CoChat

Blockchain for Secure EHRs Sharing of Mobile Cloud Based E-Health Systems

Open access

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 36 of the 36 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 8 of the 20 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Abstract

Recent years have witnessed a paradigm shift in the storage of Electronic Health Records (EHRs) on mobile cloud environments... we propose a novel EHRs sharing framework that combines blockchain and the decentralized interplanetary file system (IPFS) on a mobile cloud platform... We present a prototype implementation using Ethereum blockchain...

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

This paper proposes a blockchain-based EHR sharing framework for mobile cloud e-health systems, combining Ethereum smart contracts with IPFS to control access and avoid storing raw medical data on-chain. The authors prototype the system on AWS and Android and report that it supports authorized access, blocks unauthorized requests, and adds only modest latency overhead.

Key findings

  • The proposed architecture stores only patient addresses/metadata on blockchain while keeping large EHR files in IPFS; the paper says this reduces leakage risk because raw medical data are not stored on-chain.
  • In testing, the authors used a private Ethereum network on AWS with 2 EC2 miners, 2 Ubuntu VMs for the admin and EHRs manager, and 2 Sony Android phones.
  • For network latency, the paper reports that smart-contract-based authentication adds overhead, but in the worst case of 7 requests the extra delay was “about 100ms,” which the authors describe as acceptable.
  • The paper reports that its decentralized IPFS-based retrieval outperformed centralized AWS S3 storage in time overhead for different EHR file sizes, and that authorized/unauthorized access cases behaved as intended.

Methods

  • Design: a blockchain-enabled EHR sharing architecture using Ethereum smart contracts for access control and IPFS for decentralized storage; the system uses a cloud EHRs manager and admin to mediate requests.
  • Sample/setup: proof-of-concept implementation on Amazon cloud with a private Ethereum network, 2 AWS EC2 miner VMs, 2 Ubuntu 16.04 LTS VMs, and 2 Android 8.0 phones; testing considered 1 area ID and 10 patients.
  • Analysis: real-system tests of access control and network overhead, plus a security analysis with two threat scenarios; comparisons included decentralized IPFS storage versus AWS S3 and authenticated versus non-authenticated request processing.

Limitations

  • The paper itself notes open issues for future work: scalability, low network latency, data uploading privacy, and QoS.
  • The testing scope is narrow: the paper states that experiments used a single testing area (AreaID = 1) with 10 patients and one IPFS storage node, which limits evident generalizability.
  • The proof-of-concept relies on a controlled setup with a private Ethereum network and a small number of devices; this makes broader real-world performance and deployment constraints not fully established from the text.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1109/access.2019.2917555

Cites

36 of 36 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Figures

FIGURE 1 The overview of blockchain based e-health system on mobile cloud.
FIGURE 1 The overview of blockchain based e-health system on mobile cloud.From the PDF
FIGURE 2 The data flow of the proposed mobile cloud blockchain system.
FIGURE 2 The data flow of the proposed mobile cloud blockchain system.From the PDF
FIGURE 3 Structure of cloud EHRs storage system.
FIGURE 3 Structure of cloud EHRs storage system.From the PDF
FIGURE 4 The data block structure.
FIGURE 4 The data block structure.From the PDF
FIGURE 5 The data uploading and data sharing processes on mobile cloud blockchain.
FIGURE 5 The data uploading and data sharing processes on mobile cloud blockchain.From the PDF
FIGURE 7 Data file encryption and decryption in our design.
FIGURE 7 Data file encryption and decryption in our design.From the PDF
FIGURE 8 Experiment setup for EHRs sharing simulation.
FIGURE 8 Experiment setup for EHRs sharing simulation.From the PDF
FIGURE 9 Configuration for integrating IPFS on AWS cloud.
FIGURE 9 Configuration for integrating IPFS on AWS cloud.From the PDF
FIGURE 11 The running Ethereum blockchain for EHRs sharing on Amazon cloud.
FIGURE 11 The running Ethereum blockchain for EHRs sharing on Amazon cloud.From the PDF
FIGURE 12 Illustrations of EHRs access results on Android phones: a) User Registration form with Ethereum account, b) EHRs access results of an authorized user, c) Transaction record of authorized EHRs access, d) EHRs result of an unauthorized user, and e) Transaction record of unauthorized EHRs access.
FIGURE 12 Illustrations of EHRs access results on Android phones: a) User Registration form with Ethereum account, b) EHRs access results of an authorized user, c) Transaction record of authorized EHRs access, d) EHRs result of an unauthorized user, and e) Transaction record of unauthorized EHRs access.From the PDF
FIGURE 13 Time overheads: a) Processing time on cloud versus user requests and b) Time consumption for EHRs access on cloud storage.
FIGURE 13 Time overheads: a) Processing time on cloud versus user requests and b) Time consumption for EHRs access on cloud storage.From the PDF
Image 12
From the PDF
Image 13
From the PDF
Image 14
From the PDF
Image 15
From the PDF

Verification

Claims the paper makes

7 Valid · 2 Not valid · 9 Not checked · 52 Own results and interpretations

19 more claims

Create a free account to see all 70 claims and to verify the 2 references still open.

See all claims — free account
  • It may state two separate claims as one. 21
  • Probably not a substantial claim. 32
  • The quote only partly states this claim. 2

Create a free account to see these claims.

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

Citations

Cites

Research works printed but not linked: 12

  1. 0, Lightweight Java and Android Library for Integration With Ethereum Clients
  2. 0, Ethereum on Android
  3. 2018, Ethereum- blockchain app platform
  4. 0, Solidity 0 5 3 Documentation
  5. 0, Amazon Web Services (AWS)—Cloud Computing Services
  6. benet, 2014, IPFS - Content Addressed Versioned P2P File System
  7. 0, Setting Up IPFS on AWS
  8. 0, Android App for the InterPlanetary File System
  9. 0, Biokin
  10. 0, Decoder and Encoder for the Ethereum ABI
  11. 0, Big File and String RSA Encryption by Android
  12. ausanka-crues, 0, Methods for Access Control Advances and Limitations

Cited by

See all 575

Metadata

Authors
Nguyen, D. C., Pathirana, P. N., Ding, M., & Seneviratne, A.
Affiliations
  • Deakin University (AU)
  • Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (AU)
  • UNSW Sydney (AU)
Venue
IEEE Access
Published
2019
Volume
7
Pages
66792-66806
ISSN
2169-3536 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2946008609
Cited by
574
References
36
Citations by year
2026: 27 · 2025: 71 · 2024: 102 · 2023: 110 · 2022: 108 · 2021: 107 · 2020: 43 · 2019: 6
FWCI
81.97
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • IEEE Access (publishedVersion)
  • UNSWorks (UNSW Sydney) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
  • Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
CSIRO Data61, Australia
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Cloud Data Security Solutions
  • Health Sciences › Health Professions › Health Information Management › Electronic Health Records Systems
Keywords
electronic health records, blockchain, mobile cloud computing, e-health systems, data sharing, data privacy, access control, smart contracts, Ethereum, IPFS, decentralized storage, healthcare data security

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

The claim verdicts this report counts are experimental: their accuracy is not yet measured.

A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-10-10, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).

A second model labelled each claim on 2026-10-10 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).

Cited sources are checked with a language model’s help (gpt-6-sol and qwen3.8-omni-flash).

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.