The DOI matches its Crossref record; 189 of the 189 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer
Open accessAbstract
This article studies traditional and modern theories of executive compensation, bringing them together under a simple unifying framework accessible to the general-interest reader. We analyze assignment models of the level of pay, and static and dynamic moral-hazard models of incentives, and compare their predictions to empirical findings. We make two broad points. First, traditional theories find it difficult to explain the data, suggesting that compensation results from “rent extraction” by CEOs. However, more modern “shareholder value” theories, that arguably better capture the CEO setting, do deliver predictions consistent with observed practices, suggesting that these practices need not be inefficient. Second, seemingly innocuous features of the modeling setup, often made for tractability or convenience, can lead to significant differences in the model's implications and conclusions on the efficiency of observed practices. We close by highlighting apparent inefficiencies in executive compensation and additional directions for future research. (JEL G38, M12, M48, M52)
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Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x · Cited by 71,491
Moral Hazard and Observability
Holmstrom, B. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003320 · Cited by 8,311
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Management ownership and market valuation
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90048-7 · Cited by 6,895
The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences
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Multitask principal – agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design
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Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives
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Journal of Economic Literature
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Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value
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Outside directors and CEO turnover
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Does a long‐term orientation create value? Evidence from a regression discontinuity
Flammer, C., & Bansal, P. (2017) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.2629 · Cited by 670
Bloom, N., Sadun, R., & Van Reenen, J. (2016) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w22327 · Cited by 306
“Capitalists in the Twenty-First Century”
Smith, M., Yagan, D., Zidar, O., & Zwick, E. (2019) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjz020 · Cited by 263
A Study on the Sustainable Development of NPOs with Blockchain Technology
Shin, E.-J., Kang, H.-G., & Bae, K. (2020) · Sustainability · doi:10.3390/su12156158 · Cited by 54
Metadata
- Authors
- Edmans, A., & Gabaix, X.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Literature
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2016-12-01
- Volume
- 54
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1232-1287
- ISSN
- 0022-0515 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3121884940
- Cited by
- 270
- References
- 189
- FWCI
- 119.49
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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