Ostracism in work teams: a public good experiment
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper provides an experimental examination of the effects of ostracism on cooperation. Ostracism is one of the most radical forms of peer pressure. More generally, ostracism is the exclusion of disapproved individuals from interaction with a social group. By performing a laboratory experiment involving a public good game with exclusion, the paper provides empirical evidence that threats of exclusion increase contributions. The results show that subjects exclude their peers for two reasons. Subjects are willing to punish unfair behaviors (non‐strategic reason) and expect changes in behavior in response to exclusions (strategic reason).
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980 · Cited by 4,547
Social Norms and Economic Theory
Elster, J. (1989) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.3.4.99 · Cited by 2,071
Cited by
Dynamic social networks promote cooperation in experiments with humans
Rand, D. G., Arbesman, S., & Christakis, N. A. (2011) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1108243108 · Cited by 653
“Another form of punishment which has been shown to promote cooperation effectively is ostracism (56, 57).”
BackgroundThe economics of altruistic punishment and the maintenance of cooperation
Egas, M., & Riedl, A. (2008) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2007.1558 · Cited by 453
Early exclusion leads to cyclical cooperation in repeated group interactions
Liu, L., Xiao, Z., Chen, X., & Szolnoki, A. (2022) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2021.0755 · Cited by 50
“The experimental results show that subjects exhibit a willingness to exclude other members of their group and the threat of social exclusion for uncooperative behaviour can significantly improve the level of contribution [48].”
BackgroundRehabilitation and social behavior: Experiments in prison
Balafoutas, L., García-Gallego, A., Georgantzis, N., Jaber-Lopez, T., & Mitrokostas, E. (2020) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2019.10.009 · Cited by 36
“This strand of the literature has mainly focused on the effect of the threat of exclusion on cooperation and contribution to public good games (Masclet, 2003; Cinyabuguma et al., 2005; Kerr et al., 2009; Sheremeta et al., 2011; Maier-Rigaud et al., 2010).”
BackgroundVoting on the threat of exclusion in a public goods experiment
Dannenberg, A., Haita-Falah, C., & Zitzelsberger, S. (2020) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-019-09609-y · Cited by 26
Metadata
- Authors
- Masclet, D.
- Venue
- International Journal of Manpower
- Publisher
- Emerald
- Published
- 2003-11-01
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- 867-887
- ISSN
- 0143-7720 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2050925734
- Cited by
- 75
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 3.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Ostracism in work teams: a public good experiment. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1108/01437720310502177
- The paper
- Masclet, D. (2003). Ostracism in work teams: a public good experiment. International Journal of Manpower. https://doi.org/10.1108/01437720310502177
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.