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Cited by 379

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 50 of the 50 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Shareholder Activism and CEO Pay

Ertimur, Yonca, Ferri, Fabrizio, Muslu, Volkan·2011·Review of Financial Studies

Abstract

We study 134 vote-no campaigns and 1,198 shareholder proposals related to executive pay between 1997 and 2007. Union pension funds sponsor most of these initiatives, yet their targeting criteria do not appear to reflect labor-related motives. Shareholders favor proposals related to the pay-setting process (e.g., subject severance pay to shareholder approval) over proposals that micromanage pay level or structure. While activists target firms with high CEO pay (whether excessive or not), voting support is higher only at firms with excess CEO pay. Firms with excess CEO pay targeted by vote-no campaigns experience a significant reduction in CEO pay ($7.3 million). Our findings contribute to the debate on “say on pay” and other reforms empowering shareholders.

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Metadata

Authors
Ertimur, Y., Ferri, F., & Muslu, V.
Venue
Review of Financial Studies
Published
2010-11-19
Volume
24
Issue
2
Pages
535-592
ISSN
  • 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
  • 1465-7368
OpenAlex
W3124020223
Cited by
379
References
50
FWCI
55.15
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Shareholder Activism and CEO Pay. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/rfs/hhq113
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Ertimur, Y., Ferri, F., & Muslu, V. (2011). Shareholder Activism and CEO Pay. Review of Financial Studies. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhq113

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.