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Evolutionary games and population dynamics: maintenance of cooperation in public goods games

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Hauert, Christoph, Holmes, Miranda, Doebeli, Michael · 2006 · Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences

Abstract

The emergence and abundance of cooperation in nature poses a tenacious and challenging puzzle to evolutionary biology. Cooperative behaviour seems to contradict Darwinian evolution because altruistic individuals increase the fitness of other members of the population at a cost to themselves. Thus, in the absence of supporting mechanisms, cooperation should decrease and vanish, as predicted by classical models for cooperation in evolutionary game theory, such as the Prisoner's Dilemma and public goods games. Traditional approaches to studying the problem of cooperation assume constant population sizes and thus neglect the ecology of the interacting individuals. Here, we incorporate ecological dynamics into evolutionary games and reveal a new mechanism for maintaining cooperation. In public goods games, cooperation can gain a foothold if the population density depends on the average population payoff. Decreasing population densities, due to defection leading to small payoffs, results in smaller interaction group sizes in which cooperation can be favoured. This feedback between ecological dynamics and game dynamics can generate stable coexistence of cooperators and defectors in public goods games. However, this mechanism fails for pairwise Prisoner's Dilemma interactions and the population is driven to extinction. Our model represents natural extension of replicator dynamics to populations of varying densities.

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Metadata

Authors
Hauert, C., Holmes, M., & Doebeli, M.
Venue
Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
Published
2006-07-05
Volume
273
Issue
1600
Pages
2565-2571
ISSN
  • 0080-4649 (ISSN-L)
  • 0962-8452
  • 1471-2954
OpenAlex
W2160084302
Cited by
307
References
36
FWCI
26.51
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Evolutionary games and population dynamics: maintenance of cooperation in public goods games. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1098/rspb.2006.3600
The paper
Hauert, C., Holmes, M., & Doebeli, M. (2006). Evolutionary games and population dynamics: maintenance of cooperation in public goods games. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2006.3600

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.