The DOI matches its Crossref record; 50 of the 50 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Regulatory Capture: A Review
Abstract
This article reviews both the theoretical and empirical literatures on regulatory capture. The scope is broad, but utility regulation is emphasized. I begin by describing the Stigler–Peltzman approach to the economics of regulation. I then open the black box of influence and regulatory discretion using a three-tier hierarchical agency model under asymmetric information (in the spirit of Laffont and Tirole, 1993). I discuss alternative modelling approaches with a view to a richer set of positive predictions, including models of common agency, revolving doors, informational lobbying, coercive pressure, and influence over committees. I discuss empirical work involving capture and regulatory outcomes. I also review evidence on the revolving-door phenomenon and on the impact that different methods for selecting regulators appear to have on regulatory outcomes. The last section contains open questions for future research.
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Citations
Cites
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“Regulatory capture could be understood as a process through which regulatory targets "manipulate the state agencies that are supposed to control them" (cf. [33]).”
Does civilian oversight impact police legitimacy?
Schiff, K. J., Schiff, D. S., Moy, B. J., McCrain, J., Mourtgos, S. M., & Adams, I. T. (2025) · PNAS Nexus · doi:10.1093/pnasnexus/pgaf267 · Cited by 2
“However, we expect the opposite effect for CRBs that might be perceived as the relatively more lenient actor and thus as a “cap-tured” institution (27, 28).”
Metadata
- Authors
- Dal Bo, E.
- Venue
- Oxford Review of Economic Policy
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2006-06-01
- Volume
- 22
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 203-225
- ISSN
- 0266-903X (ISSN-L)
- 1460-2121
- OpenAlex
- W2107912056
- Cited by
- 960
- References
- 50
- FWCI
- 33.47
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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