The DOI matches its Crossref record; 50 of the 50 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Shareholder Activism and CEO Pay
Abstract
We study 134 vote-no campaigns and 1,198 shareholder proposals related to executive pay between 1997 and 2007. Union pension funds sponsor most of these initiatives, yet their targeting criteria do not appear to reflect labor-related motives. Shareholders favor proposals related to the pay-setting process (e.g., subject severance pay to shareholder approval) over proposals that micromanage pay level or structure. While activists target firms with high CEO pay (whether excessive or not), voting support is higher only at firms with excess CEO pay. Firms with excess CEO pay targeted by vote-no campaigns experience a significant reduction in CEO pay ($7.3 million). Our findings contribute to the debate on “say on pay” and other reforms empowering shareholders.
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Cites
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Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance
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Cited by
Dimson, E., Karakaş, O., & Li, X. (2015) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhv044 · Cited by 1,242
Cucari, N., Esposito De Falco, S., & Orlando, B. (2018) · Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management · doi:10.1002/csr.1452 · Cited by 864
Connecting the Dots: Bringing External Corporate Governance into the Corporate Governance Puzzle
Aguilera, R. V., Desender, K. A., Bednar, M. K., & Lee, J. H. (2015) · Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.1080/19416520.2015.1024503 · Cited by 502
Shareholder Activism: A Multidisciplinary Review
Goranova, M., & Ryan, L. V. (2014) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206313515519 · Cited by 414
Shareholder Votes and Proxy Advisors: Evidence from Say on Pay
ERTIMUR, Y., FERRI, F., & OESCH, D. (2013) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1475-679x.12024 · Cited by 401
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Ertimur, Y., Ferri, F., & Muslu, V.
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2010-11-19
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 535-592
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W3124020223
- Cited by
- 379
- References
- 50
- FWCI
- 55.15
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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