Cited by 36Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesCriminal Justice and Corrections AnalysisNames, Identity, and Discrimination Research

Rehabilitation and social behavior: Experiments in prison

Open access
Balafoutas, Loukas, García-Gallego, Aurora, Georgantzis, Nikolaos, Jaber-Lopez, Tarek, Mitrokostas, Evangelos·2020·Games and Economic Behavior

Abstract

Despite the economic and social significance of crime reduction and criminals' rehabilitation, research evaluating the effects of incarceration on behavior is surprisingly scarce. We conduct an experiment with 105 prison inmates and complement it with administrative data in order to explore several aspects of their social behavior. We first perform a comprehensive analysis of behavior in three economic games, finding evidence of discrimination against a sample from outside prison. In addition, our regression analysis reveals that inmates generally become less pro-social towards this out-group the longer they remain incarcerated. Finally, we introduce and evaluate a priming intervention that asks inmates to reflect on their time spent in prison. This intervention has a very sizeable and significant impact, increasing pro-sociality towards the out-group. Hence, a simple, low-cost intervention of this sort can have desirable effects in promoting rehabilitation and integration into social and economic life after release.

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Crossref · 10.1016/j.geb.2019.10.009

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  • Balafoutas et al. (2020) show that a simple intervention asking inmates to reflect on incarceration increased social aptitudes.

    “Balafoutas et al. (2020) randomly asked inmates to reflect on their incarceration and show that this simple intervention increased the inmates' social aptitudes.”

    From Prison Rehabilitation Programs: Efficiency and Targeting (2021) · cites this paper as Balafoutas et al. (2020)

    Section 3.3 (Priming) says inmates were randomly assigned to write either about their time in prison and its effect on their social behavior or about a neutral topic. Section 4.3 (Effects of the priming intervention) reports increased trust, reciprocity, and cooperation toward people outside prison, but not toward other inmates. The paper measures choices in economic games, not a general increase in inmates’ social aptitudes. (LLM, conf=0.86)

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2 of the 77 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Research works printed but not linked: 4

  1. Anderson, David A., 2012. The Cost of Crime. Foundations and Trends in Microeconomics, vol. 7(3), pp. 209-265.
  2. Durose, Matthew R., Cooper, Alexia, Snyder, Howard, 2014. Recidivism of prisoners released in 30 states in 2005: patterns from 2005 to 2010. In: U.S. Department of Justice Special Re (April), pp. 1-31.
  3. Villettaz, Patrice, Gilliéron, Gwladys, Killias, Martin, 2014. The Effects on Re-Offending of Custodial Versus Non-Custodial Sanction. National Council from Crime Prevention, pp. 1-104.
  4. Walmsley, Roy, 2016. World Prison Population List, eleventh edition. World Prison Brief -Institute for Criminal Policy Research.

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Authors
Balafoutas, L., García-Gallego, A., Georgantzis, N., Jaber-Lopez, T., & Mitrokostas, E.
Affiliations
  • Universität Innsbruck (AT)
  • Hellenic Open University (GR)
Corresponding author
Balafoutas, Loukas
Venue
Games and Economic Behavior
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2020-01
Volume
119
Pages
148-171
ISSN
0899-8256 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2981370235
Cited by
36
References
77
Citations by year
2026: 5 · 2025: 6 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 2 · 2018: 1 · 2017: 1
FWCI
4.37
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Games and Economic Behavior (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • Repositori UJI (Universitat Jaume I) (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • HAL (submittedVersion)
  • LA Referencia (Red Federada de Repositorios Institucionales de Publicaciones Científicas) (submittedVersion, public-domain)
Funders
  • Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad
  • British Academy
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Criminal Justice and Corrections Analysis
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Names, Identity, and Discrimination Research
Keywords
prisoner rehabilitation, social behavior, discrimination, outgroup attitudes, prosocial behavior, incarceration duration, reintegration after release, economic games, social integration

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