The DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Top‐Management Compensation and Capital Structure
Abstract
The interrelationship between top‐management compensation and the design and mix of external claims issued by a firm is studied. The optimal managerial compensation structures depend on not only the agency relationship between shareholders and management, but also the conflicts of interests which arise in the other contracting relationships for which the firm serves as a nexus. We analyze in detail the optimal management compensation for the cases when the external claims are (1) equity and risky debt, and (2) equity and convertible debt. In addition to the role of aligning managerial incentives with shareholder interests, managerial compensation in a levered firm also serves as a precommitment device to minimize the agency costs of debt. The optimal management compensation derived has low pay‐performance sensitivity. With convertible debt, instead of straight debt, the corresponding optimal managerial compensation has high pay‐to‐performance sensitivity. A negative relationship between pay‐performance sensitivity and leverage is derived. Our results provide a reconciliation of the puzzling evidence of Jensen and Murphy (1990) with agency theory. Other testable implications include (1) a relationship between the risk premium in corporate bond yields and top‐management compensation structures, and (2) the announcement effect of adoption of executive stock option plans on bond prices. The model yields implications for management compensation in banks and Federal Deposit Insurance reform. Our results explain the dynamics of top‐management compensation in firms going through financial distress and reorganization.
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Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x · Cited by 71,491
Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have
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Moral Hazard and Observability
Holmstrom, B. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003320 · Cited by 8,311
The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice
TITMAN, S., & WESSELS, R. (1988) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb02585.x · Cited by 6,112
Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives
Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. J. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261677 · Cited by 5,083
The Theory of Capital Structure
HARRIS, M., & RAVIV, A. (1991) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb03753.x · Cited by 4,347
Outside directors and CEO turnover
Weisbach, M. S. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90053-0 · Cited by 4,234
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Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory
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Cited by
Managerial incentives and risk-taking☆
COLES, J., DANIEL, N., & NAVEEN, L. (2006) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.09.004 · Cited by 2,909
Corporate Governance and Risk‐Taking
JOHN, K., LITOV, L., & YEUNG, B. (2008) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01372.x · Cited by 1,806
Self-citationChapter 38 Executive compensation
Murphy, K. J. (1999) · Handbook of Labor Economics · doi:10.1016/s1573-4463(99)30024-9 · Cited by 1,567
Corporate governance and board effectiveness
John, K., & Senbet, L. W. (1998) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/s0378-4266(98)00005-3 · Cited by 1,345
Self-citationRemuneration, Retention, and Reputation Incentives for Outside Directors
YERMACK, D. (2004) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00699.x · Cited by 840
Metadata
- Authors
- JOHN, T. A., & JOHN, K.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1993-07
- Volume
- 48
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 949-974
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W2145377320
- Cited by
- 812
- References
- 35
- FWCI
- 25.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.