Cited by 219Evolutionary Game Theory and CooperationEvolutionary Psychology and Human BehaviorAnimal Behavior and Reproduction

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Fehr, Ernst·2004·Nature

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1038/432449a

Cites

10 of 10 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Claims other papers make about this one

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  • In the deterministic model, only the emergence of other conditional strategies can save cooperation in the long run.

    “In the deterministic model, only the emergence of other conditional strategies can save cooperation in the long run 76 .”

    From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [76]

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Authors
Fehr, E.
Affiliations
University of Zurich (CH)
Corresponding author
Fehr, Ernst
Venue
Nature
Published
2004-11
Volume
432
Issue
7016
Pages
449-450
ISSN
  • 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
  • 1476-4687
OpenAlex
W2045318452
Cited by
219
References
10
Citations by year
2026: 8 · 2025: 6 · 2024: 10 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 20 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 16 · 2018: 14 · 2017: 15 · 2016: 12 · 2015: 14 · 2014: 9 · 2013: 13 · 2012: 15
FWCI
11.40
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Nature (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
  • Life Sciences › Agricultural and Biological Sciences › Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics › Animal Behavior and Reproduction
Keywords
reputation, collective action, human evolution, cooperation, social evolution, evolutionary explanation
MeSH terms
Altruism, Cooperative Behavior, Biological Evolution, Group Processes, Humans, Mass Behavior, Punishment, Reward

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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

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