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A Place for Consciousness
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IIT is actually a version of panpsychism known as panexperientialism.
“IIT is actually a version of panpsychism known as panexperientialism [38–40].”
From The Problem with Phi: A Critique of Integrated Information Theory (2015) · cites this paper as [39]
Rosenberg deals with mental causation by allowing high-level individuals to exert a small amount of downward causation through interaction with the underlying entities.
“Rosenberg is an exception: he deals with mental causation by allowing high-level individuals to exert a small amount of downward causation through interaction with the underlying entities.”
From The Combination Problem for Panpsychism (2016) · cites this paper as Gregg Rosenberg (2004)
Many solutions to the combination problem that have been put forward turn out on close examination to be forms of emergent panpsychism.
“Many solutions to the combination problem that have been put forward turn out on close examination to be forms of emergent panpsychism.”
From The Combination Problem for Panpsychism (2016) · cites this paper as Gregg Rosenberg (2004)
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Metadata
- Authors
- Rosenberg, G. H.
- Corresponding author
- Rosenberg, Gregg H.
- Venue
- Oxford University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2004-12-09
- OpenAlex
- W2489326830
- Cited by
- 122
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 22 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 8 · 2016: 9 · 2015: 4 · 2014: 5 · 2013: 3 · 2012: 2
- FWCI
- 7.05
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Oxford University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Keywords
- consciousness, philosophy of mind, nature of consciousness
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