The DOI matches its Crossref record; 53 of the 53 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Self-Enforcing Democracy
Open accessAbstract
If democracy is to have the good effects said to justify it, it must be self-enforcing in that incumbents choose to hold regular, competitive elections and comply with the results. I consider models of electoral accountability that allow rulers a choice of whether to hold elections and citizens whether to rebel. When individuals observe diverse signals of government performance, coordination to pose a credible threat of protest if the ruler “shirks” is problematic. The convention of an electoral calendar and known rules can provide a public signal for coordinating rebellion if elections are suspended or blatantly rigged, while the elections themselves aggregate private observations of performance. Two threats to this solution to political moral hazard are considered. First, a ruling faction that controls the army may prefer to fight after losing an election, and ex post transfers may not be credible. A party system in which today's losers may win in the future can restore self-enforcing democracy, though at the cost of weaker electoral control. Second, subtle electoral fraud can undermine the threat of coordinated opposition that maintains elections. I show that when there are organizations in society that can observe and announce a signal of the extent of popular discontent, the incumbent may prefer to commit to fair elections over an “accountable autocratic” equilibrium in which public goods are provided but costly rebellions periodically occur.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
An Economic Theory of Democracy.
Banfield, E. C., & Downs, A. (1958) · Midwest Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2109186 · Cited by 18,594
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy
Fukuyama, F., & Schumpeter, J. A. (1997) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20048211 · Cited by 15,264
Making democracy work: civic traditions in modern Italy
(1993) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.30-6408 · Cited by 14,307
The third wave: democratization in the late twentieth century
(1992) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.29-4135 · Cited by 7,983
Schelling, T. C. (1960) · Cited by 7,672
Threshold models of collective behavior
Granovetter, M. (1978) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/226707 · Cited by 6,072
North, D. C., & Weingast, B. R. (1989) · The Journal of Economic History · doi:10.1017/s0022050700009451 · Cited by 5,300
Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy
Bucovetsky, S., Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (2002) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1061733 · Cited by 3,748
Locke, J. (2007) · Versions of Blackness · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511840890.028 · Cited by 2,911
On the Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
Moore, B. (1984) · Critique and Anti-Critique · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-86027-2_4 · Cited by 2,694
Cited by
The Politics of Authoritarian Rule
Svolik, M. W. (2012) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139176040 · Cited by 2,611
Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government
Przeworski, A. (2010) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511778490 · Cited by 638
Przeworski, A. (2019) · doi:10.1017/9781108671019 · Cited by 599
Electoral Accountability: Recent Theoretical and Empirical Work
Ashworth, S. (2012) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-031710-103823 · Cited by 535
Gehlbach, S., & Keefer, P. (2011) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2011.04.002 · Cited by 429
Metadata
- Authors
- Fearon, J. D.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2011-11-01
- Volume
- 126
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1661-1708
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2153680987
- Cited by
- 504
- References
- 53
- FWCI
- 66.44
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Self-Enforcing Democracy. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/qje/qjr038
- The paper
- Fearon, J. D. (2011). Self-Enforcing Democracy. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjr038
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.