The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Impact of a Strong Bank-Firm Relationship on the Borrowing Firm
Abstract
Commercial banks acquire inside information about the firms they lend to. We study the impact of this informationally privileged position on the borrowing firm using a broad panel of U.S. firms over the 1993–2004 period. We measure the strength of the bank-firm relationship by bank-firm proximity, size of the loan, and the lender's insider potential. We show that a stronger relationship, by inducing better monitoring, improves the borrower's corporate governance. Simultaneously, it makes the bank a potentially more informed agent in the equity market. This information asymmetry increases adverse selection for the other market participants and lowers the firm's stock liquidity. This trade-off between improved corporate governance and greater information asymmetry affects the firm's value. Our results have normative implications for the role of banks in the development of financial markets.
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Citations
Cites
Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring
Diamond, D. W. (1984) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297430 · Cited by 8,476 · cited 4×
“The precision of the signal the bank receives on the borrower also decreases with distance (Diamond 1984; Petersen and Rajan 1994; Berger and Udell 1995; Hauswald and Marquez 2006; Sufi 2007).”
BackgroundInfluentialCorporate Governance and Equity Prices
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360535162 · Cited by 6,120
The effect of credit market competition on lending relationships
Petersen, M. A., & Rajan, R. G. (1995) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118445 · Cited by 3,294
Berger, A. N., Miller, N. H., Petersen, M. A., Rajan, R. G., & Stein, J. C. (2005) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.06.003 · Cited by 1,888
Some evidence on the uniqueness of bank loans
James, C. (1987) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(87)90003-1 · Cited by 1,610
Can Relationship Banking Survive Competition?
Boot, A. W. A., & Thakor, A. V. (2000) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00223 · Cited by 1,590 · cited 2×
“An extreme case of this “dependency” is relationship lending (Mayer 1988; Sharpe 1990; Rajan 1992; Boot and Thakor 2000).”
BackgroundPreferences for Stock Characteristics As Revealed by Mutual Fund Portfolio Holdings
FALKENSTEIN, E. G. (1996) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb05204.x · Cited by 1,058
Further evidence on the bank lending process and the capital market response to bank loan agreements
Lummer, S. L., & McConnell, J. J. (1989) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(89)90098-6 · Cited by 856
Competition and Strategic Information Acquisition in Credit Markets
Hauswald, R., & Marquez, R. (2006) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhj021 · Cited by 766
New issues in corporate finance
Mayer, C. (1988) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/0014-2921(88)90077-3 · Cited by 716
Cited by
Credit supply and corporate innovation
Amore, M. D., Schneider, C., & Žaldokas, A. (2013) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.04.006 · Cited by 824
Bank Capital and Lending Relationships
SCHWERT, M. (2018) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12604 · Cited by 392
Taxes and Financial Constraints: Evidence from Linguistic Cues
LAW, K. K. F., & MILLS, L. F. (2015) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1475-679x.12081 · Cited by 369
Does finance solve the supply chain financing problem?
Caniato, F., Gelsomino, L. M., Perego, A., & Ronchi, S. (2016) · Supply Chain Management: An International Journal · doi:10.1108/scm-11-2015-0436 · Cited by 265
Metadata
- Authors
- Dass, N., & Massa, M.
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2009-09-24
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1204-1260
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W2329249117
- Cited by
- 243
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 26.32
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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