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The Russellian Monist's Problems with Mental Causation

Howell, Robert · 2015 · The Philosophical Quarterly
Cited by 50

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Russellian Monism, the view that phenomenal or protophenomenal properties serve as the categorical grounds of physical dispositions, has increasingly been thought to enjoy an advantage over traditional property dualism in that it avoids epiphenomenalism. This paper argues otherwise. Russellian Monism faces problems with mental causation that parallel those of traditional dualism. The best it can hope for is that phenomenal properties are causally relevant, but not in virtue of their phenomenality.

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Metadata

Authors
Howell, R.
Venue
The Philosophical Quarterly
Published
2014-09-29
Volume
65
Issue
258
Pages
22-39
ISSN
  • 0031-8094 (ISSN-L)
  • 1467-9213
OpenAlex
W2024103495
Cited by
50
References
3
FWCI
1.77
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Russellian Monist's Problems with Mental Causation. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/pq/pqu058
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Howell, R. (2015). The Russellian Monist's Problems with Mental Causation. The Philosophical Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqu058

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