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How Dictators Control the Internet: A Review Essay

Open access
Keremoğlu, Eda, Weidmann, Nils B. · 2020 · Comparative Political Studies

The DOI matches its Crossref record, with a small difference in title or year; 61 of the 61 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 14 of the 69 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Abstract

A growing body of research has studied how autocratic regimes interfere with internet communication to contain challenges to their rule. In this review article, we survey the literature and identify the most important directions and challenges for future research. We structure our review along different network layers, each of which provides particular ways of governmental influence and control. While current research has made much progress in understanding individual digital tactics, we argue that there is still a need for theoretical development and empirical progress. First, we need a more comprehensive understanding of how particular tactics fit into an overall digital strategy, but also how they interact with traditional, “offline” means of autocratic politics, such as cooptation or repression. Second, we discuss a number of challenges that empirical research needs to address, such as the effectiveness of digital tactics, the problem of attribution, and the tool dependence of existing research.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

This review essay synthesizes research on how autocrats interfere with internet communication, organizing the literature by infrastructure, network, and application layers. It argues that future work needs broader theories of digital strategy and better empirical tools to assess effectiveness, attribution, and tool-specific bias.

Key findings

  • The paper identifies three layers of internet control: infrastructure, network, and application, and argues that autocratic interference operates across all three rather than only at the application layer.
  • At the infrastructure layer, governments can allocate access unevenly, impose “just-in-time” shutdowns, and throttle bandwidth; the paper cites evidence that service provision is systematically lower for politically excluded ethnic groups and that shutdowns can disconnect parts or all of a population.
  • At the network layer, autocrats use filtering, denial-of-service attacks, routing manipulation, and deep packet inspection; the paper notes that China’s “Great Firewall” blocks connections to websites and services to create a highly regulated “national intranet.”
  • At the application layer, governments censor content, manipulate information, surveil users, and use e-governance to gather information; the paper notes that Chinese censorship can show a fictitious “internet police” message and that paid users or “fifty-cent army” tactics are used to flood the web with distracting or pro-government content.

Methods

  • This is a review essay, not an original empirical study.
  • It surveys the literature on autocratic interference in internet communication and structures the review around the internet’s layers: infrastructure, network, and application.
  • It synthesizes prior studies to derive theoretical and empirical challenges, including the effectiveness of digital tactics, attribution problems, tool dependence, and the interaction between digital and conventional authoritarian tactics.

Limitations

  • The paper itself states that current research is still limited by a lack of theoretical development and empirical progress, especially on how digital tactics fit into broader autocratic strategies.
  • It explicitly notes three empirical challenges: effectiveness is often assumed rather than tested, attribution of interference is difficult, and much research is tool-dependent.
  • Evident from the text: because this is a narrative review, it does not report a new dataset, sample, or causal estimates of its own.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1177/0010414020912278

Cites

61 of 61 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

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Claims the paper makes

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Citations

Cites

Show all 61 references

Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. Freyburg T., 2018, International Journal of Communication, 12, 3896
  2. Hellmeier S., 2016, Politics & Policy, 42, 635
  3. Roberts H., 2012, Access contested: Security, identity, and resistance in Asian cyberspace, 133

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Keremoğlu, E., & Weidmann, N. B.
Affiliations
University of Konstanz (DE)
Corresponding author
Weidmann, Nils B.
Venue
Comparative Political Studies
Published
2020-03-23
Volume
53
Issue
10-11
Pages
1690-1703
ISSN
  • 0010-4140 (ISSN-L)
  • 1552-3829
OpenAlex
W3014033480
Cited by
131
References
48
Citations by year
2026: 14 · 2025: 28 · 2024: 17 · 2023: 33 · 2022: 29 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 4
FWCI
24.02
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Comparative Political Studies (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
  • KOPS (University of Konstanz) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc)
Funders
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (402127652)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Media Influence and Politics
Keywords
internet censorship, authoritarian regimes, co-optation, repression, digital strategy, network layer

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: How Dictators Control the Internet: A Review Essay. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1177/0010414020912278
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Keremoğlu, E., & Weidmann, N. B. (2020). How Dictators Control the Internet: A Review Essay. Comparative Political Studies. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414020912278

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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