The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Capital Structure and Dividend Irrelevance with Asymmetric Information
Abstract
The Modigliani and Miller propositions on the irrelevancy of capital structure and dividends are shown to be valid in a large class of models with asymmetric information. The main assumption is that managerial compensation is chosen optimally. This differs from most of the recent articles on this topic, which impose by fiat a suboptimal contract. Even when imperfections internal to the firm preclude optimal investment, there is a separation between incentives and financing. We conclude that corporations should move toward contracts with better incentives, and that new models should be built that recognize the limitations to optimal contracting.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have
Myers, S. C., & Majluf, N. S. (1984) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(84)90023-0 · Cited by 18,957
Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares
Miller, M. H., & Modigliani, F. (1961) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/294442 · Cited by 6,558
The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive‐Signalling Approach,
Ross, S. A. (1977) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003485 · Cited by 4,168
Valuation effects of security offerings and the issuance process
Mikkelson, W. H., & Partch, M. M. (1986) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(86)90049-8 · Cited by 1,213
Convertible debt issuance, capital structure change and financing-related information
Dann, L. Y., & Mikkelson, W. H. (1984) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(84)90022-9 · Cited by 407
Cited by
Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure
Hart, O. (1995) · doi:10.1093/0198288816.001.0001 · Cited by 4,672
The Theory of Capital Structure
HARRIS, M., & RAVIV, A. (1991) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb03753.x · Cited by 4,347
Zingales, L. (2000) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00262 · Cited by 1,495
Myers, S. C. (2001) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.15.2.81 · Cited by 1,411
Agency, Information and Corporate Investment
Stein, J. C. (2003) · Handbook of the Economics of Finance · doi:10.1016/s1574-0102(03)01006-9 · Cited by 1,347
Timing, investment opportunities, managerial discretion, and the security issue decision
Jung, K., Kim, Y.-C., & Stulz, R. (1996) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(96)00881-1 · Cited by 925
Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management
Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1994) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w4886 · Cited by 900
Top‐Management Compensation and Capital Structure
JOHN, T. A., & JOHN, K. (1993) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04026.x · Cited by 812
Robust Financial Contracting and the Role of Venture Capitalists
ADMATI, A. R., & PFLEIDERER, P. (1994) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb05146.x · Cited by 723
Equity Issues and Stock Price Dynamics
LUCAS, D. J., & McDONALD, R. L. (1990) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb02425.x · Cited by 648
Debt Capacity and Tests of Capital Structure Theories
Lemmon, M. L., & Zender, J. F. (2010) · Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.1017/s0022109010000499 · Cited by 612
Self-citationThe pecking order, debt capacity, and information asymmetry
Leary, M. T., & Roberts, M. R. (2010) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2009.10.009 · Cited by 600
Pay Me Later: Inside Debt and Its Role in Managerial Compensation
SUNDARAM, R. K., & YERMACK, D. L. (2007) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01251.x · Cited by 600
Managerial Conservatism, Project Choice, and Debt
Hirshleifer, D., & Thakor, A. V. (1992) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/5.3.437 · Cited by 555
Stock-based incentive compensation and investment behavior
Bizjak, J. M., Brickley, J. A., & Coles, J. L. (1993) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(93)90017-a · Cited by 486
Trade-Off and Pecking Order Theories of Debt
Frank, M. Z., & Goyal, V. K. (2007) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.670543 · Cited by 455
Frank, M. Z., & Goyal, V. K. (2008) · Handbook of Empirical Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/b978-0-444-53265-7.50004-4 · Cited by 451
Do Short-Term Objectives Lead to Under- or Overinvestment in Long-Term Projects?
Bebchuk, L. A., & Stole, L. A. (1993) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.2307/2328920 · Cited by 418
Do Short‐Term Objectives Lead to Under‐ or Overinvestment in Long‐Term Projects?
BEBCHUK, L. A., & STOLE, L. A. (1993) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04735.x · Cited by 418
Hart, O. (2001) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.39.4.1079 · Cited by 400
CARLSON, M., FISHER, A., & GIAMMARINO, R. (2006) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00865.x · Cited by 373
Shareholder Preferences and Dividend Policy
BRENNAN, M. J., & THAKOR, A. V. (1990) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb02424.x · Cited by 360
Lower Salaries and No Options? On the Optimal Structure of Executive Pay
DITTMANN, I., & MAUG, E. (2007) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01208.x · Cited by 357
Myers, S. C. (2003) · Handbook of the Economics of Finance · doi:10.1016/s1574-0102(03)01008-2 · Cited by 348
A Theory of Bank Regulation and Management Compensation
John, K., Saunders, A., & Senbet, L. W. (2000) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/13.1.95 · Cited by 323
Real Investment Implications of Employee Stock Option Exercises
Bens, D. A., Nagar, V., & Wong, M. H. F. (2002) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1475-679x.00052 · Cited by 313
Earnings management and firm valuation under asymmetric information
Chaney, P. K., & Lewis, C. M. (1995) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/0929-1199(94)00008-i · Cited by 278
Global Waves of Debt: Causes and Consequences
Kose, M. A., Nagle, P., Ohnsorge, F., & Sugawara, N. (2021) · World Bank, Washington, DC eBooks · doi:10.1596/978-1-4648-1544-7 · Cited by 259
Managerial Reputation and Corporate Investment Decisions
Hirshleifer, D. (1993) · Financial Management · doi:10.2307/3665866 · Cited by 254
Metadata
- Authors
- Dybvig, P. H., & Zender, J. F.
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1991-01
- Volume
- 4
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 201-219
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W2043748962
- Cited by
- 251
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 58.15
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.