The theory of constructed emotion: an active inference account of interoception and categorization
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 281 of the 288 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 24 of the 95 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
The science of emotion has been using folk psychology categories derived from philosophy to search for the brain basis of emotion. The last two decades of neuroscience research have brought us to the brink of a paradigm shift in understanding the workings of the brain, however, setting the stage to revolutionize our understanding of what emotions are and how they work. In this article, we begin with the structure and function of the brain, and from there deduce what the biological basis of emotions might be. The answer is a brain-based, computational account called the theory of constructed emotion.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
The paper argues that emotions are not biologically fixed entities but brain-based constructions built from predictive, allostasis-driven categorization of interoceptive and exteroceptive signals. It reframes emotion as an active inference process in which distributed brain networks generate concepts, predictions, and action plans rather than merely detecting discrete emotional states.
Key findings
- The brain’s core task is framed as allostasis: efficiently regulating the body’s internal milieu to support growth, survival, and reproduction; the paper states that humans’ internal model occupies 20% of total energy consumed in the brain.
- Emotion categories are said to be constructed from degenerate, multi-use neural patterns, not from dedicated emotion-specific neural essences; the author notes that this explains why the same emotion category can arise from multiple spatiotemporal patterns and why similar-looking neural/physiological signatures may not replicate across studies.
- The theory assigns computational roles to large-scale networks: the default mode network is hypothesized to support the brain’s internal model, the salience network to tune precision/attention to prediction error, and the frontoparietal control network to sustain and suppress simulations over longer timescales.
- The paper argues that pattern-classification findings in emotion neuroscience are often misread: a pattern that distinguishes, for example, sadness is described as a statistical summary of a highly variable set of instances, not the essence of sadness.
Methods
- The paper is a theoretical/review article, not an empirical study; it builds a brain-based account of emotion from neuroscience, computational, evolutionary, and anatomical literature.
- It synthesizes evidence from human neuroimaging, lesion studies, animal studies, and pattern-classification studies, and uses these to argue for the theory of constructed emotion.
- Main analysis is conceptual and inferential: the author deduces hypotheses about emotion from brain organization, predictive coding/active inference, interoception, and allostasis rather than testing a new dataset.
Limitations
- The paper itself states it is “a mere sketch of a much larger scientific landscape,” so it is explicitly incomplete and presented as a hypothesis-generating framework.
- It also says the theory is at the beginning of a paradigm shift and that new paradigms raise more questions than they answer; this indicates the account is not yet fully settled.
- Evident from the text: the article provides no new empirical sample, experiment, or quantitative test of its own claims; its support is argumentative and synthesis-based, not direct causal validation.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
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Figures
![Fig. 1. The classical view of emotion. The classical view of emotion includes basic emotion theories (e.g. for a review, see Tracy and Randles, 2011), causal appraisal theories (e.g. Scherer, 2009; Roseman, 2011), and theories of emotion that rely on black-box functionalism (Davis, 1992; Anderson and Adolphs, 2014). Each emotion faculty is assumed to have its own innate ‘essence’ that distinguishes it from all other emotions. This might be a Lockean essence (an underlying causal mechanism that all instances of an emotion category share, making them that kind of emotion and not some other kind of emotion, depicted by the circles in the figure). Lockean essences might be a biological, such as a set of dedicated neurons, or psychological, such as a set of evaluative mechanisms called ‘appraisals’. An emotion category is usually assumed to have a Platonic essence [a physical fingerprint that instances of that emotion share, but that other emotions do not, such a set of facial movements (an ‘expression’), a pattern of autonomic nervous system activity, and/or a pattern of appraisals]. Of course, no one is expecting complete invariance, but it is assumed that instances of a category are similar enough to be easily diagnosed as the same emotion using objective (perceiver-independent) measures alone. (A) is adapted from Davis (1992). (B) is adapted Anderson and Adolphs (2014). (C) is adapted from Barrett (2006a), which reviews the growing evidence that contracts the classical view of emotion.](https://figures.cochat.ai/paper-figures/102b017b8ff14ee894affa0c311dd43d/the-theory-of-constructed-emotion-an-active-inference-account-of-interoception-figure-1.jpg)
![Fig. 2. Hubs in the human brain. (A) Hubs of the rich club, adapted from van den Heuvel and Sporns (2013). These regions are strongly interconnected with one another and it is proposed that they integrate information across the brain to create large-scale patterns of information flow (i.e. synchronized activity; van den Heuvel and Sporns, 2013). They are sometimes referred to as convergence or confluence zones (e.g. Damasio, 1989; Meyer and Damasio, 2009). (B) Results of a forward inference analysis, revealing ‘hot spots’ in the brain that show a better than chance increase in BOLD signal across 5633 studies from the Neurosynth database. Activations are thresholded at FWE P < 0.05. Limbic regions (i.e. agranular/dysgranular with descending projections to visceromotor control nuclei) include the cingulate cortex [midcingulate cortex (MCC), pregenual anterior cingulate cortex (pgACC)], ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), supplementary motor and premotor areas (SMA and PMC), medial temporal lobe, the anterior insula (aINS) and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (vlPFC) (e.g. Carrive and Morgan, 2012; Bar et al., 2016); for a discussion and additional references, see (Kleckner et al., in press). AG, angular gyrus; MC, motor cortex.](https://figures.cochat.ai/paper-figures/d3ff6c036b244d4490f86144ee9354f4/the-theory-of-constructed-emotion-an-active-inference-account-of-interoception-figure-2.jpg)

![Fig. 4. The brain is a concept generator. (A) Brodmann areas are shaded to depict their degree of laminar organization, including the insula (bottom right). The brain’s computational architecture is depicted (adapted from Barbas, 2015), where prediction signals flow from the deep layers of less granular regions (cell bodies depicted with triangles) to the upper layers of more granular regions; this, can also be thought of concept construction [as described in Barrett (2017)]. I hypothesize that agranular (i.e. limbic) cortices generatively combine past experiences to initiate the construction of embodied concepts; multimodal summaries cascade to sensory and motor systems to create the simulations that will become motor plans and perceptions. Prediction error processing, in turn, is akin to concept learning. The upper layers of cortex compress prediction errors and reduce error dimensionality, eventually creating multimodal summaries, by virtue of a cytoarchitectural gradient: prediction error flows from the upper layers of primary sensory and motor regions (highly granular cortex) populated with many small pyramidal cells with few connections towards less granular heteromodal regions (including limbic cortices) with fewer but larger pyramidal cells having many connections (Finlay and Uchiyama, 2015). (B) Evidence of conceptual processing in the default mode network: Multimodal summaries for emotion concepts [adapted from Skerry and Saxe (2015), Figure 1B]; summary representations of sensory-motor properties (color, shape, visual motion, sound and physical manipulation [Fernandino et al. (2016), Figure 5]; and, semantic processing [adapted from Binder and Desai (2011), Figure 2]. (C) Regions that consistently increase activity during emotional experience (green), emotion regulation (blue), and their overlap (red) [as appears in Clark-Polner et al. (2016); adapted from Buhle et al. (2014) and Satpute et al. (2015)]. Overlaps are observed in the aIns, vlPFC, the MCC, SMA and posterior superior temporal sulcus. Studies of emotional experience show consistent increase in activity that is consistent with manipulating predictions (i.e. the default mode and salience networks), whereas reappraisal instructions appear to manipulate the modification of those predictions (i.e. the frontoparietal and salience networks). (D) Intensity maps for five emotion categories examined by Wager et al. (2015). Maps represent the expected activations or population centers, given a specific emotion category. Maps also reflect expected co-activation patterns. Notice that population centers for all emotion categories can be found within the default mode and salience networks. These are probabilistic summaries, not brain states for emotion Adapted from Wager et al. (2015).](https://figures.cochat.ai/paper-figures/55f563d18bfd48bb9e26f4fb7fef9be6/the-theory-of-constructed-emotion-an-active-inference-account-of-interoception-figure-4.jpg)


Verification
Claims the paper makes
17 Valid · 5 Not valid · 33 Not checked · 61 Own results and interpretations
At least one cited source doesn’t support this claim or points to a different paper, and none confirmed it — see the verdicts below.
In the paper
“When viewed in this light, it is an error to claim that studies of the human brain using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) yield different results than studies of non-human animal brains with lesions or optogenetics (e.g. Adolphs, 2013).”
§ The theory of constructed emotion: an active inference account of interoception and categorization > Selected implications of the theory
What the sources say
- Disputedcites Adolphs, 2013 matched to “The Biology of Fear” (2013) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Abstract says rodent studies show highly specific fear circuits, whereas human neuroimaging findings seem to make the opposite claim. The Conclusions and Open Challenges suggest that fMRI may miss neuron-level distinctions, offering a possible explanation for the apparent difference—not saying it is an error to report different results. No page number is available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Checked by a reasoning model — may be wrong.
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Disputed
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“The brain achieves complexity through ‘degeneracy’ (Edelman and Gally, 2001), the capacity for dissimilar representations (e.g. different sets of neurons) to give rise to instances of the same category (e.g. anger) in the same context”
§ The theory of constructed emotion: an active inference account of interoception and categorization > The biological background > What is a brain?
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Edelman and Gally, 2001 matched to “Degeneracy and complexity in biological systems” (2001) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
In the copy’s ‘Relating Degeneracy and Complexity’ passage (page unavailable), degeneracy means structurally different elements yielding similar outputs in a given context; the discussion of mammalian brains likewise describes alternative neural circuits yielding similar outputs. The paper does not establish that the brain achieves complexity *through* degeneracy—it calls their relationship a conjecture—nor does it discuss different representations producing instances of an emotion category such as anger. (LLM, conf=0.86)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“it is unlikely that all instances of an emotion category share a set of core features (i.e. a single facial expression, autonomic pattern or set of neurons; see Clark-Polner et al., 2016).”
§ The theory of constructed emotion: an active inference account of interoception and categorization > The biological background > What is a brain?
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Clark-Polner et al., 2016 matched to “Multivoxel pattern analysis does not provide evidence to support the existence of basic emotions” (2016) source
The Introduction says emotion categories contain variable instances and that a category-level pattern need not describe features shared by every instance. It also applies its criticism of essentialism to claims about facial movements, autonomic responses, and dedicated neural circuitry. (LLM, conf=0.93)
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Interoceptive sensations are usually experienced as lower dimensional feelings of affect”
§ The theory of constructed emotion: an active inference account of interoception and categorization > The biological background > How does a brain perform allostasis? For a brain to effectively regulate its body in the world, it runs an internal model of that body in the world.5 In psychology, we refer to this modeling as ‘embodied simulation’ (Barsalou, 2008; Barsalou et al., 2003) (e.g. see Figure 3). An internal model is metabolic investment, implemented by intrinsic activity (e.g. Berkes et al., 2011) that, in humans, occupies 20% of our total energy consumed (Raichle, 2010).6 Given these considerations, modeling the world ‘accurately’ in some detached, disembodied manner would be metabolically reckless. Instead, the brain models the world from the perspective of its body’s physiological needs.7 As a consequence, a brain’s internal model includes not only the relevant statistical regularities in the extrapersonal world, but also the statistical regularities of the internal milieu. Collectively, the representation and utilization of these internal sensations is called ‘interoception’ (Craig, 2015). Recent research suggests that interoception is at the core of the brain’s internal model and arises from the process of allostasis (Barrett and Simmons, 2015; Chanes and Barrett, 2016; Barrett, 2017; for related discussions, see Seth et al., 2012; Seth, 2013; Pezzulo et al., 2015; Seth & Friston, 2016). Interoceptive sensations are usually experienced as lower dimensional feelings of affect (Barrett and Bliss-Moreau, 2009; Barrett, 2017). As such, the properties of affect—valence and arousal (Barrett and Russell, 1999; Kuppens et al., 2013)—are basic features of consciousness (Damasio, 1999; Dreyfus and Thompson, 2007; Edelman and Tononi, 2000; James, 1890/2007; Searle, 1992, 2004; Wundt, 1897) that, importantly, are not unique to instances of emotion. All animals run an internal model of their world for the purpose of allostasis (i.e. the notion of an internal model is species-general). Even single-celled organisms that lack a brain learn, remember, make predictions, and forage in service to allostasis (Freddolino and Tavazoie, 2012; Sterling and Laughlin, 2015). The content of any internal model is species-specific, however, including only the parts of the animal’s physical surroundings that its brain has judged relevant for growth, survival and reproduction (i.e. a brain creates its affective niche in the present based on what has been relevant for allostasis in the past). Everything else is an extravagance that puts energy regulation at risk. As an animal’s integrated physiological state changes constantly throughout the day, its immediate past determines the aspects of the sensory world that concern the animal in the present, which in turn influences what its niche will contain in the immediate future. This observation prompts an important insight: neurons do not lie dormant until stimulated by the outside world, denoted as stimulus→response.8 Ample evidence shows that ongoing brain activity influences how the brain processes incoming sensory information (e.g. Sayers et al., 1974),9 and that neurons fire intrinsically within large networks without any need for external stimuli (Swanson, 2012). The implications of these insights are profound: namely, it is very unlikely that perception, cognition, and emotion are localized in dedicated brain systems, with perception triggering emotions that battle with cognition to control behavior (Barrett, 2009). This means classical accounts of emotion, which rely on this S→R narrative, are highly doubtful.
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Barrett and Bliss-Moreau, 2009 matched to “Chapter 4 Affect as a Psychological Primitive” (2009) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 2 describes core affect as grounded in bodily fluctuations and integrating interoceptive information; Section 4 describes it in two dimensions, valence and arousal. But Section 3 says that when affect is in the background of consciousness, it is perceived as a property of the world rather than as a feeling. The copy therefore supports the link between interoception and low-dimensional affect, but not the claim that interoceptive sensations are usually experienced as feelings of affect. Page numbers were not available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.82)
- Not matchedcites Barrett, 2017
An author–year citation the paper’s reference list doesn’t settle. We don’t search these by name.
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Using Bayesian logic (Deneve, 2008; Bastos et al., 2012), a brain uses pattern completion to decide among simulations and implement one of them (Gallivan et al., 2016), based on predicted maintenance of physiological efficiency across multiple body systems”
§ The theory of constructed emotion: an active inference account of interoception and categorization > The biological background > An internal model is predictive, not reactive
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Deneve, 2008 matched to “Bayesian Spiking Neurons I: Inference” (2008) source
- Supportedcites Bastos et al., 2012 matched to “Canonical Microcircuits for Predictive Coding” (2012) source
The Bastos et al. citation is attached to “Using Bayesian logic,” not to the later claims about pattern completion or choosing a simulation. In “Predictive coding and the free energy principle,” the paper describes the brain as maximising Bayesian model evidence and using Bayesian filtering of sensory inputs; “A canonical microcircuit for predictive coding” also describes hierarchical Bayesian inference. (LLM, conf=0.92)
- Partly supportedcites Gallivan et al., 2016 matched to “Parallel specification of competing sensorimotor control policies for alternative action options” (2016) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Introduction (page unavailable) says the brain prepares multiple potential movements in parallel before deciding between and implementing one. That supports the selection-and-implementation part attributed to Gallivan et al., but the paper does not describe this as pattern completion among simulations. The Bayesian-logic and physiological-efficiency clauses are not attached to this citation. (LLM, conf=0.88)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
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Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“Neural foundations of interoceptive inference, including the posterior and anterior insula, anterior cingulate, somatosensory cortices, and brainstem nuclei, integrate visceral afferents with higher-order appraisals of contextualized concepts and goals (Craig, 2002; Barrett, 2017).”
From Listen to your inner body: embodied emotions in predictive neuroscience and traditional East Asian medicine (2026) · cites this paper as Barrett, 2017
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“Within a predictive framework, they can be interpreted as learned correspondences between interoceptive patterns and emotion concepts, shaped by culture and experience (Barrett, 2017).”
From Listen to your inner body: embodied emotions in predictive neuroscience and traditional East Asian medicine (2026) · cites this paper as Barrett, 2017
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“Within this framework, emotion can be understood as an inference about changes in bodily states.”
From Listen to your inner body: embodied emotions in predictive neuroscience and traditional East Asian medicine (2026) · cites this paper as Barrett, 2017
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Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Barrett, L. F.
- Affiliations
- Northeastern University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Barrett, Lisa Feldman
- Venue
- Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2016-10-19
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- nsw154
- ISSN
- 1749-5016 (ISSN-L)
- 1749-5024
- PMC
- PMC5390700
- OpenAlex
- W2538626945
- Cited by
- 1,426
- References
- 288
- Citations by year
- 2026: 116 · 2025: 198 · 2024: 180 · 2023: 218 · 2022: 174 · 2021: 185 · 2020: 135 · 2019: 114 · 2018: 72 · 2017: 34
- FWCI
- 46.53
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience (publishedVersion)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- National Science Foundation (1638234, U01 CA193632)
- National Institute on Aging (AG030311, R01AG030311)
- National Cancer Institute (CA193632, CMMI 1638234, U01CA193632)
- Division of Civil, Mechanical and Manufacturing Innovation
- Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (W911NF-16–1-0191, CMMI 1638234, U01 CA193632, W911NF-15-1-0647)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
- Health Sciences › Medicine › Psychiatry and Mental health › Psychosomatic Disorders and Their Treatments
- Keywords
- theory of constructed emotion, active inference, interoception, emotion classification, folk psychology, computational models of emotion, biological basis of emotion, brain structure and function
- MeSH terms
- Affect, Brain, Emotions, Humans, Psychological Theory, Interoception
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
The claim verdicts this report counts are experimental: their accuracy is not yet measured.
A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-10-10, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).
A second model labelled each claim on 2026-10-10 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).
Cited sources are checked with a language model’s help (gpt-6-sol).
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.