The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Imitation as behaviour parsing
Open accessAbstract
Non–human great apes appear to be able to acquire elaborate skills partly by imitation, raising the possibility of the transfer of skill by imitation in animals that have only rudimentary mentalizing capacities: in contrast to the frequent assumption that imitation depends on prior understanding of others' intentions. Attempts to understand the apes' behaviour have led to the development of a purely mechanistic model of imitation, the ‘behaviour parsing’ model, in which the statistical regularities that are inevitable in planned behaviour are used to decipher the organization of another agent's behaviour, and thence to imitate parts of it. Behaviour can thereby be understood statistically in terms of its correlations (circumstances of use, effects on the environment) without understanding of intentions or the everyday physics of cause–and–effect. Thus, imitation of complex, novel behaviour may not require mentalizing, but conversely behaviour parsing may be a necessary preliminary to attributing intention and cause.
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Citations
Cites
The unbearable automaticity of being
Bargh, J. A., & Chartrand, T. L. (1999) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.54.7.462 · Cited by 3,699 · cited 2×
“This would ramify the position argued by Bargh & Chartrand (1999) , that much more of everyday human action than is currently recognized relies on fast, mechanistic, low-level processes, rather than on elaborate, rational thought processes and deeply intentional understanding.”
BackgroundTomasello, M., Kruger, A. C., & Ratner, H. H. (1993) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x0003123x · Cited by 1,891
Tomasello, M., & Call, J. (1997) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780195106237.001.0001 · Cited by 1,491
Cited by
Do humans have two systems to track beliefs and belief-like states
Apperly, I. A., & Butterfill, S. A. (2009) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/a0016923 · Cited by 1,261
Arbib, M. A. (2005) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x05000038 · Cited by 1,164
The manifold nature of interpersonal relations: the quest for a common mechanism
Gallese, V. (2003) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2002.1234 · Cited by 681
Computational approaches to motor learning by imitation
Schaal, S., Ijspeert, A., & Billard, A. (2003) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2002.1258 · Cited by 587
Rizzolatti, G., Cattaneo, L., Fabbri-Destro, M., & Rozzi, S. (2014) · Physiological Reviews · doi:10.1152/physrev.00009.2013 · Cited by 496
Metadata
- Authors
- Byrne, R. W.
- Venue
- Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences
- Publisher
- The Royal Society
- Published
- 2003-02-04
- Volume
- 358
- Issue
- 1431
- Pages
- 529-536
- ISSN
- 0962-8436 (ISSN-L)
- 1471-2970
- OpenAlex
- W2158148009
- Cited by
- 191
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 12.20
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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