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Cited by 26Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesGame Theory and Voting SystemsEvolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation

Voting on the threat of exclusion in a public goods experiment

Open access
Dannenberg, Astrid, Haita-Falah, Corina, Zitzelsberger, Sonja·2020·Experimental Economics
DOI 10.1007/s10683-019-09609-y
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Abstract

Ostracism is practiced by virtually all societies around the world as a means of enforcing cooperation. In this paper, we use a public goods experiment to study whether groups choose to implement an institution that allows for the exclusion of members. We distinguish between a costless exclusion institution and a costly exclusion institution that, if chosen, reduces the endowment of all players. We also provide a comparison with an exclusion institution that is exogenously imposed upon groups. A significant share of the experimental groups choose the exclusion institution, even when it comes at a cost, and the support for the institution increases over time. Average contributions to the public good are significantly higher when the exclusion option is available, not only because low contributors are excluded but also because high contributors sustain a higher cooperation level under the exclusion institution. Subjects who vote in favor of the exclusion institution contribute more than those who vote against it, but only when the institution is implemented. These results are largely inconsistent with standard economic theory but can be better explained by assuming heterogeneous groups in which some players have selfish and others have social preferences.

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  • Cooperation tends to increase when players can vote for exclusion of free riders, observe who is trustworthy, or enter into contracts that enforce minimum reciprocation levels.

    “Cooperation tends to increase when players can vote for exclusion of free riders19, observe who is trustworthy20, or enter into contracts that enforce minimum reciprocation levels21,22.”

    From Deep reinforcement learning can promote sustainable human behaviour in a common-pool resource problem (2025) · cites this paper as [19]

  • In laboratory settings, these solutions have been studied by equipping players with auxiliary signals or actions that allow them to communicate, influence each other or self-organise, which can increase voluntary contributions towards a public good.

    “In laboratory settings, these solutions have been studied by equipping players with auxiliary signals or actions that allow them to communicate, influence each other or self-organise, which can increase voluntary contributions towards a public good.”

    From Deep reinforcement learning can promote sustainable human behaviour in a common-pool resource problem (2025) · cites this paper as [19]

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Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. Bolleyer, N. & Gauja, A. (2015). Legal conceptions of organizational membership: Implications for intra- party dynamics and democracy. Paper Prepared for the Political Studies Association (UK) Annual Conference 2015.
  2. Fehr, E., & Williams, T. (2017). Creating an efficient culture of cooperation, Working Paper No. 267, University of Zurich, available at https ://paper s.ssrn.com/sol3/paper s.cfm?abstr act_id=30625 28.

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Authors
Dannenberg, A., Haita-Falah, C., & Zitzelsberger, S.
Affiliations
University of Kassel (DE)
Corresponding author
Dannenberg, Astrid
ORCID
Venue
Experimental Economics
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Published
2020-03
Volume
23
Issue
1
Pages
84-109
ISSN
  • 1386-4157 (ISSN-L)
  • 1573-6938
DOI
10.1007/s10683-019-09609-y
OpenAlex
W2935593447
Cited by
26
References
45
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 6 · 2021: 4 · 2019: 1
FWCI
4.81
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Experimental Economics (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • Econstor (Econstor) (submittedVersion)
  • open_UMR Marburg DSpace 10.0 (Philipps-Universität Marburg) (submittedVersion)
  • Kobra (Universitätsbibliothek Kassel)
  • data_UMR (public-domain)
Funders
H2020 European Research Council (636746)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
Keywords
ostracism, exclusion, public goods, cooperation, social preferences, heterogeneous groups, selfishness, institutional choice

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