regulatory capture. The scope is broad, but utility regulation is emphasized. I begin by describing the Stigler–Peltzman approach to the economics of regulation. I then open the black box of influence and regulatory discretion using a three-tier hierarchical agency model under asymmetric information (in the spirit of Laffont and Tirole, 1993). I discuss alternative modelling approaches with a view to a richer set of positive predictions, including models of common agency, revolving doors, informational lobbying, coercive pressure, and influence over committees. I discuss empirical work involving capture and regulatory outcomes. I also review evidence on the revolving-door phenomenon and on the impact that different methods for selecting regulators appear to have on regulatory outcomes. The last section contains open questions for future research.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach
Becker, G. S. (1968) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259394 · Cited by 13,999
The Logic of Collective Action.
Golembiewski, R. T., & Olson, M. (1966) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2091298 · Cited by 11,364
The Theory of Economic Regulation
Stigler, G. J. (2021) · The Political Economy · doi:10.4324/9781315495811-8 · Cited by 5,483
Toward a More General Theory of Regulation
Peltzman, S. (1976) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466865 · Cited by 4,729
A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence
Becker, G. S. (1983) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1886017 · Cited by 4,117
Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, E. (2008) · 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2 · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_7 · Cited by 3,302
A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation
Jean Tirole, Z., & Laffont, J. (1993) · Toulouse Capitole Publications (University Toulouse 1 Capitole) · Cited by 3,154
Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market
Khwaja, A. I., & Mian, A. (2005) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355305775097524 · Cited by 2,366
Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control
(1987) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036930 · Cited by 2,224
Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
Myerson, R. B. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912346 · Cited by 1,983
Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers
Becker, G. S., & Stigler, G. J. (1974) · The Journal of Legal Studies · doi:10.1086/467507 · Cited by 1,843
Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
Baron, D. P., & Myerson, R. B. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912769 · Cited by 1,721
Eight Questions about Corruption
Svensson, J. (2005) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/089533005774357860 · Cited by 1,699
Theories of Economic Regulation
Posner, R. (1974) · Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks · doi:10.3386/w0041 · Cited by 1,481
Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
Bernheim, B. D., & Whinston, M. D. (1986) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1884639 · Cited by 1,223
Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations
(1986) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036907 · Cited by 1,214
Local Capture: Evidence from a Central Government Transfer Program in Uganda
Reinikka, R., & Svensson, J. (2004) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/0033553041382120 · Cited by 1,064
Demsetz, H. (1972) · Readings in Industrial Economics · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-15486-9_10 · Cited by 989
Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation
Goldberg, P. K., & Maggi, G. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.5.1135 · Cited by 854
Fighting Corruption to Improve Schooling: Evidence from a Newspaper Campaign in Uganda
Reinikka, R., & Svensson, J. (2005) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1162/jeea.2005.3.2-3.259 · Cited by 719
Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented
Denzau, A. T., & Munger, M. C. (1986) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1957085 · Cited by 709
The Role of Wages and Auditing during a Crackdown on Corruption in the City of Buenos Aires
Di Tella, R., & Schargrodsky, E. (2003) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/345578 · Cited by 620
Taxes and Bribery: The Role of Wage Incentives
Besley, T., & McLaren, J. (1993) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2234340 · Cited by 579
Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection
Gawande, K., & Bandyopadhyay, U. (2000) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/003465300558579 · Cited by 513
National Champions and Corruption: Some Unpleasant Interventionist Arithmetic
Ades, A. F., & Tella, R. D. (1997) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/1468-0297.00204 · Cited by 488
The Value of Biased Information: A Rational Choice Model of Political Advice
Calvert, R. L. (1985) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.2307/2130895 · Cited by 475
A Signaling Model of Informative and Manipulative Political Action
Lohmann, S. (1993) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2939043 · Cited by 460
Elected versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence
Besley, T., & Coate, S. (2003) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1162/154247603770383424 · Cited by 445
Corruption and inefficiency: Theory and evidence from electric utilities
Dal Bó, E., & Rossi, M. A. (2007) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.11.005 · Cited by 335
Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote
Austen-Smith, D., & Wright, J. (1992) · Social Choice and Welfare · doi:10.1007/bf00192880 · Cited by 311
Separation of Regulators against Collusive Behavior
Laffont, J.-J., & Martimort, D. (1999) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2556079 · Cited by 274
“Plata o Plomo?”:Bribe and Punishment in a Theory of Political Influence
DAL BÓ, E., DAL BÓ, P., & DI TELLA, R. (2006) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055406061995 · Cited by 264
Snyder, J. M. (1991) · Economics & Politics · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1991.tb00041.x · Cited by 247
Cooperation in Ongoing Organizations
Crémer, J. (1986) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1884640 · Cited by 199
Natural Monopoly Regulation: Principles and Practice
Berg, S. V., & Tschirhart, J. (1989) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 166
Bó, E. D., & Tella, R. D. (2003) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/376951 · Cited by 136
POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL CHECKS ON CORRUPTION: EVIDENCE FROM AMERICAN STATE GOVERNMENTS
Alt, J. Ε., & Lassen, D. D. (2007) · Economics and Politics · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0343.2007.00319.x · Cited by 136
Behind the Revolving Door: A New View of Public Utility Regulation
Salant, D. (1995) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555993 · Cited by 111
Some Determinants of Allowed Rates of Return on Equity to Electric Utilities
Hagerman, R. L., & Ratchford, B. T. (1978) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003611 · Cited by 102
McCraw, T. K. (1975) · The Business History Review · doi:10.2307/3113698 · Cited by 99
Regulation of natural monopoliesPreprint
Joskow, P. L. (2005) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 98
Figueiredo, R. J. P. D., & Edwards, G. A. (2007) · Journal of Economics & Management Strategy · doi:10.1111/j.1530-9134.2007.00150.x · Cited by 92
The Basic Behavior of Regulatory Commissions
Hilton, G. W. (1972) · American Economic Review · Cited by 56
Decision Costs and the Strategic Design of Administrative Process and Judicial Review
Spiller, P. T. S., & Tiller, E. H. (1997) · The Journal of Legal Studies · doi:10.1086/467999 · Cited by 51
Holburn, G. L. F., & Bergh, R. G. V. (2006) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-006-4317-y · Cited by 48
Governance Alternatives and Pricing in the U.S. Electric Power Industry
Kwoka, J. E. (2002) · The Journal of Law Economics and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/18.1.278 · Cited by 44
Regulator Selection Methods and Electricity Prices
Primeaux, W. J., & Mann, P. C. (1986) · Land Economics · doi:10.2307/3146558 · Cited by 42
Holburn, G. L. F., & Spiller, P. T. S. (2002) · eScholarship (California Digital Library) · Cited by 41
Hansen, W. L., & Park, K. O. (1995) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2600846 · Cited by 33
A market based evaluation of the election versus appointment of regulatory commissioners
Fields, J. A., Klein, L. S., & Sfiridis, J. M. (1997) · Public Choice · doi:10.1023/a:1017938426780 · Cited by 32
Cited by
Theoretical Frontiers in Representative Bureaucracy: New Directions for Research
Meier, K. J. (2019) · Perspectives on Public Management and Governance · doi:10.1093/ppmgov/gvy004 · Cited by 284
Could digital platforms capture the media through infrastructure?
Nechushtai, E. (2018) · Journalism · doi:10.1177/1464884917725163 · Cited by 135
Piling On: Multilevel Government and the Fiscal Common‐Pool
Berry, C. (2008) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00344.x · Cited by 128
Can we learn lessons from the FDA's approval of aducanumab?
Liu, K. Y., & Howard, R. (2021) · Nature Reviews Neurology · doi:10.1038/s41582-021-00557-x · Cited by 104
Grose, C. R., Lopez, P., Sadhwani, S., & Yoshinaka, A. (2022) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/714923 · Cited by 39
Metadata
- Authors
- Dal Bo, E.
- Venue
- Oxford Review of Economic Policy
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2006-06-01
- Volume
- 22
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 203-225
- ISSN
- 0266-903X (ISSN-L)
- 1460-2121
- OpenAlex
- W2107912056
- Cited by
- 960
- References
- 50
- FWCI
- 33.47
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.