The DOI matches its Crossref record; 25 of the 25 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Investor Reactions to CEOs' Inside Debt Incentives
Abstract
Pensions and deferred compensation represent substantial components of CEO incentives. We study stockholder and bondholder reactions to companies' initial reports of CEOs' inside debt positions following a 2007 SEC disclosure reform. We find that bond prices rise, equity prices fall, and the volatility of both securities drops for firms whose CEOs have sizeable defined benefit pensions or deferred compensation. Similar changes occur for credit default swap spreads and exchange-traded options. The results indicate a reduction in firm risk, a transfer of value from equity toward debt, and an overall destruction of enterprise value when CEOs' inside debt holdings are large.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Wei, C., & Yermack, D.
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2011-04-18
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 11
- Pages
- 3813-3840
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W3123152738
- Cited by
- 292
- References
- 25
- FWCI
- 45.76
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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