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Subjective signal strength distinguishes reality from imagination

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Dijkstra, Nadine, Fleming, Stephen M. · 2023 · Nature Communications

Abstract

Humans are voracious imaginers, with internal simulations supporting memory, planning and decision-making. Because the neural mechanisms supporting imagery overlap with those supporting perception, a foundational question is how reality and imagination are kept apart. One possibility is that the intention to imagine is used to identify and discount self-generated signals during imagery. Alternatively, because internally generated signals are generally weaker, sensory strength is used to index reality. Traditional psychology experiments struggle to investigate this issue as subjects can rapidly learn that real stimuli are in play. Here, we combined one-trial-per-participant psychophysics with computational modelling and neuroimaging to show that imagined and perceived signals are in fact intermixed, with judgments of reality being determined by whether this intermixed signal is strong enough to cross a reality threshold. A consequence of this account is that when virtual or imagined signals are strong enough, they become subjectively indistinguishable from reality.

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Fig. 1 Experimental design and theoretical accounts of reality monitoring. A We employed online psychophysics to test reality monitoring in a statistically robust manner. Participants were instructed to imagine oriented gratings while looking at dynamic noise. On the final, critical trial, a grating with either the same (congruent) or perpendicular (incongruent) orientation to the imagined stimulus gradually became more visible until it was around detection threshold. Participants were then asked whether they thought a stimulus was presented on the last trial or if what they saw was imagined. Importantly, each participant only performed one critical, reality monitoring trial ensuring they remained naïve about the potential presence of external stimuli. B We compared three theoretical accounts of perceptual reality monitoring: H0 source separation, H1 Perky effect11 and H2 complete source mixing.
Fig. 1 Experimental design and theoretical accounts of reality monitoring. A We employed online psychophysics to test reality monitoring in a statistically robust manner. Participants were instructed to imagine oriented gratings while looking at dynamic noise. On the final, critical trial, a grating with either the same (congruent) or perpendicular (incongruent) orientation to the imagined stimulus gradually became more visible until it was around detection threshold. Participants were then asked whether they thought a stimulus was presented on the last trial or if what they saw was imagined. Importantly, each participant only performed one critical, reality monitoring trial ensuring they remained naïve about the potential presence of external stimuli. B We compared three theoretical accounts of perceptual reality monitoring: H0 source separation, H1 Perky effect11 and H2 complete source mixing.CC BY · PubMed Central
Fig. 2 Model predictions and results. A Simulations of the three alternative theoretical models. Predicted percentage of trials judged as “real” (left hand bars) and imagery vividness (right hand bars) separated by condition (congruent, incongruent) and, for vividness ratings, reality judgment. Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean (SEM) over simulation samples. For H0: n = 1898; H1: n = 1872; H2: n = 1682 independent simulation samples. B Empirical data for reality judgments and vividness from Experiment 1. Data are presented as mean values +/− SEM and dots indicate individual participants, n = 274 independent participants. A logistic regression indicated a main effect of condition on reality judgements (β(1) = 0.860 (CI = 0.31–1.41), p = 0.002 (uncorrected), OR = 0.423). A multinomial regression indicated that there was a significant difference in vividness for real versus imagined judgements for the congruent condition (β(1)=0.40 (CI = 0.22– 0.58) p = 0.000013 (uncorrected)) but not for the incongruent condition (β(1)=0.19 (CI = −0.03–0.40), p = 0.092 (uncorrected)) C Model simulations as in (A), but now for the case with no external input. Data are presented as mean values + /− SEM over simulation samples, for H0: n = 902; H1: n = 879; H2: n = 929 independent simulation samples D. Empirical findings for Experiment 2. A multinomial regression indicated a significance difference in vividness for real versus imagined judgements (β(1)=0.22, p = 0.013, CI = 0.05–0.40). Data are presented as mean values +/− SEM over participants, n = 339 independent participants. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.005; ***p < 0.0005; ****p < 0.00005 all two-sided. Source data are provided as a Source Data file.
Fig. 2 Model predictions and results. A Simulations of the three alternative theoretical models. Predicted percentage of trials judged as “real” (left hand bars) and imagery vividness (right hand bars) separated by condition (congruent, incongruent) and, for vividness ratings, reality judgment. Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean (SEM) over simulation samples. For H0: n = 1898; H1: n = 1872; H2: n = 1682 independent simulation samples. B Empirical data for reality judgments and vividness from Experiment 1. Data are presented as mean values +/− SEM and dots indicate individual participants, n = 274 independent participants. A logistic regression indicated a main effect of condition on reality judgements (β(1) = 0.860 (CI = 0.31–1.41), p = 0.002 (uncorrected), OR = 0.423). A multinomial regression indicated that there was a significant difference in vividness for real versus imagined judgements for the congruent condition (β(1)=0.40 (CI = 0.22– 0.58) p = 0.000013 (uncorrected)) but not for the incongruent condition (β(1)=0.19 (CI = −0.03–0.40), p = 0.092 (uncorrected)) C Model simulations as in (A), but now for the case with no external input. Data are presented as mean values + /− SEM over simulation samples, for H0: n = 902; H1: n = 879; H2: n = 929 independent simulation samples D. Empirical findings for Experiment 2. A multinomial regression indicated a significance difference in vividness for real versus imagined judgements (β(1)=0.22, p = 0.013, CI = 0.05–0.40). Data are presented as mean values +/− SEM over participants, n = 339 independent participants. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.005; ***p < 0.0005; ****p < 0.00005 all two-sided. Source data are provided as a Source Data file.CC BY · PubMed Central
Fig. 3 Neural representations of imagery vividness and perceptual visibility. A The outer panels show brain areas significantly modulated by imagery vividness (left) and perceptual visibility (right). The bars indicate the average activation per vividness/visibility level where 1 is low vividness/visibility and 4 is high vividness/visibility. The middle panel shows cross-decoding accuracy minus chance level (50%) between imagery vividness and perceptual visibility in the three brain areas that showed significant univariate modulation, indicating that not only are the same areas involved in tracking vividness and visibility, they also do so in a similar manner. Pre-SMA: pre-supplementary motor area, dlPFC: dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. n = 35 independent participants. Plotted brain regions showed a significant effect of vividness/visibility in a general linear model with whole-brain FDR correction applied at a q-value of 0.01 (two-sided) with all t(34)<−4.14. Significance of decoding accuracy was determined based on a one-sided permutation test within individual ROIs84; pre-SMA: t(34)=2.96, p = 0.0003, d = 0.5, CI = 0.51–0.55; anterior insula: t(34) = 2.96, p = 0.0008, d = 0.5, CI = 0.51–0.54; right dlPFC: t(34) = 2.37, p = 0.0097, d = 0.4, CI = 0.502–0.53, all uncorrected. B The influence of vividness/visibility on early visual cortex activity (EVC). The bottom left plot represents the location of the EVC region of interest (ROI) in blue. The top panel indicate the univariate effect of vividness F(26, 3) = 1.76, p = 0.18 (two-sided, uncorrected)/visibility (F(26, 3) = 0.35, p = 0.78 (two-sided, uncorrected) on overall activation level within the ROI (lefthand two plots) as well as on the cross-decoding accuracy (t(34) = 1.18, p = 0.13 (one-sided, uncorrected), CI = 0.5–0.52) between vividness and visibility (right plot). The panels on the bottom right indicate the influence of vividness/visibility on the overlap in representations of stimulus content between imagery and perception. Purple bars reflect training on perception and decoding during imagery and green bars reflect training on imagery and decoding during perception. Light bars reflect training on low visibility/vividness trials, and darker bars reflects training on high visibility/vividness trials. These results indicate that representations of stimulus content during imagery are more akin to those evoked on low-visibility perception trials, whereas representations of stimulus content during perception are more akin to those evoked during high vividness imagery. n = 33 independent participants. Errors bars represent SEM over participants, and dots represent individual participants; train on low visibility: t(32) = 0.77, p = 0.025 (one-sided, uncorrected), CI = 0.5–0.514; train on high visibility: t(32) = 0.78, p = 0.175 (one-sided, uncorrected), CI = 0.496–0.511); train on high vividness: t(32) = 2.58, p < 0.0001 (one-sided, uncorrected), CI = 0.503–0.523; train on low vividness: t(32) = 0.4, p = 0.77 (one-sided, uncorrected), CI = 0.488-0.508. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.005; ***p < 0.0005. Source data are provided as a Source Data file.
Fig. 3 Neural representations of imagery vividness and perceptual visibility. A The outer panels show brain areas significantly modulated by imagery vividness (left) and perceptual visibility (right). The bars indicate the average activation per vividness/visibility level where 1 is low vividness/visibility and 4 is high vividness/visibility. The middle panel shows cross-decoding accuracy minus chance level (50%) between imagery vividness and perceptual visibility in the three brain areas that showed significant univariate modulation, indicating that not only are the same areas involved in tracking vividness and visibility, they also do so in a similar manner. Pre-SMA: pre-supplementary motor area, dlPFC: dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. n = 35 independent participants. Plotted brain regions showed a significant effect of vividness/visibility in a general linear model with whole-brain FDR correction applied at a q-value of 0.01 (two-sided) with all t(34)<−4.14. Significance of decoding accuracy was determined based on a one-sided permutation test within individual ROIs84; pre-SMA: t(34)=2.96, p = 0.0003, d = 0.5, CI = 0.51–0.55; anterior insula: t(34) = 2.96, p = 0.0008, d = 0.5, CI = 0.51–0.54; right dlPFC: t(34) = 2.37, p = 0.0097, d = 0.4, CI = 0.502–0.53, all uncorrected. B The influence of vividness/visibility on early visual cortex activity (EVC). The bottom left plot represents the location of the EVC region of interest (ROI) in blue. The top panel indicate the univariate effect of vividness F(26, 3) = 1.76, p = 0.18 (two-sided, uncorrected)/visibility (F(26, 3) = 0.35, p = 0.78 (two-sided, uncorrected) on overall activation level within the ROI (lefthand two plots) as well as on the cross-decoding accuracy (t(34) = 1.18, p = 0.13 (one-sided, uncorrected), CI = 0.5–0.52) between vividness and visibility (right plot). The panels on the bottom right indicate the influence of vividness/visibility on the overlap in representations of stimulus content between imagery and perception. Purple bars reflect training on perception and decoding during imagery and green bars reflect training on imagery and decoding during perception. Light bars reflect training on low visibility/vividness trials, and darker bars reflects training on high visibility/vividness trials. These results indicate that representations of stimulus content during imagery are more akin to those evoked on low-visibility perception trials, whereas representations of stimulus content during perception are more akin to those evoked during high vividness imagery. n = 33 independent participants. Errors bars represent SEM over participants, and dots represent individual participants; train on low visibility: t(32) = 0.77, p = 0.025 (one-sided, uncorrected), CI = 0.5–0.514; train on high visibility: t(32) = 0.78, p = 0.175 (one-sided, uncorrected), CI = 0.496–0.511); train on high vividness: t(32) = 2.58, p < 0.0001 (one-sided, uncorrected), CI = 0.503–0.523; train on low vividness: t(32) = 0.4, p = 0.77 (one-sided, uncorrected), CI = 0.488-0.508. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.005; ***p < 0.0005. Source data are provided as a Source Data file.CC BY · PubMed Central

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Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. Green, D. M. & Swets, J. A. Signal detection theory and psychophysics. John Wiley vol. 5 (1966).
  2. Perky, C. W. An Experimental Study of Imagination. Am. J. Psychol. 21, 422–452 (1910). · DOI · Paper page
  3. Marks, D. F. New directions for mental imagery research. J. Ment. Imag. 19, 153–167 (1995).

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Metadata

Authors
Dijkstra, N., & Fleming, S. M.
Affiliations
Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging (GB)
Corresponding author
Dijkstra, Nadine
Venue
Nature Communications
Published
2023-03-23
Volume
14
Issue
1
Pages
1627-1627
ISSN
2041-1723 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W4360607983
Cited by
115
References
80
Citations by year
2026: 24 · 2025: 44 · 2024: 33 · 2023: 13
FWCI
17.07
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Nature Communications (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
  • MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • Canadian Institute for Advanced Research
  • Wellcome Trust (Z/17/Z, 206648/Z/17/Z)
  • Leverhulme Trust
  • European Commission (HORIZON2020, 882832)
  • Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (019.192SG.003)
  • Max-Planck-Gesellschaft (206648/Z/17/Z)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Visual perception and processing mechanisms
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Memory Processes and Influences
Keywords
mental imagery, perception, internal simulation, virtual reality, perceptual realism
MeSH terms
Computer Simulation, Humans, Imagination, Learning, Psychophysics, Imagery, Psychotherapy

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Dijkstra, N., & Fleming, S. M. (2023). Subjective signal strength distinguishes reality from imagination. Nature Communications. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-023-37322-1

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