On What it Takes to be an Expert
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper tackles the problem of defining what a cognitive expert is. Starting from a shared intuition that the definition of an expert depends upon the conceptual function of expertise, I shed light on two main approaches to the notion of an expert: according to novice-oriented accounts of expertise, experts need to provide laypeople with information they lack in some domain; whereas, according to research-oriented accounts, experts need to contribute to the epistemic progress of their discipline. In this paper, I defend the thesis that cognitive experts should be identified by their ability to perform the latter function rather than the former, as novice-oriented accounts, unlike research-oriented ones, fail to comply with the rules of a functionalist approach to expertise.
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Citations
Cites
Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?
GOLDMAN, A. I. (2001) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00093.x · Cited by 911
Baehr, J. (2011) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604074.001.0001 · Cited by 618
Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief
Zagzebski, L. T. (2012) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199936472.001.0001 · Cited by 489
Elgin, C. (2007) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-006-9054-z · Cited by 309
What to believe now: applying epistemology to contemporary issues
(2012) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.50-1383 · Cited by 274
EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY, PREEMPTIVE REASONS, AND UNDERSTANDING
Jäger, C. (2016) · Episteme · doi:10.1017/epi.2015.38 · Cited by 144
Goldman, A. I. (2018) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-016-9410-3 · Cited by 107
Cited by
Ferrario, A., Facchini, A., & Termine, A. (2024) · Minds and Machines · doi:10.1007/s11023-024-09681-1 · Cited by 64
“The list is not exhaustive; for instance, firmness is also mentioned in the literature (Croce, 2018, 2019a).”
InfluentialFor A Service Conception of Epistemic Authority: A Collective Approach
Croce, M. (2019) · Social Epistemology · doi:10.1080/02691728.2019.1577511 · Cited by 27
“…belief or testimony, and further work on how to disentangle cases of disagreement between experts and laypeople as well as between expert peers (see, e.g., Coady 2012; Constantin and Grundmann 2018; Croce 2018a, 2019; Dormandy 2018; Goldman 2001, 2018; Jäger 2016; Lackey 2018; Zagzebski 2012).”
BackgroundSelf-citationLange, B. (2026) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-01377-4_9 · Cited by 12
AI and the Philosophy of Expertise and Epistemic Authority
Hauswald, R. (2025) · A Companion to Applied Philosophy of AI · doi:10.1002/9781394238651.ch5 · Cited by 5
Metadata
- Authors
- Croce, M.
- Venue
- The Philosophical Quarterly
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2018-10-10
- Volume
- 69
- Issue
- 274
- Pages
- 1-21
- ISSN
- 0031-8094 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9213
- OpenAlex
- W2896820298
- Cited by
- 62
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 17.60
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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