A neuroscientific approach to normative judgment in law and justice
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Developments in cognitive neuroscience are providing new insights into the nature of normative judgment. Traditional views in such disciplines as philosophy, religion, law, psychology and economics have differed over the role and usefulness of intuition and emotion in judging blameworthiness. Cognitive psychology and neurobiology provide new tools and methods for studying questions of normative judgment. Recently, a consensus view has emerged, which recognizes important roles for emotion and intuition and which suggests that normative judgment is a distributed process in the brain. Testing this approach through lesion and scanning studies has linked a set of brain regions to such judgment, including the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, orbitofrontal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex and posterior superior temporal sulcus. Better models of emotion and intuition will help provide further clarification of the processes involved. The study of law and justice is less well developed. We advance a model of law in the brain which suggests that law can recruit a wider variety of sources of information and paths of processing than do the intuitive moral responses that have been studied so far. We propose specific hypotheses and lines of further research that could help test this approach.
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Citations
Cites
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BackgroundAffective Neuroscience: The Foundations of Human and Animal Emotions
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Background
Cited by
The role of social cognition in decision making
Frith, C. D., & Singer, T. (2008) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2008.0156 · Cited by 361
The self as a moral agent: linking the neural bases of social agency and moral sensitivity
Moll, J., Oliveira-Souza, R. D., Garrido, G. J., Bramati, I. E., Caparelli-Daquer, E. M. A., Paiva, M. L. M. F., Zahn, R., & Grafman, J. (2007) · Social Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/17470910701392024 · Cited by 220
“Although lawyers and philosophers have long been aware of the mutual dependence of morality and agency, investigations on the neurobiology of moral emotions and agency have so far evolved largely in parallel (Chorvat & McCabe, 2004; Goodenough & Prehn, 2004; Zeki & Goodenough, 2004).”
BackgroundFrom moral to legal judgment: the influence of normative context in lawyers and other academics
Schleim, S., Spranger, T. M., Erk, S., & Walter, H. (2011) · Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience · doi:10.1093/scan/nsq010 · Cited by 66
“Considering the recent discussion about the neuroscientific implications for the legal system (Goodenough and Prehn, 2004; Greene and Cohen, 2004; Garland, 2005; Zeki and Goodenough, 2006; Mobbs et al., 2007; Tovino, 2007; Gazzaniga, 2008), sometimes even referred to as ‘neurolaw’ (Wolf, 2008; Schleim et al.”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Zeki, S., Goodenough, O. R., Goodenough, O. R., & Prehn, K.
- Venue
- Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences
- Publisher
- The Royal Society
- Published
- 2004-11-29
- Volume
- 359
- Issue
- 1451
- Pages
- 1709-1726
- ISSN
- 0962-8436 (ISSN-L)
- 1471-2970
- OpenAlex
- W1637265009
- Cited by
- 79
- References
- 26
- FWCI
- 1.76
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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