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Cited by 631

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Transparency and Deliberation Within the FOMC: A Computational Linguistics Approach*

Open access
Hansen, Stephen, McMahon, Michael, Prat, Andrea·2018·The Quarterly Journal of Economics
DOI 10.1093/qje/qjx045
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Abstract

How does transparency, a key feature of central bank design, affect monetary policy makers’ deliberations? Theory predicts a positive discipline effect and negative conformity effect. We empirically explore these effects using a natural experiment in the Federal Open Market Committee in 1993 and computational linguistics algorithms. We first find large changes in communication patterns after transparency. We then propose a difference-in-differences approach inspired by the career concerns literature, and find evidence for both effects. Finally, we construct an influence measure that suggests the discipline effect dominates.

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Citations

Cites

Show all 8 references

Research works printed but not linked: 50

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Cited by

Metadata

Authors
Hansen, S., McMahon, M., & Prat, A.
Venue
The Quarterly Journal of Economics
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Published
2017-10-31
Volume
133
Issue
2
Pages
801-870
ISSN
  • 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
  • 1531-4650
DOI
10.1093/qje/qjx045
OpenAlex
W1582026748
Cited by
631
References
8
FWCI
91.66
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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