The DOI matches its Crossref record; 60 of the 60 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Corporate Governance Propagation through Overlapping Directors
Abstract
How are governance practices propagated across firms? This article proposes, and empirically verifies, that observed governance practices are partly the outcome of network effects among firms with common directors. While firms attempt to select directors whose other directorships are at firms with similar governance practices (“familiarity effect”), this matching of governance practices is imperfect because other factors also affect the director choice. This generates an “influence effect” as directors acquainted with different practices at other firms influence the firm's governance to move toward the practices of those other firms. These network effects cause governance practices to converge.
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Cites
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Cited by
The Supply of Corporate Directors and Board Independence
Knyazeva, A., Knyazeva, D., & Masulis, R. W. (2013) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hht020 · Cited by 678
Social learning and corporate peer effects
Kaustia, M., & Rantala, V. (2015) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.06.006 · Cited by 314
Metadata
- Authors
- Bouwman, C. H. S.
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2011-05-18
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- 2358-2394
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W2132763102
- Cited by
- 265
- References
- 60
- FWCI
- 32.03
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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