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Public Opinion and Cyberterrorism

Open access
Shandler, Ryan, Kostyuk, Nadiya, Oppenheimer, Harry · 2023 · Public Opinion Quarterly

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 63 of the 63 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 9 of the 49 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Abstract

Research into cyber-conflict, public opinion, and international security is burgeoning, yet the field suffers from an absence of conceptual agreement about key terms. For instance, every time a cyberattack takes place, a public debate erupts as to whether it constitutes cyberterrorism. This debate bears significant consequences, seeing as the ascription of a “terrorism” label enables the application of heavy-handed counterterrorism powers and heightens the level of perceived threat among the public. In light of widespread conceptual disagreement in cyberspace, we assert that public opinion plays a heightened role in understanding the nature of cyber threats. We construct a typological framework to illuminate the attributes that drive the public classification of an attack as cyberterrorism, which we test through a ratings-based conjoint experiment in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel (N = 21,238 observations). We find that the public (1) refrains from labeling attacks by unknown actors or hacker collectives as cyberterrorism; and (2) classifies attacks that disseminate sensitive data as terrorism to a greater extent even than physically explosive attacks. Importantly, the uniform public perspectives across the three countries challenge a foundational tenet of public opinion and international relations scholarship that divided views among elites on foreign policy matters will be reflected by a divided public. This study concludes by providing a definitive conceptual baseline to support future research on the topic.

Overview

CoChat Summary

## TL;DR

This paper uses a ratings-based conjoint experiment with 3,036 respondents in the United States, United Kingdom, and Israel to identify which cyberattack attributes make people classify an incident as cyberterrorism. The strongest patterns are that unknown actors and hacker collectives are less likely to be labeled cyberterrorism, while attacks that steal and disseminate sensitive data are seen as especially serious and are labeled cyberterrorism at high rates.

## Key findings

  • Across the full sample, an attack described as by an individual hacker was 7.3 percentage points less likely to be classified as cyberterrorism than the baseline (foreign country), and an unaffiliated hacker group was 4.1 percentage points less likely.
  • An unknown actor reduced the likelihood of a cyberterrorism label by 8.7 percentage points; an unknown motivation reduced it by 3.1 percentage points.
  • Compared with no damage, attacks causing minor physical destruction increased cyberterrorism classification by 3.5 percentage points, and major physical destruction by 5.4 percentage points; attacks involving theft/dissemination of sensitive data increased it by 9.0 percentage points, more than major physical destruction.
  • A generic “attack” description lowered cyberterrorism classification by 12.7 percentage points relative to a “cyberattack” description, and the paper reports that there was conspicuously little difference between specific cyber methods such as phishing, malware, virus, and infected USB key.

## Methods

  • The study uses a ratings-based conjoint experiment in which respondents classified randomly generated cyberattack scenarios as cyberterrorism or not; each scenario varied along five attributes: agent, method, motivation, outcome, and target.
  • Sample: 3,036 respondents who completed all conjoint questions and passed reCAPTCHA, drawn on 26 August 2020 from the United States (N = 1,077), United Kingdom (N = 1,042), and Israel (N = 1,123); the analysis includes 21,238 observations.
  • Main analysis: estimation of average marginal component effects (AMCEs) with standard errors clustered by respondent; cross-country differences were additionally examined using conditional marginal means.

## Limitations

  • The paper itself notes limited generalizability because the empirical sample focuses heavily on Western, democratic, and technologically advanced countries; the authors say to be wary of overbroad generalizations.
  • The text also makes evident that the study is based on survey vignettes/reported scenarios, not real-world incident behavior, and the authors are agnostic about whether media coverage accurately depicts objective facts; that is an evidence limitation from the design.
  • Not stated in the paper.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1093/poq/nfad006

Cites

63 of 63 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Figures

Figure 1. An example conjoint scenario.
Figure 1. An example conjoint scenario.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 2. Effects of incident attributes on probability of being classified as cyberterrorism. This plot depicts estimates of the effects of each randomly assigned attribute values on the probability of a scenario being classified as cyberterrorism. Estimates are based on the AMCE model with respondent-clustered standard errors. Bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals. This plot reveals a pooled estimate for the full multicountry sample (N = 21,238 observations from 3,036 unique respondents).
Figure 2. Effects of incident attributes on probability of being classified as cyberterrorism. This plot depicts estimates of the effects of each randomly assigned attribute values on the probability of a scenario being classified as cyberterrorism. Estimates are based on the AMCE model with respondent-clustered standard errors. Bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals. This plot reveals a pooled estimate for the full multicountry sample (N = 21,238 observations from 3,036 unique respondents).CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 3. Effects of incident attributes on probability of being classified as cyberterrorism—by country. This plot depicts estimates of the effects of each randomly assigned attribute value on the probability of a scenario being classified as cyberterrorism. Estimates are based on the AMCE model with clustered standard errors. Bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals. This plot exhibits a pooled estimate for each country sample (N = 7,084 observations from 1,012 respondents in the United States; 7,070 observations from 1,010 respondents in the United Kingdom; and 7,098 observations from 1,014 respondents in Israel).
Figure 3. Effects of incident attributes on probability of being classified as cyberterrorism—by country. This plot depicts estimates of the effects of each randomly assigned attribute value on the probability of a scenario being classified as cyberterrorism. Estimates are based on the AMCE model with clustered standard errors. Bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals. This plot exhibits a pooled estimate for each country sample (N = 7,084 observations from 1,012 respondents in the United States; 7,070 observations from 1,010 respondents in the United Kingdom; and 7,098 observations from 1,014 respondents in Israel).CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 4. Marginal means differences by country. This figure contains a plot of the difference in marginal mean levels cyberterrorism attribution by treatment category with 95 percent confidence intervals. The country that appears first in the title is the reference condition, against which the country listed second is compared. For example, attributing the motivation of an attack to revenge has a more positive effect on attribution for American respondents than Israeli or British respondents. IL: Israel; UK: United Kingdom; US: United States.
Figure 4. Marginal means differences by country. This figure contains a plot of the difference in marginal mean levels cyberterrorism attribution by treatment category with 95 percent confidence intervals. The country that appears first in the title is the reference condition, against which the country listed second is compared. For example, attributing the motivation of an attack to revenge has a more positive effect on attribution for American respondents than Israeli or British respondents. IL: Israel; UK: United Kingdom; US: United States.CC BY · PubMed Central

Verification

Claims the paper makes

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Citations

Cites

Show all 63 references

Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. Hoffman, 2006, Inside Terrorism
  2. Zeri, 2017, Framing Cyberterrorism: A Content Analysis of the New York Times, Journal of Media and Information Warfare, 9, 179

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Shandler, R., Kostyuk, N., & Oppenheimer, H.
Affiliations
  • University of Oxford (GB)
  • Georgia Institute of Technology (US)
  • Harvard University (US)
Corresponding author
Shandler, Ryan
Venue
Public Opinion Quarterly
Published
2023-02-01
Volume
87
Issue
1
Pages
92-119
ISSN
  • 0033-362X (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-5331
OpenAlex
W4362591733
Cited by
14
References
60
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 2
FWCI
12.72
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Public Opinion Quarterly (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Funders
  • Georgia Institute of Technology
  • University of Haifa
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
Keywords
cyberterrorism, public opinion, cyberattacks, typological framework, data leakage, threat perception, international security, cyber conflict

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Public Opinion and Cyberterrorism. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/poq/nfad006
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Shandler, R., Kostyuk, N., & Oppenheimer, H. (2023). Public Opinion and Cyberterrorism. Public Opinion Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfad006

Data sources

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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