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Cited by 338

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 33 of the 33 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Cooperation in the noisy case: Prisoner’s dilemma game on two types of regular random graphs

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Vukov, Jeromos, Szabó, György, Szolnoki, Attila·2006·Physical Review E

Abstract

We have studied an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with players located on two types of random regular graphs with a degree of 4. The analysis is focused on the effects of payoffs and noise (temperature) on the maintenance of cooperation. When varying the noise level and/or the highest payoff, the system exhibits a second-order phase transition from a mixed state of cooperators and defectors to an absorbing state where only defectors remain alive. For the random regular graph (and Bethe lattice) the behavior of the system is similar to those found previously on the square lattice with nearest neighbor interactions, although the measure of cooperation is enhanced by the absence of loops in the connectivity structure. For low noise the optimal connectivity structure is built up from randomly connected triangles.

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Metadata

Authors
Vukov, J., Szabó, G., & Szolnoki, A.
Venue
Physical Review E
Published
2006-06-23
Volume
73
Issue
6
Pages
067103-067103
ISSN
  • 1539-3755 (ISSN-L)
  • 1550-2376
OpenAlex
W1975932302
Cited by
338
References
33
FWCI
69.17
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Cooperation in the noisy case: Prisoner’s dilemma game on two types of regular random graphs. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1103/physreve.73.067103
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Vukov, J., Szabó, G., & Szolnoki, A. (2006). Cooperation in the noisy case: Prisoner’s dilemma game on two types of regular random graphs. Physical Review E. https://doi.org/10.1103/physreve.73.067103

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