Why develop open-source software? The role of non-pecuniary benefits, monetary rewards, and open-source licence type
Open accessAbstract
A review of the basic theory of optimal open-source software contributions points to three key factors affecting the decision to contribute to the open-source development process: non-pecuniary benefits, future expected monetary returns, and open-source licence type. This paper argues that existing large-scale software developer surveys are inadequate for measuring the relative importance of these three factors. Previous econometric studies that collect their own unique datasets also fall short because they generally measure the importance of only one supply factor in isolation. To fill the gap, I specify an estimable dynamic programming model of joint labour supply and open-source participation decisions that can provide empirical estimates of relative importance within a single unified framework of optimal decision-making.
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Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
The paper reviews theory and econometric evidence on why developers contribute to open source, arguing that non-pecuniary benefits, expected future monetary returns, and open-source licence type are key but existing surveys and studies cannot measure their relative importance. It proposes a dynamic programming model of joint employment and open-source participation decisions to estimate all three factors in one framework.
Key findings
- Three key supply factors are identified: non-pecuniary benefits, future expected monetary returns, and open-source licence type; prior econometric work generally examines monetary rewards and licence type in isolation, and no study empirically identifies non-pecuniary benefits.
- FLOSS-EU survey data (text says 2,784 respondents; Table 1 labels N=2718) show motivations: 78.9% joined to learn/develop new skills, 49.8% to share knowledge/skills, 23.9% to improve job opportunities, 9.1% for reputation, and 4.4% to make money; 46.3% report not earning money from OS/FS, while more than half report some monetary reward.
- Prior evidence reviewed: Hann et al. (147 Apache contributors) find little return to volume of contributions but higher ASF rank raises wages by 13–27%, interpreted as signaling/sorting stronger than human capital/learning; Lerner and Tirole (SourceForge, ~40,000 projects) find restrictive GPL licences more prevalent for end-user projects and less prevalent for developer/commercial projects; Fershtman and Gandal (71 projects, nine observations over 18 months) find more restrictive licences induce more output per contributor.
- The proposed model allows three employment states (non-employment, schooling, software developer) and three open-source participation states (none, non-GPL, GPL), with offer-arrival constraints, to estimate the relative importance of the three factors.
Methods
- Design: literature review plus specification of a dynamic programming model of joint labour supply and open-source contribution decisions; no estimation is performed.
- Data/sample: reviews the FLOSS-EU survey (text: 2,784 respondents; Table 1: N=2718) and prior econometric datasets: Hann et al. 147 Apache contributors; Lerner and Tirole SourceForge ~40,000 projects; Fershtman and Gandal panel of 71 projects observed nine times over 18 months.
- Main analysis: conceptual/theoretical; Bellman equation, utility and wage functions, nonparametric unobserved types, and offer arrival probabilities; proposes structural estimation once suitable panel data become available.
Limitations
- The paper states existing large-scale developer surveys are inadequate for measuring relative importance; they are cross-sectional, lack a non-participant control group, and only reach open-source participants.
- The paper states prior econometric studies collect original datasets but generally measure only one supply factor in isolation; no study identifies non-pecuniary benefits.
- The proposed model is not empirically implemented; the paper says it could be estimated when suitable panel data become available. Also evident from the text: no results from the model are presented.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
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Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
0 of 30 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged
- Findingcitation
Lerner and Tirole (2005b) found that restrictive licenses are significantly less prevalent among projects geared towards other software developers or commercial environments.
“Also consistent with the basic theory of voluntary contributions is the finding that restrictive licenses are significantly less prevalent among projects geared towards other software developers or projects designed for operating in commercial environments.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Lerner and Tirole (2005b)
Not checked in the free run.
- Findingcitation
In FLOSS-EU, 49% of respondents joined because they wanted to share existing knowledge and skills.
“The next most frequent reason, accounting for 49% of respondents, was a desire to share already existing knowledge and skills.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Gosh et al. (2002)
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- Findingcitation
In FLOSS-EU, 79% of respondents joined the OS/FS community because they were interested in learning and developing new skills.
“The table shows that 79% of the respondents joined the OS/FS community because they were interested in learning and developing new skills.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Gosh et al. (2002)
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- Findingown data
More than half of FLOSS-EU developers earn money from their OS/FS activities.
“The response frequencies reveal that more than half of the developers earn money from their OS/FS activities.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Gosh et al. (2002)
Not checked in the free run.
- Findingcitation
Fershtman and Gandal (2007) found that protecting code under more restrictive licenses induces more output per contributor.
“The results show that protecting code under more restrictive licenses induces more output per contributor.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Fershtman and Gandal (2007)
Not checked in the free run.
- Findingcitation
Lerner and Tirole (2005b) found that restrictive licenses are more prevalent among projects targeted to end-users rather than to other developers or system administrators.
“The probit results indicate that restrictive licenses are more prevalent amongst projects that are targeted to end-users (e.g., desktop tools and games) as opposed to other developers or system administrators.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Lerner and Tirole (2005b)
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisenone given
Previous econometric studies that collect their own datasets generally measure only one supply factor in isolation.
“Moreover, previous econometric studies that collect their own unique datasets generally measure the importance of only one supply factor in isolation.”
- Also stated in: § 1 Introduction · plain
“It is pointed out that the empirical literature currently falls short because it generally looks at the role of monetary rewards and open-source licence type in isolation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § 1 Introduction · plain
- Interpretationnone given
No studies have empirically identified the role of non-pecuniary benefits in the open-source supply decision.
“There are also no studies, to the best of my knowledge, that attempt to empirically identify the role of non-pecuniary benefits in the supply decision.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
In the patch scenario, under personal-use motivation, high uncertainty about value to others, and zero distribution costs, the developer is indifferent between keeping the patch and releasing it for free.
“Under these conditions, the developer of the patch will be indifferent between keeping the patch for himself, which yields zero profits, and distributing the patch to the public for free, which also yields zero profits (assuming zero costs of distribution).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: In the patch example, the developer originally wrote the patch for personal use of the program.
- The authors state this as an assumption: In the patch example, there is very high uncertainty about the patch's value to other developers or consumers, so no positive price exists at which others would buy it.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Distribution costs are zero.
- Premisereasoning
Development costs already incurred do not affect the decision to release a patch because they are sunk.
“The costs that the developer initially incurs to produce the patch are not relevant in the decision to release or not release because development costs are sunk.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationcitation
The same equilibrium of voluntary contributions can arise through reputation signaling: releasing code signals programming skill and leads to higher future skill prices.
“The same equilibrium outcome of voluntary contributions could arise if one's reputation as a skilled programmer is enhanced by distributing the patch for free.”
- Also stated in: § 2 The Basic Theory of Voluntary Software Contributions · hedged
“This could lead to differentially higher expected future returns through higher future skill prices.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Lerner and Tirole (2002)
Not checked in the free run.
- Also stated in: § 2 The Basic Theory of Voluntary Software Contributions · hedged
- Interpretationreasoning
The advantages from ego-gratification and future monetary rewards can be outweighed by current and future submission and distribution costs.
“The advantages derived from egogratification and higher future monetary rewards could be outweighed by the current and future costs of submission and distribution.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
The marginal benefit of voluntary contribution increases with the number of developers involved in the project.
“The marginal benefit of voluntarily contributing increases with the number of developers involved in the project.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Lerner and Tirole (2002)
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- cites Johnson (2002)
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- Interpretationreasoning
Existing large-scale software developer surveys are not adequate for measuring the relative importance of the three supply factors.
“This paper argues that existing large-scale software developer surveys are inadequate for measuring the relative importance of these three factors.”
- Also stated in: § 3.1 FLOSS-EU · plain
“The form of the questions and responses in Table 2 make it difficult to fruitfully use these data for generalizing about key motivations.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § 3.1 FLOSS-EU · plain
- Interpretationcitation
The indifference between keeping and releasing a patch can be broken by assuming differential expected future returns between the two options.
“In the above scenario, the software developer's indifference between keeping the patch private, and releasing the patch to the public for free, can be broken by assuming that there are differential expected future returns between the two options.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: There are differential expected future returns between keeping the patch private and releasing it for free.
- Interpretationreasoning
The voluntary contributions model can be adapted to explain a commercial firm's decision to release internally developed code.
“The voluntary contributions optimization model outlined above not only provides a useful and simple theoretical framework for identifying the main factors that affect supply at the individual level, but it can also be adapted to help explain the decision of commercial firms to voluntarily open-up internally developed code.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisereasoning
Earlier econometric research has studied monetary rewards and open-source licence type separately rather than jointly.
“The review of the empirical literature in the previous section highlights how prior econometric work has focussed on the influence of monetary rewards and type of open source license in isolation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
A firm releasing code may lose profits because competitors can free-ride on the program without bearing initial development costs.
“On the cost side of opening-up internally developed code, the firm may suffer lost profits due to competitors in the industry being able to free-ride and benefit from the program, without having incurred initial development costs.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisenone given
Econometric studies using original datasets generally examine monetary rewards and licence type separately.
“Econometric studies that have collected original datasets are also limited because they generally consider the role of monetary rewards and licence type in isolation, and do not attempt to measure the influence of non-pecuniary benefits.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given
If a firm keeps code closed, it may face costly replacement of in-house developers who leave.
“If the code remains closed, or internal to the firm, it could be costly to find suitable replacement programmers after the original in-house developers have left.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationown data
Rank is another proxy for open source experience.
“Putting the likely endogeneity of the instrument aside, the first stage results suggest that rank is another proxy for open source experience.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
From a firm's perspective, opening code even under a restrictive licence like GPL can be advantageous beyond improved program functionality, for example by spreading development risk.
“From the firm's perspective, opening-up the code, even under a restrictive license such as GPL, can be advantageous for reasons other than improved program functionality.”
- Also stated in: § 2 The Basic Theory of Voluntary Software Contributions · plain
“For example, releasing the code can help spread the risk of development.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § 2 The Basic Theory of Voluntary Software Contributions · plain
- Interpretationcitation
If industry competition is high, the costs of releasing code may be large.
“For example, if there is a high degree of competition in the industry then the costs of releasing the code may be large ( see von Hippel (2002 2005).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites von Hippel (2002 2005)
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- Interpretationcitation
The greater prevalence of restrictive licenses among end-user projects is consistent with the hypothesis that restrictive licenses substitute for otherwise low non-pecuniary benefits.
“This is consistent with the hypothesis mentioned earlier, in the basic theory of voluntary contributions, that restrictive licenses can substitute for otherwise low non-pecuniary benefits.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisenone given
No econometric study has tried to identify the role of non-pecuniary benefits.
“In addition, there are no econometric studies that attempt to identify the role of non-pecuniary benefits.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisenone given
Econometric studies using original datasets do not try to measure non-pecuniary benefits.
“Econometric studies that have collected original datasets are also limited because they generally consider the role of monetary rewards and licence type in isolation, and do not attempt to measure the influence of non-pecuniary benefits.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
For a firm, the main expected future benefit of releasing code is receiving programming input from many additional developers who can improve functionality.
“The main expected future benefit to releasing the code into the public domain is the receipt of programming input from hundreds of additional developers who can improve program functionality.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Raymond (1999a)
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
Estimated returns to Apache rank could be too high if non-contributors expect no wage gain from higher rank.
“For example, the return to ASF rank may be upward biased if those who do not participate in Apache projects know that they would not experience wage increases with higher ASF ranks.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given
Current surveys are only cross-sectional, limiting researchers' ability to control for unobservable characteristics that are fixed over time, such as developer ability.
“Another major problem is that current surveys are only cross-sectional, limiting the ability of researchers to control for unobservable characteristics that are fixed over time, such as developer ability.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The Lerner and Tirole study does not address how license choice affects open-source participation at the individual contributor level.
“The study also does not address the more interesting question of how license choice affects open source participation at the individual contributor level.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Lerner and Tirole (2005b)
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisenone given
Existing developer surveys cannot support study of the comparative weight of non-pecuniary gains, future monetary returns, and licence category.
“Unfortunately, the developer surveys that are available to researchers today are inadequate for studying the relative importance of these three key factors.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The licence under which a project is released can be a critical factor in a developer's decision to supply labour to open-source development.
“It is for these latter reasons that the form of intellectual property protection, or the license under which a project is released, can be a critical factor in the developer's decision to supply labor to open source development.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisereasoning
Three main drivers shape the choice to contribute to open-source work: non-pecuniary gains, expected future monetary returns, and licence category.
“A review of the basic theory of optimal open-source software contributions points to three key factors affecting the decision to contribute to the open-source development process.These three factors are non-pecuniary benefits, future expected monetary returns, and open-source licence type.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The extent of lost profits from releasing code depends on the generality of the program and the industry's market structure.
“The extent of lost profits will likely depend on the generality of the program and the industry's market structure.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Participation in firm-initiated open-source projects may be weak because developers are less likely to receive ideological satisfaction or enhanced community status.
“This is because the desire of developers to participate in an open source project initiated by a commercial firm may be weak.”
- Also stated in: § 2 The Basic Theory of Voluntary Software Contributions · hedged
“With firm-initiated projects, developers are less likely to reap non-pecuniary benefits related to ideological satisfaction and/or enhanced status in the open source community.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § 2 The Basic Theory of Voluntary Software Contributions · hedged
- May combine two claims. 16
- The quote only partly states this claim. 2
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 20
May combine two claims.
FindingcitationIn FLOSS-EU, desires to improve job opportunities, gain reputation in the OS/FS community, and make money were less important but not negligible.
“The desire to improve job opportunities, to get a reputation in the OS/FS community, and to make money are relatively less important, but are not negligible.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Gosh et al. (2002)
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May combine two claims.
FindingcitationHann et al. (2004) found little return to the volume of open-source contributions, but achieving a higher rank in ASF significantly increases wages.
“With standard panel data wage regressions that control for unobserved individual fixed effects -such as developer ability -the authors find that there is little return to the volume of contributions, but achieving a higher rank in ASF significantly increases”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Hann et al. (2004)
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May combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.
InterpretationcitationReleasing a patch for free is the optimal choice and equilibrium outcome because it generates reciprocal giving and higher future returns.
“Raymond (1999c) maintains that higher future returns are captured when the patch is released for free because it gives rise to reciprocal giving.”
- Also stated in: § 2 The Basic Theory of Voluntary Software Contributions · plain
“Hence, releasing the patch for free is the optimal choice for each developer, and is the equilibrium outcome.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Raymond (1999c)
Not checked in the free run.
- Also stated in: § 2 The Basic Theory of Voluntary Software Contributions · plain
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationnone givenThe main determinants of the supply of open-source software are still unknown.
“In stark contrast to the demand side of the software market, the main determinants of the supply of open source software are still unknown.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Most open-source software developers are volunteers who supply their labour without pay.
- Rests on an assumption: Many developers agree to have their contributions licensed in ways that make it difficult for them to profit directly from the resulting software.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
PremisecitationNon-pecuniary benefits include status from gift-giving, ego-gratification or peer recognition, and ideological satisfaction.
“For example, in Raymond (1999b) the open source community is conceived of as a gift culture in which a developer's status in that community depends on the quality of the software gift that he/she gives to others.”
- Also stated in: § 2 The Basic Theory of Voluntary Software Contributions · plain
“Non-pecuniary benefits can also come in the form of ideological satisfaction for those that believe software should be supplied free of charge or that Microsoft abuses its market position.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Raymond (1999b)
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- Also stated in: § 2 The Basic Theory of Voluntary Software Contributions · plain
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationThe basic theory of optimal open-source contributions identifies three main supply factors: non-pecuniary benefits, expected future monetary returns, and open-source licence type.
“A review of the basic theory of optimal open-source software contributions points to three key factors affecting supply: non-pecuniary benefits, future expected monetary returns, and opensource licence type.”
- Also stated in: § 1 Introduction · plain
“Previous research addressing this puzzle has pointed to non-pecuniary benefits, future monetary rewards and open source license type as the three key factors influencing the individual's decision to voluntarily contribute to open source development (see, e.g., Lerner and Tirole (2002)).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Lerner and Tirole (2002)
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- Also stated in: § 1 Introduction · plain
May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationIt is implausible that distribution costs of open-source participation are zero or negligible; regulatory burden can make releasing a patch costly.
“While it seems plausible that higher non-pecuniary benefits and expected future monetary returns can be captured through choosing to voluntarily contribute, it is somewhat implausible to maintain that there are zero (or negligible) distribution costs to open source participation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Raymond (1999c)
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationreasoningThe proposed dynamic programming model of joint labour supply and open-source contribution decisions can estimate the relative importance of the three factors within one unified framework.
“To fill the gap, I specify a dynamic programming model of joint labour supply and open-source contribution decisions that can provide empirical estimates of relative importance within a single unified framework.”
- Also stated in: § 1 Introduction · plain
“I propose a model of joint labour supply and open-source software contribution decisions that can be used to measure the relative influence of non-pecuniary benefits, future monetary rewards, and open-source licence type in a single model.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Also stated in: § 1 Introduction · plain
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenThere is very little empirical evidence on the relative importance of non-pecuniary benefits, future monetary rewards, and licence type.
“However, there is currently very little empirical evidence on the relative importance of these three supply factors.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningProjects for other developers or commercial environments likely have higher ego-gratification and/or signaling value and less need for a restrictive license.
“These latter projects likely have a higher ego-gratification component and/or signaling value, and less of a need for a restrictive license.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone givenThe model has three work states: jobless, post-secondary education, and full-time work as a software developer.
“The three states in the employment choice set, denoted as K, are unemployment (k = 0), post-secondary schooling (k = 1) and full-time employment as a software developer (k = 2).”
- Also stated in: § 5 Conclusion · plain
“The model allows for three employment states (non-employment, schooling, and employment as a software developer) and three open-source participation states (no participation, participation in a project not licensed under GPL, and participation in a project licensed under GPL).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Also stated in: § 5 Conclusion · plain
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationcitationThe significant effect of license type is consistent with an ideological and/or status/signaling motivation for open-source participation.
“The authors conclude that the significant effect of license type is consistent with an ideological and/or status/signaling motivation to open source participation as hypothesized in the basic theory of voluntary contributions (see also Bonaccorsi and Rossi (2002)).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Fershtman and Gandal (2007)
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- cites Bonaccorsi and Rossi (2002)
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May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationIf network effects and switching costs are considerable, competition is low, the second-best software package may have only a tiny market share, and lost profits from releasing code are negligible.
“On the other hand, as Lerner and Tirole (2005a) point out, if network effects and switching costs are considerable, then there will be little competition, the second-best software package may have only a tiny market share, and the loss in profits due to releasing the code will be negligible.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Lerner and Tirole (2005a)
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May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningEnd-user applications may lack a strong ego-gratification component, so placing the project under a restrictive license may be the only way to substantially increase utility and induce participation.
“Applications of this type may not have a strong ego-gratification component so that placing the project under a restrictive license may be the only way to substantially increase utility and induce participation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningPlacing a project under a restrictive licence such as GPL rather than BSD can satisfy ideological preferences, reduce fear of hijacking, and induce greater developer participation.
“Placing the project under GPL, rather than BSD or some other less restrictive license, can help satisfy ideological preferences, reduce the fear of hijacking, and induce greater participation from the developer community.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationcitationThe comparative weight of non-pecuniary gains, later monetary gains, and licence category can be estimated in this model with standard dynamic programming and structural estimation methods.
“The relative importance of non-pecuniary benefits, future monetary rewards and open source license type can be empirically assessed in this model using the standard techniques of dynamic programming solution and structural estimation (see e.g., Keane and Wolpin (1994), Keane and Wolpin (1997) and Sauer (1998)).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Keane and Wolpin (1994)
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- cites Keane and Wolpin (1997)
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- cites Sauer (1998)
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- The authors state this as an assumption: Utility is linear in consumption and open-source participation status.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Open-source participation is constrained by the arrival of offers, with given probabilities, and at most one offer per period.
- The authors state this as an assumption: The wage function is a standard Mincerian wage function.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationreasoningThe paper puts forward an econometric framework able to gauge the comparative weight of non-pecuniary gains, monetary incentives, and licence category within one model.
“In this section, we propose an econometric framework that can be used to identify the relative importance of non-pecuniary benefits, monetary rewards and open source license type in a single model of forward-looking optimal decision-making.”
- Also stated in: § 5 Conclusion · hedged
“In order to fill the gap in the literature, this paper proposes a dynamic programming model of open-source participation decisions that could provide empirical estimates of the relative importance of non-pecuniary benefits, monetary rewards and licence type within a single model.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Also stated in: § 5 Conclusion · hedged
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationSome large companies have paid for open-source work and hired open-source programmers.
“As a result of these potential benefits, several large firms have been known to directly fund open source projects and offer salaries to open source developers (see Berlecon Research (2002)).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Berlecon Research (2002)
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May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningCurrent developer surveys only reach software developers who participate in open-source projects, so a control group of non-participants is absent.
“It is important to note that current developer surveys have additional drawbacks because they only reach software developers that participate in open source projects.”
- Also stated in: § 3.1 FLOSS-EU · plain
“A control group of software developers that does not participate in open source projects is completely absent.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Also stated in: § 3.1 FLOSS-EU · plain
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe Lerner and Tirole (2005b) study is limited to statistical correlations and cannot account for unobserved project characteristics, making causal effects doubtful.
“Although the Lerner and Tirole (2005a) study yields interesting insights into the determinants of a project license, it is limited in that it remains at the level of establishing statistical correlations.”
- Also stated in: § 3.2 Econometric Studies · hedged
“Data limitations prevent accounting for unobserved project characteristics that could confound the relationship between observed project characteristics and license choice.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Lerner and Tirole (2005b)
Not checked in the free run.
- Also stated in: § 3.2 Econometric Studies · hedged
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningThose who do not take part may have no reason to signal ability to employers.
“Non-participants may not need to signal their productivity to the market for developers.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationreasoningThe form of FLOSS-EU questions and responses makes it difficult to use the data to generalize about key motivations.
“The form of the questions and responses in Table 2 make it difficult to fruitfully use these data for generalizing about key motivations.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningSimilar interpretational problems arise with other recent developer surveys.
“A similar interpretational problem arises with the responses to other developer surveys that have recently been conducted (see, e.g., Boston Consulting Group (2003), Haruvy, Wu and Chakravarty (2003), Lakhani and von Hippel (2003) and Lakhani and Wolf (2005)).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Boston Consulting Group (2003)
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- cites Haruvy, Wu and Chakravarty (2003)
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- cites Lakhani and von Hippel (2003)
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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenTwo error terms suffice to give every work state a positive choice probability, so unemployment returns need not be modelled as random.
“A non-zero choice probability for each of the three employment states can be generated with only two error terms.Therefore, it is not strictly necessary to specify the returns to unemployment to be stochastic.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Utility is linear in consumption and open-source participation status.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Open-source participation is constrained by the arrival of offers, with given probabilities, and at most one offer per period.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe model treats schooling, work, and open-source involvement as decided together and with an eye to the future.
“It is important to note that the model in equations (1)-(7) explicitly recognizes that education, employment and open source participation choices are jointly determined as well as forward-looking.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationVariation in organizational structure and associated distribution costs may be critical parameters in the developer's optimization problem and in an open-source product's market share.
“Thus, variation in organizational structure and associated costs of distribution may be critical parameters in the open source developer's optimization problem, and in the eventual market share of an open source product.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Raymond (1999c)
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). The quote only partly states this claim.
InterpretationreasoningIf lines-of-code contributed does not accurately measure true open-source experience, the coefficient on experience may be biased by measurement error, including attenuation bias.
“Note that if open source experience, measured as lines-of-code contributed, does not accurately measure true experience then there may also be a bias in the coefficient on experience due to measurement error.”
- Also stated in: § 3.2 Econometric Studies · hedged
“That is, attenuation bias is another possibility why low estimated returns to open source experience were obtained.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Also stated in: § 3.2 Econometric Studies · hedged
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe coefficient on ASF rank may partially absorb returns to open-source experience and should not be strictly interpreted as a return to signaling or sorting.
“Therefore, the coefficient on rank may be partially absorbing the returns to open source experience.”
- Also stated in: § 3.2 Econometric Studies · plain
“It should not be strictly interpreted as a return to signaling/sorting.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Also stated in: § 3.2 Econometric Studies · plain
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationreasoningThe model distinguishes parameters tied to present non-pecuniary gains from those tied to later monetary gains.
“Moreover, the model makes it clear which parameters are associated with current non-pecuniary benefits to open source participation, and which parameters are associated with future monetary rewards.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Utility is linear in consumption and open-source participation status.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationnone givenThe model has three open-source involvement states: none, involvement in a project with a non-GPL licence, and involvement in a GPL-only project.
“The three open source project participation states, denoted as L, are specified as no open source project participation (l = 0), participation in a project licensed under BSD or other licenses less restrictive than GPL (l = 1), and participation in a project in which all licenses are GPL (l = 2).”
- Also stated in: § 5 Conclusion · plain
“The model allows for three employment states (non-employment, schooling, and employment as a software developer) and three open-source participation states (no participation, participation in a project not licensed under GPL, and participation in a project licensed under GPL).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Also stated in: § 5 Conclusion · plain
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationreasoningWithin the model, each period a developer selects both a work state and an open-source involvement state, subject to receiving job and project offers.
“Because the developer chooses both an employment state k and a project participation state l in each time period t, the dimension of the choice set in each period is K * L. However, the choice set is constrained by the receipt of job offers and open source project offers to be specified below.”
- Also stated in: § 5 Conclusion · plain
“In the model, developers choose an employment state and a project participation state in each period but are constrained by the arrival of employment and project participation offers.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Also stated in: § 5 Conclusion · plain
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationreasoningIt is not obvious how to map FLOSS-EU responses into metrics that disentangle the relative importance of non-pecuniary benefits, future monetary rewards, and licence type.
“However, it is not obvious how one could map these responses into metrics that would enable a researcher to disentangle the relative importance of non-pecuniary benefits, future monetary rewards and open source license type.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationreasoningThe model spells out how licence category affects the choice to join an open-source project.
“In addition, the influence of open source license type in the decision to participate in an open source project is made explicit.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Utility is linear in consumption and open-source participation status.
The paper relies on this without support.
Most open-source software developers are volunteers who supply their labour without pay.
“The central puzzle is that most open source software developers are volunteers that supply their labor for free”
The paper relies on this without support.
Many developers agree to have their contributions licensed in ways that make it difficult for them to profit directly from the resulting software.
“and many developers agree to have their contributions licensed in such a way that it is difficult for them to directly profit from the resulting software product.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
In the patch example, the developer originally wrote the patch for personal use of the program.
“Assume that the developer was originally motivated to write the patch for his own personal use of the program.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
In the patch example, there is very high uncertainty about the patch's value to other developers or consumers, so no positive price exists at which others would buy it.
“In addition, assume that there is a very high degree of uncertainty regarding the value of the patch to other software developers/consumers so that there is no non-zero price at which others are willing to buy it.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Distribution costs are zero.
“(assuming zero costs of distribution)”
The authors state this as an assumption.
There are differential expected future returns between keeping the patch private and releasing it for free.
“can be broken by assuming that there are differential expected future returns between the two options.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
In the firm example, the internally developed software is an intermediate good in the firm's production process.
“suppose the internally developed software is an intermediate good in the firm's production process, e.g., an accounting package.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The initial development costs for the firm's code are sunk.
“The initial development costs are sunk.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Utility is linear in consumption and open-source participation status.
“For simplicity, U it in (2) is assumed to be a linear function of consumption and open source participation status”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Open-source participation is constrained by the arrival of offers, with given probabilities, and at most one offer per period.
“It is assumed that only one open source project offer, if any, arrives in each period t.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Each period's consumption must satisfy a budget constraint.
“Consumption in each period t is determined by a budget constraint that is assumed to be satisfied in each period”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Accumulated open-source experience increases by one year regardless of licence type.
“Accumulated open source experience is augmented by one year regardless of open source project license type.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The wage function is a standard Mincerian wage function.
“Assuming a standard Mincerian wage function, w it can be written as,”
The authors state this as an assumption.
A wage offer can only arrive after a job offer.
“An additional constraint imposed on the maximization problem is that a developer must receive a job offer prior to receiving a wage offer determined by (7).”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The productivity shock is i.i.d. and serially uncorrelated.
“ε i2t is a productivity shock assumed to be i.i.d. and serially uncorrelated.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Open-source participation carries the same cost under every licence.
“The parameter c is the consumption cost of open source project participation which is restricted to be the same regardless of open source license type.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Open-source project arrival rates reflect prior licensing decisions by project initiators and are taken as given by the individual developer.
“The open source project arrival rates reflect prior licensing decisions by project initiators and are taken as given by the individual developer.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The developer maximizes expected present discounted value of remaining lifetime utility.
“The objective of the software developer is to choose an employment and project participation state in each time t to maximize the expected present discounted value of remaining lifetime utility.”
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
License-choice study attributed to two different papers
MinorThe discussion identifies Lerner and Tirole (2005b) as the study of license-choice determinants, then calls the same study Lerner and Tirole (2005a).
“Lerner and Tirole (2005b) examine the determinants of license choice using the SourceForge database”
“Although the Lerner and Tirole (2005a) study yields interesting insights into the determinants of a project license”
Wrong equation cited for the omitted base type
MinorThe base-type dummy A 0i is omitted from the equation defining α i, which is numbered (6). Equation (5) instead gives the laws of motion for experience.
“As the base type, A 0i is excluded from (5).”
“α i = θ 1 A 1i + θ 2 A 2i(6)”
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Raymond, E. S. (1998) · Knowledge, technology & policy/Knowledge in society/Knowledge, technology, & policy · doi:10.1007/s12130-999-1026-0 · Cited by 3,083 · see citing works
Some Simple Economics of Open Source
Lerner, J., & Tirole, J. (2002) · The Journal of Industrial Economics · doi:10.1111/1467-6451.00174 · Cited by 2,355 · cited 1× · see citing works
“This labour-market signalling function of voluntary contributions is the central notion in the work of Lerner and Tirole (2002).”
BackgroundThe cathedral and the bazaar: musings on Linux and open source by an accidental revolutionary
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How open source software works: “free” user-to-user assistance
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Lakhani, K. R., & Wolf, R. G. (2003) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.443040 · Cited by 1,531 · see citing works
Lakhani, K. R., & Wolf, R. G. (2005) · Perspectives on Free and Open Source Software · doi:10.7551/mitpress/5326.003.0005 · Cited by 1,530 · see citing works
The Career Decisions of Young Men
Keane, M. P., & Wolpin, K. I. (1997) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/262080 · Cited by 1,420 · see citing works
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“For example, if there is a high degree of competition in the industry then the costs of releasing the code may be large (see von Hippel, 2002; Harhoff et al ., 2003; Henkel, 2005; Maurer and Scotchmer, 2005).”
Bonaccorsi, A. J., & Rossi, C. (2003) · CINECA IRIS Institutial research information system (University of Pisa) · doi:10.1016/s0048-7333(03)00051-9 · Cited by 691 · cited 1× · see citing works
“A better understanding of the determinants of open-source software supply is becoming”
BackgroundKeane, M. P., & Wolpin, K. I. (1994) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.2307/2109768 · Cited by 460 · cited 1× · see citing works
“The relative importance of non-pecuniary benefits, future monetary rewards, and open-source licence type can be empirically assessed in this model using the standard techniques of dynamic programming solution and structural estimation (see, for example, Keane and Wolpin, 1994,”
MethodThe Scope of Open Source Licensing
Lerner, J., & Jean Tirole, Z. (2002) · The Journal of Law Economics and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/ewi002 · Cited by 433 · see citing works
The Economics of Technology Sharing: Open Source and Beyond
Lerner, J., & Jean Tirole, Z. (2005) · The Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/0895330054048678 · Cited by 393 · see citing works
Raymond, E. S. (1998) · First Monday · doi:10.5210/fm.v3i10.621 · Cited by 290 · see citing works
Open Source Software: Private Provision of a Public Good
Johnson, J. P. (2002) · Journal of Economics & Management Strategy · doi:10.1111/j.1430-9134.2002.00637.x · Cited by 248 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Along these lines, Johnson (2002) models a developer’s decision to invest effort in developing code that will become a public good, and formally illustrates the effect of a changing contributor population size. open-source open-source participation, and in Raymond (1999 c ) it is on reciprocal…”
Raymond, E. S. (1999) · Cited by 103 · see citing works
Open Source Software: The New Intellectual Property Paradigm
Maurer, S., & Scotchmer, S. (2006) · NBER Working Paper No. 12148 · doi:10.3386/w12148 · Cited by 81 · see citing works
Open source software: Motivation and restrictive licensing
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“This latter question of how licence type affects open-source supply decisions is directly addressed in a paper by Fershtman and Gandal (2007). Also using the SourceForge database, the authors construct a panel of 71 open-source projects observed nine times over an 18-month period (once every 2 months).”
MethodJob Mobility and the Market for Lawyers
Sauer, R. M. (1998) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250005 · Cited by 66 · see citing works
Self-citationTHE JUKEBOX MODE OF INNOVATION - A MODEL OF COMMERCIAL OPEN SOURCE DEVELOPMENTPreprint
Henkel, J. (2004) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 32 · see citing works
Open Source Projects as Horizontal Innovation Networks - By and for usersPreprint
von Hippel, E. (2003) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 28 · see citing works
Haruvy, E. E., Wu, F., & Chakravarty, S. (2005) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 15 · see citing works
Flagged first, then by citations
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Multimodal machine learning in precision health: A scoping review
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Research and Technology Commercialization
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A Comprehensive Review and Synthesis of Open Source Research
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The attraction of contributors in free and open source software projects
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Emerging Hackerspaces – Peer-Production Generation
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Intellectual property: the assessment
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Software als Institution und ihre Gestaltbarkeit
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“Beiträge gesteuert wird anstatt durch monetäre Anreize [30].”
BackgroundInfluentialA comparative analysis of open source business intelligence platforms
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Competition Between Open Source and Proprietary Software: Strategies for Survival
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Hierarchy, Laboratory and Collective: Unveiling Linux as Innovation, Machination and Constitution
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“We suggest that economic analyses of open source (Kollock, 1999; Lerner and Tirole, 2000; Lerner and Tirole, 2004; Meyer and Montagne, 2007; Sauer, 2007) that take for granted the latter formative context have missed a profound difference and have so far failed to deliver a convincing explanation…”
BackgroundDecoding Authorship: Is There Really no Place for an Algorithmic Author Under Copyright Law?
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'Letting go of Control' to Embrace Open Source: Implications for Company and Community
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“It is recognized that TCO is not necessarily lower for open source, and in any case is not easy to measure [42, 43].”
BackgroundAcademic software downloads from Google Code: useful usage indicators?
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Determinants of Open Source Software License Choice: A Social Influence Perspective
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“…recognition from other contributors, communities, enterprises and other groups, as well as their own reputation, technical influence and other non-economic benefits, and can also obtain economic benefits from selling supporting software and hardware products separately (Sauer 2007; Wu et al. 2017).”
Attractiveness Of Free And Open Source Software Projects
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Society 5.0 and the future of work skills for software engineers and developers
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“…resolution, leadership, teamwork, communication, empathy, independence, creativity, multi-tasking, work ethic (Calitz, Greyling, & Cullen, 2010; Gallivan, Truex, & Kvasny, 2004; Groeneveld, Vennekens, & Aerts, 2019; Klotz, 2004; Lee, 2010; Lepak et al., 2007; Sauer, 2007; Strobbe et al., 2004)”
InfluentialIs there a wage premium for volunteer OSS engagement? – signalling, learning and noise
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“3 Cf. the critics of missing counterfactuals in OSS studies by Sauer (2007). therefore, be correlated with the error term.”
BackgroundOpen Source as the Foundation of Safety and Security in Logistics Digital Transformation
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“Disadvantages also exist, including the exposure of security vulnerabilities and the risk that the project will become fragmented ( Hoepman & Jacobs, 2007 ; Sauer, 2007 ; Sturmer, 2005 ).”
BackgroundSoftware als Institution und ihre Gestaltbarkeit Carsten Orwat · Oliver Raabe
Buchmann, E., Anandasivam, A., Freytag, J.-C., Helberger, N., Ishii, K., Lutterbeck, B., Neumann, D., Otter, T., Pallas, F., Reussner, R., et al. (2010)
The Economics of Collaborative Production and Consumption with Applications in Digital Technologies
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A Novel Web Publishing System Architecture for Statistics Data Using Open Source Technology
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(2016) · Innovation, technology, and education for growth · doi:10.1108/978-1-78635-742-720161009
- Authors
- Sauer, R. M.
- Affiliations
- University of Southampton (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Sauer, R. M.
- Venue
- Oxford Review of Economic Policy
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2007-12-01
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 605-619
- ISSN
- 0266-903X (ISSN-L)
- 1460-2121
- OpenAlex
- W2115478646
- Semantic Scholar
- cd537940a601ea37b3b97e67f5e985d9ab276490
- Cited by
- 25
- References
- 22
- Citations by year
- 2025: 2 · 2022: 3 · 2018: 1 · 2017: 1 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 1 · 2014: 1 · 2012: 2
- FWCI
- 8.11
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- docs.iza.org
- Licence
- public-domain
- Locations
- Oxford Review of Economic Policy (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion, public-domain)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Econstor (Econstor) (submittedVersion)
- ePrints Soton (University of Southampton) (submittedVersion)
- HighWire Press Open Archive (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Science Applications › Open Source Software Innovations
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Digital Platforms and Economics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Software Engineering Techniques and Practices
- Keywords
- open source software, non-monetary benefits, monetary rewards, developer engagement, labor supply, dynamic programming model
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-09.
Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-09.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
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