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Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change*
Abstract
This article presents a model of information manipulation and political regime change. There is a regime that can be overthrown but only if enough citizens participate in an uprising. Citizens are imperfectly informed about the regime's ability to resist an uprising and the regime can engage in propaganda that, taken at face-value, makes the regime seem stronger than it truly is. This coordination game with endogenous information manipulation has a unique equilibrium and the article gives a complete analytic characterization of the equilibrium's comparative statics. Holding fixed the number of signals available to citizens, if the per-unit signal precision is sufficiently high then the regime is harder to overthrow. In contrast, if the number of signals increases, so that both total signal precision and the regime's costs of manipulation rise together, then the regime is easier to overthrow unless there are strong economies of scale in information control.
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“While some theoretical work suggests that the internet may impede non-democratic rule (Edmond, 2013), empirical research provides tentative support for cyber-pessimists who claim that the internet plays into the hands of autocrats (Rød & Weidmann, 2015).”
From How Dictators Control the Internet: A Review Essay (2020) · cites this paper as Edmond, 2013
Citations
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Hager, A., Hensel, L., Hermle, J., & Roth, C. (2020) · Social Science Research Network · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3468019 · Cited by 5
Stability of revolutionary governments in the face of mass protest
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Should I Stay or should I Go? Bandwagons in the lab
Heggedal, T.-R., Helland, L., & Joslin, K.-E. N. (2018) · Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2018.03.019 · Cited by 5
“Examples include bank runs (Garratt and Keister, 2009; Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005); speculative currency attacks (Morris and Shin, 1998); setting of industry standards (Farrell and Saloner, 1985; Farrell and Klemperer, 2007); technology adoption (Katz and Shapiro, 1985, 1986); political revolts (Edmond, 2013; Egorov…”
BackgroundBeyond Coercion: The New Politics of Conflict Processing in China
Liu, C.-R. (2017) · Chinese Political Science Review · doi:10.1007/s41111-017-0060-4 · Cited by 5
The power of whispers: : A theory of rumor, communication, and revolution
Chen, H., Lu, Y. K., & Suen, W. (2016) · International Economic Review · doi:10.1111/iere.12149 · Cited by 5
“The parameter s can be interpreted as the “sentiment” of the public, which captures their perception of what uninformative messages would sound like.8 For example, if 7We abstract from free-riding issues, which have been carefully addressed by Edmond (2011) and Bernhardt and Shadmehr (2011).”
Huang, H.-F. (2015) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2325101 · Cited by 5
Cognitive Imprecision and Strategic Behavior
Frydman, C., & Nunnari, S. (2021) · Social Science Research Network · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3939522 · Cited by 5
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Chen, J.-D., & Xu, Y. (2017) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2487437 · Cited by 5
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Hu, Q., & Pu, Y.-P. (2023) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0286985 · Cited by 4
“Many studies have shown that the regime may be overthrown due to a lack of trust [1, 2], political trust is closely related to the legitimacy of the regime and political stability, and is regarded as an important feature of democracy [3–6], therefore, maintaining political trust has always been one of the primary task…”
BackgroundHot topics: Denial-of-Service attacks on news websites in autocracies
Lutscher, P. (2021) · Political Science Research and Methods · doi:10.1017/psrm.2021.68 · Cited by 18
“Theoretical models expect the use of censorship and other means of information control during contentious periods (Edmond, 2013; Gehlbach and Sonin, 2014).”
Artificial Intelligence, Surveillance, and Big Data
Karpa, D., Klarl, T., & Rochlitz, M. (2021) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2111.00992 · Cited by 4
“As a result of censorship, media control and the absence or manipulation of elections, the regime does not know the true sentiments of its citizens (Edmond 2013; Egorov and Sonin 2020; Xu 2021).”
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Jann, O., & Schottmüller, C. (2021) · Games Econ. Behav. · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2021.05.008 · Cited by 4
Sanctions and incentives to repudiate external debt
de Bassa, C., Grillo, E., & Passarelli, F. (2021) · doi:10.1177/0951629820984851 · Cited by 4
“Second, we model the survival probability of the ruling regime through a global game (Atkeson, 2000; Edmond, 2013; Morris and Shin, 2001).”
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Simons, G. (2021) · Journal of International Analytics · doi:10.46272/2587-8476-2020-11-4-72-90 · Cited by 4
Alonso, R., & Zachariadis, K. (2021) · Journal of Economics Theory · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3781499 · Cited by 4
Political Use of Twitter in Post-Gezi Environmental Protests
Doğu, B. (2019) · Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication · doi:10.1163/18739865-01202007 · Cited by 4
Overcoming inefficient lock-in in coordination games with sophisticated and myopic players
Masiliūnas, A. (2019) · Mathematical Social Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.03.005 · Cited by 5
Coups, Regime Transition, and the Dynamics of Press Freedom
Bjørnskov, C., Freytag, A., & Gutmann, J. (2018) · Social Science Research Network · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3275370 · Cited by 4
Repeated coordination with private learning
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Multiplier effect and comparative statics in global games of regime change
Szkup, M. (2017) · Theoretical Economics · doi:10.3982/te3074 · Cited by 4
“For example, currency crises have been considered in Morris and Shin (1998), Hellwig, Mukherji, and Tsyvinski (2006), and Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan (2006, 2007); debt crises have been addressed in Szkup (2018b) and Zabai (2014); political revolts have been treated in Edmond (2013); and business cycles have been de…”
BackgroundSocial identity, cross-cutting cleavages, and explaining the breakdown of interethnic cooperation
Wilson, S. (2015) · Rationality and Society · doi:10.1177/1043463115605301 · Cited by 4
“Uncertainty has been incorporated in a number of ways, including uncertainty over the next state of the game (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2009), over the regime’s capacity for repression (Boix and Svolik, 2011), over the level of anti-government sentiment in society (De Mesquita, 2010), over the payoffs in each state of th…”
BackgroundEmergence and Persistence of Extreme Political SystemsPreprint
Buchheim, L., & Ulbricht, R. (2014) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.20864 · Cited by 2
“6 Angeletos, Hellwig and Pavan (2006) and Edmond (2013) also explore how decision makers may strategically manipulate information that affects the outcome of a coordination game in the context of the global games literature.”
Biased Experts, Costly Lies, and Binary DecisionsPreprint
Hodler, R., Loertscher, S., & Rohner, D. (2010) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1639351 · Cited by 4
Learning What is Similar: Precedents and Equilibrium Selection
Argenziano, R., & Gilboa, I. (2018) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3178676 · Cited by 4
“(See, for example, Edmond, 2013).”
Ma, Y., & Liu, C.-R. (2025) · Journal of Chinese Political Science · doi:10.1007/s11366-025-09923-8 · Cited by 3
“Central to this mode of state action is the mobilization of the security and police sector, which can suppress opposition and deter future protests by raising the costs of coordinating collective action [24].”
Selection through information acquisition in coordination games
Szkup, M., & Treviño, I. (2025) · Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/s00199-025-01658-0 · Cited by 3
Overstatement of GDP growth in autocracies and the recent decline in global inequality
Pandian, R. K. (2025) · Social Forces · doi:10.1093/sf/soaf026 · Cited by 3
“While constituents might draw on their personal economic fortunes to assess performance, they also rely on economic statistics produced by the incumbent governments to do so (Edmond 2013; Guriev and Treisman 2019).”
Murtazashvili, I., & Zhou, Y. (2024) · Constitutional Political Economy · doi:10.1007/s10602-024-09450-3 · Cited by 3
“See, for example, Egorov et al. (2009), Gehlbach and Sonin (2014) or Edmond ( 2013 ), among many others.”
Unraveling Coordination Problems
Heijmans, R. (2023) · Social Science Research Network · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4552733 · Cited by 3
“The same distinction also set this paper apart from the broader literature on policy design in global games (Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005; Angeletos et al., 2006, 2007; Sakovics and Steiner, 2012; Edmond, 2013; Basak and Zhou, 2020).”
BackgroundSilence the media or the story? Theory and evidence of media capture
Louis-Sidois, C., & Mougin, E. (2023) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104533 · Cited by 3
Horz, C. M. (2023) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123423000182 · Cited by 11
“…formal-theoretic models of propaganda almost exclusively focus on propaganda concerning facts, such as a regime ’ s economic performance, popularity, or military capacity (see, for example, Callander and Wilkie 2007; Chen and Xu 2017; Edmond 2013; Gehlbach and Sonin 2014; Huang 2015; Little 2017).”
BackgroundToo Good to Be True? Retention Rules for Noisy Agents
Espinosa, F., & Ray, D. (2023) · American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · doi:10.1257/mic.20200472 · Cited by 3
“Edmond (2013) also studies the obfuscation of states (say by a dictatorial regime).”
BackgroundElectoral Integrity, the Concession of Power, and the Disciplining Role of Protests
Duley, C., & Gai, P. (2023) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/00220027231158055 · Cited by 2
“Whereas fi rst-generation global game models such as Little et al. (2015) and Edmond (2013) predict that changes in the cost of protesting always shift the election thresholds e and e (and e U in the case of a unique equilibrium), our results qualify this assessment.”
BackgroundResultInformation quality and regime change: Evidence from the lab
Helland, L., Iachan, F. S., Juelsrud, R., & Nenov, P. (2021) · Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2021.08.036 · Cited by 3
Morris, S., & Shadmehr, M. (2021) · Social Science Research Network · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3796411 · Cited by 3
“…of multi-action coordination games, departing from the binary-action models of protest used in the literature (Chwe 2000; Bueno de Mesquita 2010; Boix and Svolik 2013; Edmond 2013; Casper and Tyson 2014; Chen and Suen 2016; Tyson and Smith 2018; Shadmehr 2019; Barbera and Jackson 2020).”
MethodThe Institutional Foundations of Religious Freedom
Koyama, M. (2020) · Journal of Economics, Management and Religion · doi:10.1142/s2737436x20500065 · Cited by 3
“A change in the distribution of religious beliefs should therefore lead to a change in a society’s reliance on religious 17For example, revolutions and social movements can be modelled as global games (Angeletos et al., 2006; Edmond, 2013; Little, 2016; Barberà and Jackson, 2017).”
BackgroundRegime change in large information networks
de Martí, J., & Milán, P. (2019) · Games Econ. Behav. · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.010 · Cited by 3
“Others, such as Edmond (2013) and Bueno de Mesquita (2010), have similarly dealt with discrete action global games in large populations, tackling diverse aspects such as the possibility of strategic action by the status quo, or by political vanguards.”
BackgroundClientelism, Contagious Voting and Governance
Sarkar, A. (2018) · Economica · doi:10.1111/ecca.12265 · Cited by 6
Michaeli, M., & Spiro, D. (2025) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102705 · Cited by 4
Optimal Size of Rebellions: Trade-off Between Large Group and Maintaining Secrecy
Zhou, C.-Y. (2016) · Quarterly Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2796810 · Cited by 3
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Iterated generalized half-dominance and global game selection
Iijima, R. (2015) · Journal of Economics Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.013 · Cited by 3
“p-dominance is theoretically motivated by the “critical path lemma” of Kajii and Morris (1997), which is applicable to general incomplete information games.(5) On the other hand, the GH-dominance selection result exploits the belief structure that is specific to global games; as a consequence, GH-dominance can be easi…”
BackgroundEspinosa, F., & Ray, D. (2018) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w24627 · Cited by 3
“…for one of the two types.7 It follows that at least one 6For instance, in the context of a global game in which a sender can manipulate the noise with which signals are emitted and seeks to prevent a coordinated attack against the sender, Edmond (2013) restricts his attention to monotone responses.”
BackgroundMacro shocks and costly political action in non-democracies
Dorsch, M., Dunz, K., & Maarek, P. (2015) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-015-0239-x · Cited by 2
“For papers that endogenize the probability that protests lead to successful revolutions, see, among others Bueno de Mesquita (2010); Edmund (2011); Ellis and Fender (2011); Kricheli, Livne, and Magaloni (2011); Kuran (1989); Lohmann (1994); Shadmehr and Bernhardt (2011).”
BackgroundKarpa, D. F. (2026) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/s11109-026-10122-1 · Cited by 2
Conceptualizing Digital Democracy: A Policy‐Oriented Approach Through Computational Text Analysis
Dai, S. (2025) · Policy & Internet · doi:10.1002/poi3.70022 · Cited by 6
“…assumptions, often portraying the Internet as a “ liberation technology ” inherently capable of strengthening democratic cultures, providing open access to information, and empowering citizens, particularly in contexts with limited freedom of speech (Diamond 2010; Van Gelder 2012; Edmond 2013).”
Political and economic protests in authoritarian regimes
Mitchell, A. M., Inata, K., & Higashijima, M. (2025) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-025-01316-y · Cited by 4
“1 See Lohmann (1994); Ginkel and Smith (1999); Shadmehr and Bernhardt (2011); Kricheli et al. (2011); Edmond (2013); Casper and Tyson (2014); Hollyer et al. (2015, 2019); Mueller (2024).”
Correa, S. (2025) · American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · doi:10.1257/mic.20220191 · Cited by 2
“Since the seminal work of Morris & Shin (1998), their framework has been used to study public protests and revolutions in different institutional settings (see Edmond (2013), Egorov et al. (2009), Boix & Svolik (2013) and Morris & Shadmehr (2018)). The key component in these models is a coordination game with incomple…”
Collective procrastination and protest cycles
Gieczewski, G., & Koçak, K. (2024) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12913 · Cited by 1
The Politics of Punishment: Why Dictators Join the International Criminal Court
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Coordinated and uncoordinated punishment in a team investment game
Calabuig, V., Jiménez, N., Olcina, G., & Rodríguez-Lara, I. (2024) · Theory and Decision · doi:10.1007/s11238-024-09977-9 · Cited by 2
“In this regard, revolutions have been modeled as coordination or stag‑hunt games in De Mesquita (2010), Edmond (2013), Kiss et al. (2017) or Barbera and Jackson (2020), and some models assume that protesters may have information on what others have done (e.g., Barbera & Jackson, 2020; Kiss et al.,…”
Tell me the truth? Dictatorship and the commitment to media freedom
Sheen, G. C.-H., Tung, H. H., & Wu, W.-C. (2023) · Journal of Theoretical Politics · doi:10.1177/09516298231208419 · Cited by 2
“In a more sophisticated sense, dictators can strategically choose an optimal level of censorship and propaganda to mobilize citizens to take a speci fi c action (e.g. Edmond, 2013; Gehlbach and Sonin, 2014).”
BackgroundRobust implementation in sequential information design under supermodular payoffs and objective
Sato, H. (2022) · Review of Economic Design · doi:10.1007/s10058-022-00304-8 · Cited by 2
“…(2019) study information design with adversarial equilibrium selection in a regime change game. ris and Shin 2004), investment game (Carlsson and van Damme 1993), team work production (Moriya and Yamashita 2020), and policy changes (De Mesquita 2010; Edmond 2013; Chen and Suen 2017), among others.”
BackgroundInformation manipulation and competition
Grünewald, A., & Kräkel, M. (2021) · Games Econ. Behav. · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2021.11.007 · Cited by 2
Public information and global games with strategic complements and substitutes
Lee, K., & Oh, F. D. (2021) · doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109703 · Cited by 2
Computational Efficiency in Multivariate Adversarial Risk Analysis Models
Perry, M., & El-Amine, H. (2019) · Decision Analytics · doi:10.1287/deca.2019.0394 · Cited by 2
“…among political actors to include fringe figures such as moderate terrorists (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita (2005), Lapan and Sandler (1988), Bueno de Mesquita (1997)), and coordination games among willing participants in revolutionary activities (e.g. Kiss, et al. (2017), Chwe (2000), Edmond (2013)).”
BackgroundTime-Varying Skewness and Real Business Cycles
Richmond, F. R. B. O., Phan, T., & Kent, L. (2019) · Economic quarterly - Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond · doi:10.21144/eq1050201
Feng-ming, L., & Ma, X. (2015) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2627627 · Cited by 3
Multiplicity and Uniqueness in Generalized Regime Change Games
Shadmehr, M. (2018) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3121241 · Cited by 2
“Examples of published papers in top political science journals include Boix and Svolik (2013), Casper and Tyson (2014), Little et al. (2015), Rundlett and Svolik (2016), Shadmehr and Bernhardt (2017), and Tyson and Smith (2018). There are many other working papers or economics publications that use regime change games…”
BackgroundInformation Shocks and Internet Silos: Evidence from Creationist Friendly CurriculumPreprint
Sen, A., & Tucker, C. E. (2017) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3008686 · Cited by 2
From Revolution to Elections. A Comparative Analysis of Tunisia and Egypt
Bettarelli, L. (2017) · doi:10.1515/peps-2016-0050 · Cited by 2
“Indeed, Twitter, Facebook and Youtube have been extensively exploited by protesters to spread their ideals, to attract potential fellows and to coordinate street mobilisations ( Acemoglu, Hassan & Tahoun, 2014; Edmond, 2013).”
BackgroundCoordination and social learning
Huang, C. (2016) · Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/s00199-016-1014-z · Cited by 2
“Pauzner 2005), debt crises (Morris and Shin 2004), and political changes (Edmond 2013). These static regime change games are solvable by iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies for fixed prior beliefs and arbitrarily informative private signal structures (see Morris and Shin 2003). In my model, if no att…”
InfluentialThe Roles of Transparency in Regime Change: Striking When the Iron's Gone ColdPreprint
Quigley, D., & Toscani, F. (2016) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2768455 · Cited by 2
“In the political regime change context c could be the expected cost of death/punishment, the private payoff the benefit of being part of the future elite (see Edmond [2013]) and q the social benefit (cost) of changing leader.”
Do Politicians Serve the One Percent? Evidence from OECD Countries
Torija, P. (2013) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2219853 · Cited by 2
“, media (Prat and Strömberg, 2011 or Edmond, 2011), public prosecution (Alt and Lassen, 2010 or Torija 2011), rent extraction (Dreher and Schneider, 2010. or Ferraz and Finan, 2011.)”
BackgroundCoordination Games with Strategic Delegation of PivotalityPreprint
Shadmehr, M., & Bernhardt, D. (2010) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1662019 · Cited by 2
Hidden Politics? An Empirical Study on Factors Influencing Business Lobbying in Brazil
Fernandes, B. P., & Dias, M. (2024) · American Journal of Industrial and Business Management · doi:10.4236/ajibm.2024.144023 · Cited by 2
Attention to Biased Media and Perceptions of InequalityPreprint
Chen, J. (2020) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3515718 · Cited by 1
Corporate disclosure, government bailout, and liquidity crisis
Lee, K., Oh, F. D., & Park, J. (2026) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2026.103091 · Cited by 1
Neyazi, T. A., & Nakamizo, K. (2026) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2026.2615851 · Cited by 1
Herrera, H., & Sethi, R. (2026) · Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics · doi:10.1086/740209 · Cited by 1
“8There has recently been a great deal of effort in applying information design to political environments including Edmond (2013), Cotton & Li (2018), Gratton & Lee (2022), Luo & Rozenas (2022), Innocenti (2022), Heese et al. (2019), and Prato & Turner (2022).”
The welfare effects of policy signalling in a regime change game
Lukyanov, G. (2025) · Economic Theory Bulletin · doi:10.1007/s40505-025-00295-z
“For instance, Corsetti et al. (2004) study how a major speculator (e.g., George Soros) can trigger a currency attack that influences smaller speculators, while Edmond (2013) examines a political leader who manipulates information about the regime’s strength, which citizens then rationally discount.”
Baerlocher, D., Caldas, R. D. M., Cavalcanti, F., & Schneider, R. (2025) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106998 · Cited by 4
Does Hard Propaganda (Also) Work in Democracies? Evidence from the United States
Lutscher, P., & Donnay, K. (2025) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s153759272400272x · Cited by 2
“Several theoretical models from autocratic politics show that — especially during contentious periods — regimes should leverage hard propaganda to prevent being over-thrown and to signal resolve (Edmond 2013; Svolik 2012).”
Shifting social norms through endorsements
Gallice, A., & Grillo, E. (2025) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106903 · Cited by 1
Similarity of Information and Collective Action
Basak, D., Deb, J., & Kuvalekar, A. (2024) · The American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20241056 · Cited by 1
Revolutionary leaders and the punishment of critics
Sander, C. J. (2024) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-024-01150-8 · Cited by 1
“…where professional dissidents may mobilize citizens to revolt against the incumbent regime by altering their beliefs about the regime’s power, whereas (Edmond, 2013) analyzes a regime’s usage of propaganda to manipulation citizens’ beliefs about its strength in order to prevent being overthrown.”
Canen, N., & Chakraborty, A. (2023) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2023.10.018 · Cited by 1
The dynamics of revolution: Discrimination, social unrest and the optimal timing of revolution
Camacho, C., & Hassan, W. (2023) · Economic Modelling · doi:10.1016/j.econmod.2023.106489 · Cited by 1
On Mexican poverty-trap regimes and struggling to escape them
Carrera, E. S. S., & Risso, W. A. (2023) · Macroeconomic Dynamics · doi:10.1017/s1365100523000275 · Cited by 1
Armed forces and airwaves: media control and military coups in autocracies
Eschenauer-Engler, T. (2023) · Contemporary Politics · doi:10.1080/13569775.2023.2173874 · Cited by 1
“…and under which circumstances media strengthen dictatorships or contribute to the erosion of authoritarian rule (e.g. Edmond, 2013; Lorentzen, 2014; Rød & Weidmann, 2015).1 Despite an intense exchange on the role of media and information for the stability and…”
BackgroundShadmehr, M., & Bernhardt, D. (2022) · Quarterly Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1561/100.00019195 · Cited by 1
“Models of censoring public data (Shadmehr and Bernhardt 2015) are different from models of making public data noisier (Edmond 2013): a regime censors by not reporting bad news, which is not the same as adding noise to the original distribution, as in their formulation.”
MethodResultSocial reform as a path to political leadership: A dynamic model
Bhalla, M., Chatterjee, K., & Dutta, S. (2021) · Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2021.09.043 · Cited by 1
Die politische Ökonomie von Massenprotesten und Revolutionen
Apolte, T. (2021) · Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik · doi:10.1515/pwp-2021-0036 · Cited by 1
The role of large players in global games with strategic complements and substitutes
Lee, K., & Oh, F. D. (2020) · doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109688 · Cited by 1
Interest articulation, social stability and public governance
Gui, L., Yin, Z., & Nie, H.-H. (2020) · doi:10.1108/cpe-05-2020-0002 · Cited by 1
Social Media and the Dynamics of ProtestsPreprint
Boyer, P., Delemotte, T., Rollet, V., Gauthier, G., & Schmutz, B. (2020) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3618851 · Cited by 5
“Edmond, C. (2013). Information manipulation, coordination, and regime change.”
InfluentialJudicial Independence and Human Rights in AutocraciesPreprint
Shadmehr, M., Boleslavsky, R., & Ginsburg, T. (2019) · Social Science Research Network · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3419727 · Cited by 1
“Moreover, the large literature on information manipulation in autocracies has not studied the informational content of the state’s actions about its legitimacy (Egorov et al. 2009; Edmond 2013; Shadmehr and Bernhardt 2015; Barbera and Jackson 2016; Huang et al. 2019).”
BackgroundNon-Laplacian beliefs in a global game with noisy signaling
Edmond, C. (2017) · Research in Economics · doi:10.1016/j.rie.2017.07.005 · Cited by 1
“This is the last part of Proposition 3 in Edmond (2013) and is proved in Appendix A.4 to that paper.”
BackgroundResultInfluentialSelf-citationThree Basic Dimensions of Manipulative Message
Vlăduțescu, Ș., & Voinea, D. (2016) · doi:10.15405/epsbs.2016.09.135 · Cited by 1
When Rock Trumps Paper: A Theory of Constitutional ResistancePreprint
Pilpilidis, K. (2015) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2624459
On the mobilizing role of social media in revolutions: a game-theoretic approachPreprint
Kiss, H. J., & Rosa-García, A. (2013) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2298662 · Cited by 1
Does increasing inequality threaten social stability? Evidence from the labPreprint
Barr, A. M., Hochleitner, A., & Sonderegger, S. (2024) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4751234
A Social Choice Force Model for Estimating Collective Action Manipulation
Zhang, J., Zeng, S., Liu, W.-L., Wang, T., Wang, F., & Chen, C. L. P. (2014) · IFAC Proceedings Volumes · doi:10.3182/20140824-6-za-1003.01151 · Cited by 1
“Meanwhile, collective actions (Waytz, 2012) (Edmond, 2011) can be exploited to manipulate to affect customers choice (e.g. by a mass of sponsored advertising or fraud clicks), if the effect is larger than regular promotion methods such as advertising and price-off.”
BackgroundNationwide shutdowns and government offensives
Gohdes, A. R. (2024) · Repression in the Digital Age · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197743577.003.0005
Collective Resistance under Authoritarianism: Elite–Mass Strategies in an Experimental Game
Chong, D., Liu, M., & Zhang, Q. (2016) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/s11109-016-9342-z · Cited by 20
“Governments deter political activism and maintain authoritarian control by offering concessions or alternatively signaling their capacity and willingness to repress collective action (Boix and Svolik 2013; Edmond 2013).”
BackgroundInfluentialIslam, M., & Rahman, M. (2026) · Third World Quarterly · doi:10.1080/01436597.2026.2727666
Does increasing inequality threaten social stability? Evidence from the lab
Adriani, F., Barr, A. M., Hochleitner, A., & Sonderegger, S. (2026) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2026.104061
Crisis without Collapse: A Theory of Capitalist Persistence
̨ova, M. (2026) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2610.12477
“…1986) and Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) supply the soft budget constraint; Barzel (1974) ), Morris and Shin (1998, 2002, 2003), Hellwig (2002), Angeletos and Werning (2006), and Edmond (2013), with the sociology supplied by Granovetter (1978), Kuran (1989, 1991), Chwe (2001), and Lohmann (1994).”
Metadata
- Authors
- Edmond, C.
- Affiliations
- The University of Melbourne (AU)
- Corresponding author
- Edmond, Chris
- ORCID
- Edmond, Chris
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2013-07-04
- Volume
- 80
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1422-1458
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-937X
- OpenAlex
- W3123860814
- Cited by
- 433
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 27 · 2025: 39 · 2024: 21 · 2023: 73 · 2022: 33 · 2021: 32 · 2020: 34 · 2019: 24 · 2018: 29 · 2017: 30 · 2016: 21 · 2015: 33 · 2014: 16 · 2013: 10
- FWCI
- 36.43
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Review of Economic Studies (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Media Influence and Politics
- Keywords
- information manipulation, regime change, propaganda, rebellion, coordination games, imperfect information, signal precision, equilibrium characterization, comparative statics, economies of scale
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