Understanding Artificial Agency
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 75 of the 75 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Which artificial intelligence (AI) systems are agents? To answer this question, I propose a multidimensional account of agency. According to this account, a system's agency profile is jointly determined by its level of goal-directedness and autonomy as well as is abilities for directly impacting the surrounding world, long-term planning and acting for reasons. Rooted in extant theories of agency, this account enables fine-grained, nuanced comparative characterizations of artificial agency. I show that this account has multiple important virtues and is more informative than alternatives. More speculatively, it may help to illuminate two important emerging questions in AI ethics: 1. Can agency contribute to the moral status of non-human beings, and how? 2. When and why might AI systems exhibit power-seeking behaviour and does this pose an existential risk to humanity?
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“Formulating an agency indicator is challenging because accounts of agency vary widely [65].”
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Floridi, L. (2025) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-025-00858-9 · Cited by 154
“For example, (Dung, 2024) proposes a five-dimensional framework for understanding Artificial Agency encompassing goal-directedness, autonomy, efficacy, planning, and intentionality.”
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Influential
Metadata
- Authors
- Dung, L.
- Affiliations
- Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg (DE)
- Corresponding author
- Dung, Leonard
- ORCID
- Dung, Leonard
- Venue
- The Philosophical Quarterly
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2024-02-05
- Volume
- 75
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 450-472
- ISSN
- 0031-8094 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9213
- OpenAlex
- W4391592270
- Cited by
- 69
- References
- 75
- Citations by year
- 2026: 45 · 2025: 20 · 2024: 4
- FWCI
- 28.73
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- philarchive.org
- Licence
- Locations
- The Philosophical Quarterly (publishedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- BMBF (033KI216)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
- Social Sciences › Law › Literary and Philosophical Studies
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Cybernetics and Technology in Society
- Keywords
- artificial agency, goal-directed behavior, autonomy, long-term planning, AI ethics, existential risk, artificial intelligence
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