Two distinct feedback codes in V1 for ‘real’ and ‘imaginary’ internal experiences
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Visual illusions and visual imagery are conscious sensory events that lack a corresponding physical input. But while everyday mental imagery feels distinct from incoming stimulus input, visual illusions, like hallucinations, are under limited volitional control and appear indistinguishable from physical reality. Illusions are thought to arise from lower-level processes within sensory cortices. In contrast, imagery involves a wide network of brain areas that recruit early visual cortices for the sensory representation of the imagined stimulus. Here, we combine laminar fMRI brain imaging with psychophysical methods and multivariate pattern analysis to investigate in human participants how seemingly ‘real’ and imaginary non-physical experiences are processed in primary visual cortex (V1). We find that the content of mental imagery is only decodable in deep layers, whereas illusory content is only decodable at superficial depths. This suggests that feedback to the different layers may serve distinct functions: low-level feedback to superficial layers might be responsible for shaping perception-like experiences, while deep-layer feedback might serve the formation of a more malleable ‘inner’ world, separate from ongoing perception.
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Cites
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“For example, (most) feedforward sensory input from the eye arrives in the middle layers, whereas (most) feedback input from other brain areas arrives in the deep and superficial layers(13, 14).”
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Self-citation
Cited by
Subjective signal strength distinguishes reality from imagination
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Why do imagery and perception look and feel so different?
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Cortical excitability controls the strength of mental imagery
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“Interestingly, recent research suggests that imagery-related signals are predominantly found in deep cortical layers (Bergmann et al., 2019).”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Bergmann, J., Morgan, A. T., & Muckli, L.
- Venue
- bioRxiv (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory)
- Publisher
- openRxiv
- Published
- 2019-06-13
- OpenAlex
- W2949153829
- Cited by
- 78
- References
- 14
- Type
- posted content
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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