Alliance formation with exclusion in the spatial public goods game
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Detecting defection and alarming partners about the possible danger could be essential to avoid being exploited. This act, however, may require a huge individual effort from those who take this job, hence such a strategy seems to be unfavorable. But structured populations can provide an opportunity where a largely unselfish excluder strategy can form an effective alliance with other cooperative strategies, hence they can sweep out defection. Interestingly, this alliance is functioning even at the extremely high cost of exclusion where the sole application of an exclusion strategy would be harmful otherwise. These results may explain why the emergence of extreme selfless behavior is not necessarily against individual selection but could be the result of an evolutionary process.
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Citations
Cites
Altruistic punishment in humans
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415137a · Cited by 5,616
Reputation helps solve the ‘tragedy of the commons’
Milinski, M., Semmann, D., & Krambeck, H.-J. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415424a · Cited by 1,371
Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem
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Coevolution of Strategy and Structure in Complex Networks with Dynamical Linking
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Reputation-based partner choice promotes cooperation in social networks
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Cited by
Liu, L., Chen, X., & Szolnoki, A. (2019) · Mathematical Models and Methods in Applied Sciences · doi:10.1142/s0218202519500428 · Cited by 128
“One prominently discussed solution is the employment of pro-social punishment, that is, punishing uncooperative individuals by lowering their income.(11,14,32,33,44,51,54,59,61,69) In particular, two different ways of punishment are studied, namely, peer punishment and pool punishment.”
BackgroundSelf-citationThe evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game with conditional peer exclusion
Quan, J., Li, X., & Wang, X. (2019) · Chaos An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science · doi:10.1063/1.5119395 · Cited by 53
Early exclusion leads to cyclical cooperation in repeated group interactions
Liu, L., Xiao, Z., Chen, X., & Szolnoki, A. (2022) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2021.0755 · Cited by 50
Self-citationBlocking defector invasion by focusing on the most successful partner
Szolnoki, A., & Chen, X. (2020) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2020.125430 · Cited by 43
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Metadata
- Authors
- Szolnoki, A., & Chen, X.
- Venue
- Physical Review E
- Publisher
- American Physical Society (APS)
- Published
- 2017-05-22
- Volume
- 95
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 052316-052316
- ISSN
- 2470-0045 (ISSN-L)
- 2470-0053
- OpenAlex
- W2620423570
- Cited by
- 152
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 22.36
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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