The DOI matches its Crossref record; 60 of the 60 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Corporate Governance Propagation through Overlapping Directors
Abstract
How are governance practices propagated across firms? This article proposes, and empirically verifies, that observed governance practices are partly the outcome of network effects among firms with common directors. While firms attempt to select directors whose other directorships are at firms with similar governance practices (“familiarity effect”), this matching of governance practices is imperfect because other factors also affect the director choice. This generates an “influence effect” as directors acquainted with different practices at other firms influence the firm's governance to move toward the practices of those other firms. These network effects cause governance practices to converge.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Separation of Ownership and Control
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467037 · Cited by 19,058
Kass, R. E., & Raftery, A. E. (1995) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.1080/01621459.1995.10476572 · Cited by 12,558
The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems
JENSEN, M. C. (1993) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04022.x · Cited by 8,528
Moral Hazard and Observability
Holmstrom, B. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003320 · Cited by 8,311
Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables.
MTW, & Long, J. S. (1997) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.2307/2965458 · Cited by 6,898
Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors
Yermack, D. (1996) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(95)00844-5 · Cited by 6,603
Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance
Core, J. E., Holthausen, R. W., & Larcker, D. F. (1999) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(98)00058-0 · Cited by 4,335
Boards: Does one size fit all☆
COLES, J., DANIEL, N., & NAVEEN, L. (2008) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.08.008 · Cited by 3,075
Home Bias at Home: Local Equity Preference in Domestic Portfolios
Coval, J. D., & Moskowitz, T. J. (1999) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00181 · Cited by 2,870
ADAMS, R. B., & FERREIRA, D. (2007) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01206.x · Cited by 2,401
The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey
Adams, R. B., Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (2010) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.48.1.58 · Cited by 2,358
Kass, R. E., & Raftery, A. E. (1995) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.2307/2291091 · Cited by 2,312
Does Distance Still Matter? The Information Revolution in Small Business Lending
Petersen, M. A., & Rajan, R. G. (2002) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00505 · Cited by 2,150
Board meeting frequency and firm performance
Vafeas, N. (1999) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(99)00018-5 · Cited by 2,071
The Geography of Investment: Informed Trading and Asset Prices
Coval, J. D., & Moskowitz, T. J. (2001) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/322088 · Cited by 2,002
Huberman, G. (2001) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/14.3.659 · Cited by 1,910
Social Interaction and Stock‐Market Participation
Hong, H., Kubik, J. D., & Stein, J. C. (2004) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00629.x · Cited by 1,823
The determinants of board structure☆
LINCK, J., NETTER, J., & YANG, T. (2008) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.03.004 · Cited by 1,802
Mizruchi, M. S. (1996) · Annual Review of Sociology · doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.22.1.271 · Cited by 1,777
The determinants of corporate board size and composition: An empirical analysis
Boone, A. L., Casares Field, L., Karpoff, J. M., & Raheja, C. G. (2007) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.05.004 · Cited by 1,719
The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems
JENSEN, M. C. (1993) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.2307/2329018 · Cited by 1,666
Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?
FICH, E. M., & SHIVDASANI, A. (2006) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00852.x · Cited by 1,660
Leadership structure: Separating the CEO and Chairman of the Board
Brickley, J. A., Coles, J. L., & Jarrell, G. (1997) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/s0929-1199(96)00013-2 · Cited by 1,526
Too Busy to Mind the Business? Monitoring by Directors with Multiple Board Appointments
Ferris, S. P., Jagannathan, M., & Pritchard, A. C. (2003) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00559 · Cited by 1,479
A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital
Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1994) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118350 · Cited by 1,438
Determinants of Board Size and Composition: A Theory of Corporate Boards
Raheja, C. G. (2005) · Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.1017/s0022109000002313 · Cited by 1,275
A Theory of Board Control and Size
Harris, M., & Raviv, A. (2008) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhl030 · Cited by 1,144
A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital
Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1991) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w3906 · Cited by 1,060
Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?
Fich, E. M., & Shivdasani, A. (2012) · Corporate Governance · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-31579-4_10 · Cited by 1,051
Thy Neighbor's Portfolio: Word‐of‐Mouth Effects in the Holdings and Trades of Money Managers
HONG, H., KUBIK, J. D., & STEIN, J. C. (2005) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00817.x · Cited by 930
Hwang, B.-H., & Kim, S. (2009) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.07.005 · Cited by 917
Board composition, ownership structure, and hostile takeovers
Shivdasani, A. (1993) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(93)90009-5 · Cited by 906
The Geography of Equity Analysis
Malloy, C. J. (2005) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00744.x · Cited by 879
CEO compensation, director compensation, and firm performance: Evidence of cronyism?
Brick, I. E., Palmon, O., & Wald, J. K. (2006) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2005.08.005 · Cited by 871
Overconfidence, CEO Selection, and Corporate Governance
GOEL, A. M., & THAKOR, A. V. (2008) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01412.x · Cited by 826
Participation and investment decisions in a retirement plan: the influence of colleagues’ choices
Duflo, E., & Saez, E. (2002) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(01)00098-6 · Cited by 782
The Small World of the American Corporate Elite, 1982-2001
Davis, G. F., Yoo, M., & Baker, W. E. (2003) · Strategic Organization · doi:10.1177/14761270030013002 · Cited by 728
Managerial Incentives and Capital Management
Holmstrom, B., & Costa, J. R. I. (1986) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1884180 · Cited by 671
Network Effects and Welfare Cultures*
Bertrand, M., Luttmer, E. F. P., & Mullainathan, S. (2000) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300554971 · Cited by 631
The Determinants of Board Structure at the Initial Public Offering
Baker, M., & Gompers, P. A. (2003) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/380409 · Cited by 624
CEO Compensation and Board Structure
CHHAOCHHARIA, V., & GRINSTEIN, Y. (2009) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01433.x · Cited by 611
Network Effects and Welfare Cultures
Bertrand, M., Luttmer, E. F. P., & Mullainathan, S. (1998) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w6832 · Cited by 521
Does the use of peer groups contribute to higher pay and less efficient compensation?☆
BIZJAK, J., LEMMON, M., & NAVEEN, L. (2008) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.08.007 · Cited by 509
Bebchuk, L. (2005) · Oxford Review of Economic Policy · doi:10.1093/oxrep/gri017 · Cited by 490
Option Backdating and Board Interlocks
Bizjak, J., Lemmon, M., & Whitby, R. (2009) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn120 · Cited by 488
Garvey, G. T., & Milbourn, T. T. (2006) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.01.006 · Cited by 480
Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. (2008) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2008.06.002 · Cited by 457
CEO compensation, diversification, and incentives
Jin, L. (2002) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(02)00150-2 · Cited by 384
Dooley, P. C. (1969) · American Economic Review · Cited by 355
THE STATE OF U.S. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: WHAT'S RIGHT AND WHAT'S WRONG?
Holmstrom, B. R., & Kaplan, S. N. (2003) · Journal of applied corporate finance · doi:10.1111/j.1745-6622.2003.tb00457.x · Cited by 310
Neighborhood matters: The impact of location on broad based stock option plans
Kedia, S., & Rajgopal, S. (2008) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.03.004 · Cited by 296
THE COMPANY YOU KEEP: THE EFFECTS OF FAMILY AND NEIGHBORHOOD ON DISADVANTAGED YOUNTHSPreprint
Case, A. C., & Katz, L. F. (1991) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 281
Distance Still Matters: Evidence from Municipal Bond Underwriting
Butler, A. W. (2008) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn002 · Cited by 277
Information Control, Career Concerns, and Corporate Governance
SONG, F., & THAKOR, A. V. (2006) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00891.x · Cited by 229
Explaining Corporate Governance: Boards, Bylaws, and Charter Provisions
Gillan, S. L., Hartzell, J. C., & Starks, L. T. (2003) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.442740 · Cited by 211
Pay Without Performance and the Managerial Power Hypothesis: A CommentPreprint
Holmstrom, B. R. (2006) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.899096 · Cited by 182
Board Interlocks and Earnings Management ContagionPreprint
Chiu, P., Teoh, S. H., & Tian, F. (2010) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1723714 · Cited by 83
Distance, Language, and Culture Bias: The Role of Investor SophisticationPreprint
Grinblatt, M. S., & Keloharju, M. (2000) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.222169 · Cited by 77
Board Networks and Merger Performance
Schonlau, R. J., & Singh, P. (2018) · Figshare · doi:10.1184/r1/6704153 · Cited by 33
Board Networks and Merger PerformancePreprint
Singh, P. V., & Schonlau, R. J. (2009) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1322223 · Cited by 32
Cited by
The Supply of Corporate Directors and Board Independence
Knyazeva, A., Knyazeva, D., & Masulis, R. W. (2013) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hht020 · Cited by 678
Social learning and corporate peer effects
Kaustia, M., & Rantala, V. (2015) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.06.006 · Cited by 314
Metadata
- Authors
- Bouwman, C. H. S.
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2011-05-18
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- 2358-2394
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W2132763102
- Cited by
- 265
- References
- 60
- FWCI
- 32.03
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.