The Russellian Monist's Problems with Mental Causation
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Russellian Monism, the view that phenomenal or protophenomenal properties serve as the categorical grounds of physical dispositions, has increasingly been thought to enjoy an advantage over traditional property dualism in that it avoids epiphenomenalism. This paper argues otherwise. Russellian Monism faces problems with mental causation that parallel those of traditional dualism. The best it can hope for is that phenomenal properties are causally relevant, but not in virtue of their phenomenality.
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Citations
Cites
Kripke, S. A. (1972) · Semantics of Natural Language · doi:10.1007/978-94-010-2557-7_9 · Cited by 7,028
Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism
Chalmers, D. J. (2016) · Panpsychism · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199359943.003.0002 · Cited by 432
Rosenberg, G. H. (2004) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195168143.001.0001 · Cited by 122
Cited by
(2017) · Cited by 436
Sentience and the Origins of Consciousness: From Cartesian Duality to Markovian Monism
Friston, K. J., Wiese, W., & Hobson, J. A. (2020) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e22050516 · Cited by 186
“The only causal interaction in question involves neutral entities (however, the problem of mental causation may reappear, in the sense that macro-level mental properties may still be causally irrelevant, see [102], pp.”
BackgroundDid the universe design itself?
Goff, P. (2019) · International Journal for Philosophy of Religion · doi:10.1007/s11153-018-9692-z · Cited by 62
“But they disagree concerning the positive nature of the basic 7 Howell (2015) argues that Russellian monism cannot avoid causal exclusion worries.”
BackgroundPanpsychism and Russellian Monism
Alter, T., & Coleman, S. (2019) · The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism · doi:10.4324/9781315717708-20 · Cited by 27
Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness
Mørch, H. H. (2024) · doi:10.1017/9781009317344 · Cited by 18
Metadata
- Authors
- Howell, R.
- Venue
- The Philosophical Quarterly
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2014-09-29
- Volume
- 65
- Issue
- 258
- Pages
- 22-39
- ISSN
- 0031-8094 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9213
- OpenAlex
- W2024103495
- Cited by
- 50
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 1.77
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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