Emergence of cooperation in public goods games
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Evolution of cooperation has been a major issue in evolutionary biology. Cooperation is observed not only in dyadic interactions, but also in social interactions involving more than two individuals. It has been argued that direct reciprocity cannot explain the emergence of cooperation in large groups because the basin of attraction for the ‘cooperative’ equilibrium state shrinks rapidly as the group size increases. However, this argument is based on the analysis of models that consider the deterministic process. More recently, stochastic models of two-player games have been developed and the conditions for natural selection to favour the emergence of cooperation in finite populations have been specified. These conditions have been given as a mathematically simple expression, which is called the one-third law. In this paper, we investigate a stochastic model of n -player games and show that natural selection can favour a reciprocator replacing a population of defectors in the n -player repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game. We also derive a generalized version of the one-third law (the {2/[ n ( n +1)]} 1/( n −1) law). Additionally, contrary to previous studies, the model suggests that the evolution of cooperation in public goods game can be facilitated by larger group size under certain conditions.
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Citations
Cites
The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism
Trivers, R. L. (1971) · The Quarterly Review of Biology · doi:10.1086/406755 · Cited by 11,010
Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation
Nowak, M. A. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1133755 · Cited by 5,894 · cited 4×
“7) include the corresponding conditions that have been obtained (Nowak et al. 2004) for the case of n= 2. Following Nowak et al. (2004), we call strategy B ESSN (evolutionarily stable strategy) if the following two conditions are met: (i) selection opposes A invading B, which means that a single mutant A in a populati…”
BackgroundInfluentialEvolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
Hofbauer, J., & Sigmund, K. (1998) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173179 · Cited by 5,502 · cited 1×
“Let us compare the ESSN conditions (2.8) and (2.9) with the traditional ESS condition in the conventional deterministic model (e.g. Maynard Smith 1982; Hofbauer & Sigmund 1998).”
ResultInfluentialSocial dilemmas: the anatomy of cooperation
Kollock, P. (1998) · Annual Review of Sociology · doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.24.1.183 · Cited by 1,746 · cited 2×
“Humans often cooperate in public goods games and in situations ranging from family issues to global warming (Kollock 1998; Milinski et al. 2006).”
Background
Cited by
Evolutionary games in the multiverse
Gokhale, C. S., & Traulsen, A. (2010) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0912214107 · Cited by 279
Evolution of cooperation in stochastic games
Hilbe, C., Šimsa, Š., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. A. (2018) · Nature · doi:10.1038/s41586-018-0277-x · Cited by 277
Signalling boosts the evolution of cooperation in repeated group interactions
Martinez-Vaquero, L. A., Santos, F. C., & Trianni, V. (2020) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2020.0635 · Cited by 11
Metadata
- Authors
- Kurokawa, S., & Ihara, Y.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
- Publisher
- The Royal Society
- Published
- 2009-01-13
- Volume
- 276
- Issue
- 1660
- Pages
- 1379-1384
- ISSN
- 0080-4649 (ISSN-L)
- 0962-8452
- 1471-2954
- OpenAlex
- W2168904520
- Cited by
- 163
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 19.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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