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Trojan-horse attacks on quantum-key-distribution systems

Open access
Gisin, N., Fasel, S., Kraus, B., Zbinden, H., Ribordy, G.·2006·Physical Review A

Abstract

General Trojan-horse attacks on quantum-key-distribution systems, i.e., attacks on Alice or Bob's system via the quantum channel, are analyzed. We illustrate the power of such attacks with today's technology and conclude that all systems must implement active counter measures. In particular, all systems must include an auxiliary detector that monitors any incoming light. We show that such counter measures can be efficient, provided that enough additional privacy amplification is applied to the data. We present a practical way to reduce the maximal information gain that an adversary can gain using Trojan-horse attacks. This does reduce the security analysis of the two-way plug-and-play implementation to those of the standard one-way systems.

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Crossref · 10.1103/physreva.73.022320

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Metadata

Authors
Gisin, N., Fasel, S., Kraus, B., Zbinden, H., & Ribordy, G.
Venue
Physical Review A
Published
2006-02-13
Volume
73
Issue
2
ISSN
  • 0556-2791 (ISSN-L)
  • 1050-2947
  • 1094-1622
OpenAlex
W1968204762
Cited by
588
References
2
FWCI
17.60
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Trojan-horse attacks on quantum-key-distribution systems. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1103/physreva.73.022320
The paper
Gisin, N., Fasel, S., Kraus, B., Zbinden, H., & Ribordy, G. (2006). Trojan-horse attacks on quantum-key-distribution systems. Physical Review A. https://doi.org/10.1103/physreva.73.022320

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.