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Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change*
Abstract
This article presents a model of information manipulation and political regime change. There is a regime that can be overthrown but only if enough citizens participate in an uprising. Citizens are imperfectly informed about the regime's ability to resist an uprising and the regime can engage in propaganda that, taken at face-value, makes the regime seem stronger than it truly is. This coordination game with endogenous information manipulation has a unique equilibrium and the article gives a complete analytic characterization of the equilibrium's comparative statics. Holding fixed the number of signals available to citizens, if the per-unit signal precision is sufficiently high then the regime is harder to overthrow. In contrast, if the number of signals increases, so that both total signal precision and the regime's costs of manipulation rise together, then the regime is easier to overthrow unless there are strong economies of scale in information control.
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“While some theoretical work suggests that the internet may impede non-democratic rule (Edmond, 2013), empirical research provides tentative support for cyber-pessimists who claim that the internet plays into the hands of autocrats (Rød & Weidmann, 2015).”
From How Dictators Control the Internet: A Review Essay (2020) · cites this paper as Edmond, 2013
Citations
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Cited by
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Items 301–359 of 359
Matta, B. N. (2026) · American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · doi:10.1257/mic.20230241
Concessions and Protest Demobilization
de Vogel, S., & Sun, J. (2026) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/00104140261466973
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Hakobyan, Z. (2026) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2607.10228
“…et al., 2022; Guriev et al., 2026; Acemoglu et al., 2024; Crawford and Sobel, 1982; Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011; Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005; Edmond, 2013), algorithmic curation and recommendation design (Berman and Katona, 2020; Qian and Jain, 2024; Peitz and Sobolev, 2026; Xu and Yang,…”
Empirical Global Games of Regime Change
Baker, M. J., Eltokhy, K., & Guo, W.-C. (2026) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2607.05534
“Finally, we incorporate an index of information reliability, adapted from the informational framework developed in Edmond (2013), intended to capture the precision of information available to agents engaged in strategic coordination.”
InfluentialLoose bricks in the wall: Underground press and political opposition in non-democracies
Tcaci, O. (2026) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-026-01401-w
Two-player binary global games without dominance solvable states
Park, I.-U., & Smyrniotis, E. (2026) · Games Econ. Behav. · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2026.04.008
A model of participatory persuasion
Deng, L.-C., & Sun, Y. (2026) · Games Econ. Behav. · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2026.05.006
Manipulation of information in times of crisis: evidence from Covid excess mortality
Karlinsky, A., & Shayo, M. (2026) · Journal of Economic Growth · doi:10.1007/s10887-026-09266-w
“The second form of manipulation is to downplay, conceal, or sugarcoat the hardship in an attempt to project competence (Edmond, 2013 ; Guriev & Treisman, 2015; Gehlbach et al., 2016 ; Rozenas & Stukal, 2019 ); curtail public distrust in the government (Honryo & Yano, 2021); reduce public opposition…”
Conditional Disclosure as a Coordination Device
Cashman, M. (2026) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2604.00874
“…selection (Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005); principals can alter coordination through targeted subsidies (S´akovics and Steiner, 2012) or discriminatory success-contingent rewards (Winter, 2004; Ha-lac, Kremer and Winter, 2020); and information manipulation changes signals and beliefs (Edmond, 2013).”
“I alone can fix it:” the strongman narrative and leader support
Horz, C. M., & Kocak, K. (2026) · Quarterly Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1108/qjps-06-2024-0083
Klunover, D. (2025) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-025-01358-2
Akkaş, C. (2025) · Journal of Arab & Muslim Media Research · doi:10.1386/jammr_00114_1
Public communication in regime change games
Lukyanov, G., & Makhmudova, A. (2025) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/s00182-026-00980-8
“Among the former, Edmond (2013) studies the role of state propaganda in suppressing collective action.”
InfluentialPolitical salience, endogenous bandwagoning, and regime resilience
Schweighofer-Kodritsch, S., Huck, S., & Humphreys, M. (2025) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.011
Cooperative and competitive reasoning: From games to revolutions
Jimenez-Gomez, D. (2025) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107141
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Kempf, H., & Kuznetsova, O. (2025) · Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/s00199-025-01676-y
Open-source information and repression
Oechslin, M. (2025) · Journal of comparative economics (Print) · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2025.07.006
The policy-driven misallocation: a political economy perspective
Pan, S., & Zhang, Q. (2025) · China Economic Journal · doi:10.1080/17538963.2025.2508077
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Bosco, D., Colombo, L. V. A., & Femminis, G. (2025) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102681
Nie, H.-H., & Yang, N. (2025) · Economic and Political Studies · doi:10.1080/20954816.2025.2450107
Mass media i media społecznościowe w polityce wewnętrznej Federacji Rosyjskiej
Potulski, J., & Kamińska-Korolczuk, K. (2024) · Politeja · doi:10.12797/politeja.21.2024.94.13
Synthesizing Theories of Authoritarian Elections: A Game-Free Analysis
Leventoğlu, B., Malesky, E. J., & Wen, T. (2024) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/00104140241302708
“As in Svolik (2012) and Egorov and Sonin (2020), we assume that D is vulnerable to social unrest (also see Bueno De Mesquita (2010); Edmond (2013); Schadmehr and Bernhardt (2019)).”
Szydlowski, M. (2024) · Journal of Economics Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2024.105875
Information manipulation and majority rule
Wang, B., & Zheng, S.-L. (2024) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111824
Reputation in the Shadow of Exit
Luo, D. (2024) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2404.18884
“The first change relates to a large literature in global games where some “large” player can take an action that modifies the global game and leads to new applied insights about regime change (see Angeletos et al. (2006), Edmond (2013), and Morris and Shadmehr (2024)).”
Similarity Nash Equilibria in Statistical Games
Argenziano, R., & Gilboa, I. (2023) · American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · doi:10.1257/mic.20220049
Optimal overconfidence in the presence of information manipulation
Wang, B., & Zheng, S.-L. (2023) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111280
Media and Reform in the Digital Age: Lessons from the Political Pendulum in Ecuador
Francisco, R. P. J. (2023) · Revista Empresa y Humanismo · doi:10.15581/015.xxvi.2.211-244 · Cited by 1
“In Edmond (2013) there is an impact on regime stability depending on the economies of scale of media control.”
BackgroundMuchipa, T. Z., & Mulubale, S. (2023) · International Journal of Innovative Research & Development · doi:10.24940/ijird/2023/v12/i4/apr23020
Information Jamming and Capture Cost: A Global Game Analysis of Collective Action
Wu, T., Gui, L., Zhang, L., & Kung, C.-C. (2023) · SAGE Open · doi:10.1177/21582440221142302
“As Edmond (2013) notes, we need to add an additional assumption to avoid the free-rider problem.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialRegime change and critical junctures
Rivas, J. (2022) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2022.102269
“Edmon (2013) considers a game of regime change where there is uncertainty about the strength of the current regime 2In our model, there will be equilibria where all members of the elite choose the same tax rate (and equilibria where they do not).”
BackgroundWhy Regimes Repress: The Factors that Lead to Censorship of Social Media
Hasan, E. (2019) · American Journal of Undergraduate Research · doi:10.33697/ajur.2019.028
Rents from power for a dissident elite and mass mobilization
Aköz, K. K., & Hernández‐Lagos, P. (2018) · Scottish Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1111/sjpe.12205
“Dewan and Myatt (2008) analyzes information transmission by leaders (see also Morris and Shin, 2002; and Hellwig, 2002 for the role of public information in global games), while Ekmekc i (2009) and Edmond (2013) study the implications of strategic information manipulation by a leader.”
Optimal Macroeconomic Policy under Uncertainty
Kuznetsova, O. (2017) · doi:10.70675/b8a05474z1cdfz4d8bza30dz617dbf1b7d33
Buchheim, L., & Ulbricht, R. (2016) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2392385
Ehdeed, S., Bates, J., & Cox, A. (2016) · doi:10.9776/16342
“This can make governments susceptible to being toppled (Edmond, 2013).”
BackgroundHow Jeremy Bentham Would Defend Against Coordinated Attacks
Jann, O., & Schottmüller, C. (2015) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2664043
“The problem of a player (usually called ”policymaker”) who is attacked by a group has also been analyzed with a focus on signaling and information manipulation (Edmond, 2013), signaling through defensive measures (Angeletos and Pavan, 2013), reputation (Huang, 2014) and the optimal stopping problem when under attack (…”
Better feared than loved: reputations and the motives for conflict
Long, I. W. (2015) · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2015.03.016
“In more modern times, the use of propaganda in the run up to conflict is well documented (c.f. Glaeser 2009; Edmond 2013).”
BackgroundMonitoring, moral hazard, and turnover
Rothert, J. (2015) · doi:10.1007/s00199-014-0823-1
Citizens, Dictators and Networks: A Game Theory Approach
Pérez-Oviedo, W. (2015) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.522362
“The same situation occurs in Edmond (2013). 13 An obvious additional assumption about T will be necessary to ensure a positive utility for the dictator (see below).”
Aoki, M. (2014) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2520889
“4Political-economy applications of the global game include riots (Atkeson 2000), the manipulation of information by the government (Edmond 2013), privately communicated rumors during revolution (Chen et al 2014), and violent actions by a “revolution entrepreneur” (Bueno de Mesquita…”
BackgroundBusiness Cycles with RevolutionsPreprint
Kent, L., & Phan, T. (2013) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2347318 · Cited by 3
“ς γ Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2011) 5 5 Colacito et al.”
Manipulated Voters in Competitive Election CampaignsPreprint
Aköz, K. K., & Arbatlı, C. E. (2013) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2281870
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Liao, X., & Szkup, M. (2026) · Theoretical Economics · doi:10.3982/te5938
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Angelini, L., Bertinelli, L., Cömertpay, R., & Maystadt, J.-F. (2026) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2025.107218
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Huhe, N., & Chen, J. (2025) · Asian Survey · doi:10.1525/as.2025.2663626 · Cited by 1
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Cumming, D. J., & Tran, V. (2025) · Social Science Research Network · doi:10.2139/ssrn.5971854
MISCOORDINATION, POLITICS AND POPULISM
Duley, C., & Gai, P. (2022) · National Institute Economic Review · doi:10.1017/nie.2022.3
“1Recent models of regime change include Bueno de Mesquita (2010), Edmond (2013) and Chen and Suen (2016).”
BackgroundCan A Social Planner Manipulate Network Dynamics And Solve Coordination Problems?
Hakobyan, Z. (2020) · Social Science Research Network · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3587024
“My model is di¤erent from standard sender/receiver games such as Crawford and Sobel (1982), Kartik(2009), and Edmond (2013).”
How? The Dictator’s Divide-and-Rule Strategy
Tung, H. H. (2019) · Economic Growth and Endogenous Authoritarian Institutions in Post-Reform China · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-04828-0_3
Competing to Coordinate : Crowding Out in Coordination Games *
Bunsupha, S., & Ahuja, S. (2018) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3398428
“1This is true in most models with incomplete information such as Morris and Shin (1998) for currency crises, Rochet and Vives (2004) for bank runs, Morris and Shin (2004a) for debt crises, and Edmond (2013) for political riots.”
BackgroundRussia Plays the (Triangular) Sanctions Game
Patane, C. F., & Drury, C. (2018) · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-63435-7_6
Rollover risk and the social value of credibility∗
Pereira, A. E. (2017) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3091777
Schroth, S., Helfer, J., & Lanfair, J. K. (2017) · doi:10.4135/9781412975711.n105
Rhetoric as repression : the roles and effects of government framing
Patane, C. F. (2016) · doi:10.32469/10355/57251
Caines, C. (2016) · doi:10.7916/d87s7nsz
Essays on game theory and coordination problems
Shino, J. (2011) · Rutgers University Community Repository (Rutgers University) · doi:10.7282/t32b8wm1
Metadata
- Authors
- Edmond, C.
- Affiliations
- The University of Melbourne (AU)
- Corresponding author
- Edmond, Chris
- ORCID
- Edmond, Chris
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2013-07-04
- Volume
- 80
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1422-1458
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-937X
- OpenAlex
- W3123860814
- Cited by
- 433
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 27 · 2025: 39 · 2024: 21 · 2023: 73 · 2022: 33 · 2021: 32 · 2020: 34 · 2019: 24 · 2018: 29 · 2017: 30 · 2016: 21 · 2015: 33 · 2014: 16 · 2013: 10
- FWCI
- 36.43
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Review of Economic Studies (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Media Influence and Politics
- Keywords
- information manipulation, regime change, propaganda, rebellion, coordination games, imperfect information, signal precision, equilibrium characterization, comparative statics, economies of scale
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