Blockchain for Secure EHRs Sharing of Mobile Cloud Based E-Health Systems
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 36 of the 36 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 8 of the 20 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
Recent years have witnessed a paradigm shift in the storage of Electronic Health Records (EHRs) on mobile cloud environments... we propose a novel EHRs sharing framework that combines blockchain and the decentralized interplanetary file system (IPFS) on a mobile cloud platform... We present a prototype implementation using Ethereum blockchain...
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
This paper proposes a blockchain-based EHR sharing framework for mobile cloud e-health systems, combining Ethereum smart contracts with IPFS to control access and avoid storing raw medical data on-chain. The authors prototype the system on AWS and Android and report that it supports authorized access, blocks unauthorized requests, and adds only modest latency overhead.
Key findings
- The proposed architecture stores only patient addresses/metadata on blockchain while keeping large EHR files in IPFS; the paper says this reduces leakage risk because raw medical data are not stored on-chain.
- In testing, the authors used a private Ethereum network on AWS with 2 EC2 miners, 2 Ubuntu VMs for the admin and EHRs manager, and 2 Sony Android phones.
- For network latency, the paper reports that smart-contract-based authentication adds overhead, but in the worst case of 7 requests the extra delay was “about 100ms,” which the authors describe as acceptable.
- The paper reports that its decentralized IPFS-based retrieval outperformed centralized AWS S3 storage in time overhead for different EHR file sizes, and that authorized/unauthorized access cases behaved as intended.
Methods
- Design: a blockchain-enabled EHR sharing architecture using Ethereum smart contracts for access control and IPFS for decentralized storage; the system uses a cloud EHRs manager and admin to mediate requests.
- Sample/setup: proof-of-concept implementation on Amazon cloud with a private Ethereum network, 2 AWS EC2 miner VMs, 2 Ubuntu 16.04 LTS VMs, and 2 Android 8.0 phones; testing considered 1 area ID and 10 patients.
- Analysis: real-system tests of access control and network overhead, plus a security analysis with two threat scenarios; comparisons included decentralized IPFS storage versus AWS S3 and authenticated versus non-authenticated request processing.
Limitations
- The paper itself notes open issues for future work: scalability, low network latency, data uploading privacy, and QoS.
- The testing scope is narrow: the paper states that experiments used a single testing area (AreaID = 1) with 10 patients and one IPFS storage node, which limits evident generalizability.
- The proof-of-concept relies on a controlled setup with a private Ethereum network and a small number of devices; this makes broader real-world performance and deployment constraints not fully established from the text.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
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Verification
Claims the paper makes
7 Valid · 2 Not valid · 9 Not checked · 52 Own results and interpretations
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Specially, blockchain-based access control with its distributed nature can work well when any party fails without loss of data, risks and trust concerns [5].”
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [5] Marko Holbl, Marko Kompara, Aida Kamisalic, and Lili Nemec Zlatolas, "A Systematic Review of the Use of Blockchain in Healthcare," Symmetry , 2018. sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 2.4 says blockchain is robust against attacks and failures, offers access-control methods, and can let parties exchange data without a trusted third party. It does not establish that access control will continue working whenever any party fails, or that such failure entails no data loss, risk, or trust concerns. No page number is available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.86)
plainstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“Besides all these great advantages, however, the trend of EHRs storage on clouds also poses security challenges which hinder the deployment of e-health applications on clouds [10], [11].”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [10] Eman AbuKhousa, Nader Mohamed, and Jameela Al-Jaroodi, "e-Health Cloud: Opportunities and Challenges," Future Internet , 2012. source
Section 5 (Security and Privacy Challenges in e-Health Cloud) states that 'security is still one of the key deterrents that prevent many healthcare organizations from adopting e-Health Cloud solutions', directly supporting the hindrance/deployment part of the claim. The same section and the Security/Privacy bullet list describe the security and privacy problems of storing patients' records in multi-tenant clouds (access control, secure transmission, service-provider access to providers' data, patients wanting acceptable privacy 'before moving to the cloud'), and Section 4.1 covers cloud-based storage of EMR/EHR with its data security and privacy requirements. Section 3 also notes the e-Health Cloud 'adds more weight to these challenges as it is used to store and process sensitive medical data'. The paraphrase therefore matches what this source says. (LLM, conf=0.88)
- Supportedcites [11] Meingast M1, Roosta T, and Sastry S, "Security and Privacy Issues with Health Care Information Technology," in Proc. IEEE Eng Med Biol Soc. , 2006. source
Section 5 (Security and Privacy Challenges in e-Health Cloud) states plainly that "security is still one of the key deterrents that prevent many healthcare organizations from adopting e-Health Cloud solutions", and the same section notes that privacy concerns are amplified "when using the Cloud for e-Health services" because records are stored alongside other providers' data in multi-tenant clouds. The Introduction frames the same point as challenges "which could hinder its large scale diffusion", and Section 3 attributes the added weight of these challenges to the fact that the e-Health Cloud "is used to store and process sensitive medical data" — matching the citing sentence's link between cloud EHR storage and hindered deployment. The Discussion (Section 6) likewise lists security among the serious challenges persisting despite the advantages, consistent with the "besides all these great advantages" framing. (LLM, conf=0.86)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“First, the designs of conventional access control strategies [14]-[16] require external key authorities with a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), which can be extremely complex and usually demands expensive resources to achieve secure EHRs sharing [25].”
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [25] sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The “Interoperability: Current State” section describes institutional EHR exchange as operationally challenging, with complex patient matching and repeated authentication. “Reducing the Cost of Verification and Networking” identifies security, authentication, and network costs. Neither passage says conventional access control requires external key authorities with PKI or that those requirements usually demand expensive resources. (LLM, conf=0.82)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The experiment results with respect to different EHRs file sizes show our decentralized storage design on blockchain outperforms the conventional scheme with centralized storage in terms of time overhead.”
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper states — it cites no source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Such illegal request is prevented and discarded from our EHRs database”
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
19 more claims
Create a free account to see all 70 claims and to verify the 2 references still open.
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- Probably not a substantial claim. 32
- The quote only partly states this claim. 2
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“The majority of reviewed studies have focused their attention on preventing unauthorized access (Nguyen et al., 2019) and protecting against eavesdropping (Uddin et al., 2018).”
From Blockchain in healthcare: A systematic literature review, synthesizing framework and future research agenda (2020) · cites this paper as Nguyen et al., 2019
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Citations
Cites
Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System
Wright, C. S. (2008) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3440802 · Cited by 13,922
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“significant changes in e-health operations [7], [8].”
Blockchain distributed ledger technologies for biomedical and health care applications
Kuo, T.-T., Kim, H.-E., & Ohno-Machado, L. (2017) · Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association · doi:10.1093/jamia/ocx068 · Cited by 1,350 · cited 1×
“Recently, there has been a growing interest in employing the blockchain technology to promote medical and e-health services [1]–[3].”
BackgroundBlockchain Meets IoT: An Architecture for Scalable Access Management in IoT
Novo, O. (2018) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2018.2812239 · Cited by 1,318 · cited 2×
“It is worth noting that the feasibility of blockchain based access control was demonstrated in various practical scenarios, such as IoT [26]–[29], vehicular edge computing and networks (VECONs) [30].”
BackgroundBlockchain technology in healthcare: The revolution starts here
Mettler, M. (2016) · 2016 IEEE 18th International Conference on e-Health Networking, Applications and Services (Healthcom) · doi:10.1109/healthcom.2016.7749510 · Cited by 1,237
A Privacy-Preserving and Transparent Certification System for Digital Credentials
Saramago, R. Q., Meling, H., & Jehl, L. N. (2014) · DROPS (Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz Center for Informatics) · doi:10.4230/lipics.opodis.2022.9 · Cited by 1,171
MeDShare: Trust-Less Medical Data Sharing Among Cloud Service Providers via Blockchain
Xia, Q., Sifah, E. B., Asamoah, K. O., Gao, J., Du, X., & Guizani, M. (2017) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2017.2730843 · Cited by 1,148 · cited 1×
“The work [19] introduced a system called MeDShare which dealt with the problem of medical data sharing among cloud service providers.”
BackgroundBlockchain: A Panacea for Healthcare Cloud-Based Data Security and Privacy?
Esposito, C., De Santis, A., Tortora, G., Chang, H., & Choo, K.-K. R. (2018) · IEEE Cloud Computing · doi:10.1109/mcc.2018.011791712 · Cited by 855
Blockchain Technology for Healthcare: Facilitating the Transition to Patient-Driven Interoperability
Gordon, W. J., & Catalini, C. (2018) · Computational and Structural Biotechnology Journal · doi:10.1016/j.csbj.2018.06.003 · Cited by 828 · cited 1×
“Recently, there has been a growing interest in employing the blockchain technology to promote medical and e-health services [1]–[3].”
BackgroundBlockchain for Secure and Efficient Data Sharing in Vehicular Edge Computing and Networks
Kang, J., Yu, R., Huang, X., Wu, M., Maharjan, S., Xie, S., & Zhang, Y. (2019) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2018.2875542 · Cited by 798 · cited 2×
“To overcome such challenges, mobile edge cloud can be a promising solution to provide nearby health services to mobile users with low network latency [30].”
BackgroundSmart contract-based access control for the internet of things
Zhang, Y., Kasahara, S., Shen, Y., Jiang, X., & Wan, J. (2019) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2018.2847705 · Cited by 788 · cited 13×
“[28] R. Xu, Y. Chen, E. Blasch, and G. Chen, ‘‘BlendCAC: A smart contract enabled decentralized capability-based access control mechanism for the IoT,’’ Computers, vol. 7, no. 3, p. 39, 2018.”
BackgroundInfluentialA Systematic Review of the Use of Blockchain in Healthcare
Hölbl, M., Kompara, M., Kamišalić, A., & Nemec Zlatolas, L. (2018) · Symmetry · doi:10.3390/sym10100470 · Cited by 780 · cited 2×
“Specially, blockchainbased access control with its distributed nature can work well when any party fails without loss of data, risks and trust concerns [5].”
BackgroundIntegrating blockchain for data sharing and collaboration in mobile healthcare applications
Liang, X., Zhao, J., Shetty, S., Liu, J., & Li, D. (2017) · 2017 IEEE 28th Annual International Symposium on Personal, Indoor, and Mobile Radio Communications (PIMRC) · doi:10.1109/pimrc.2017.8292361 · Cited by 711 · cited 3×
“The authors in [20] introduced an innovative user-centric health data sharing method that could enhance identity management and preserve data privacy for patients.”
BackgroundWang, S., Zhang, Y., & Zhang, Y. (2018) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2018.2851611 · Cited by 627 · cited 2×
“To better preserve data privacy and availability on clouds, the authors in [21] designed a decentralized storage system by combining Interplanetary File System (IPFS), Ethereum blockchain, and attribute-based encryption (ABE) technologies.”
MethodSecure and Trustable Electronic Medical Records Sharing using Blockchain
Dubovitskaya, A., Xu, Z., Ryu, S., Schumacher, M., & Wang, F. (2017) · PubMed · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1709.06528 · Cited by 422 · cited 1×
“Blockchain with its decentralized and trustworthy nature has demonstrated immense potentials in various e-health sectors such as secure sharing of Electronic Health Records (EHRs) and data access management among multiple medical entities [4]–[6].”
BackgroundBlocHIE: A BLOCkchain-Based Platform for Healthcare Information Exchange
Jiang, S., Cao, J., Wu, H., Yang, Y., Ma, M., & He, J. (2018) · 2018 IEEE International Conference on Smart Computing (SMARTCOMP) · doi:10.1109/smartcomp.2018.00073 · Cited by 379 · cited 1×
“Blockchain with its decentralized and trustworthy nature has demonstrated immense potentials in various e-health sectors such as secure sharing of Electronic Health Records (EHRs) and data access management among multiple medical entities [4]–[6].”
BackgroundSecurity and Privacy Issues with Health Care Information Technology
Meingast, M., Roosta, T., & Sastry, S. (2006) · 2006 International Conference of the IEEE Engineering in Medicine and Biology Society · doi:10.1109/iembs.2006.260060 · Cited by 341 · cited 1×
“Besides all these great advantages, however, the trend of EHRs storage on clouds also poses security challenges which hinder the deployment of e-health applications on clouds [10], [11].”
BackgroundMobile Cloud Computing Model and Big Data Analysis for Healthcare Applications
Tawalbeh, L. A., Mehmood, R., Benkhlifa, E., & Song, H. (2016) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2016.2613278 · Cited by 291 · cited 1×
“significant changes in e-health operations [7], [8].”
$\mathsf{LightChain}$: A Lightweight Blockchain System for Industrial Internet of Things
Liu, Y., Wang, K., Lin, Y., & Xu, W. (2019) · IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics · doi:10.1109/tii.2019.2904049 · Cited by 286
Blockchain-Based, Decentralized Access Control for IPFS
Steichen, M., Fiz, B., Norvill, R., Shbair, W., & State, R. (2018) · 2018 IEEE International Conference on Internet of Things (iThings) and IEEE Green Computing and Communications (GreenCom) and IEEE Cyber, Physical and Social Computing (CPSCom) and IEEE Smart Data (SmartData) · doi:10.1109/cybermatics_2018.2018.00253 · Cited by 272 · cited 1×
“To solve the problem of storing large data on blockchain, the works in [22]–[24] introduced models that integrated the IPFS system with smart contracts to provide data sharing in IoT scenarios.”
MethodA Cloud-based Approach for Interoperable Electronic Health Records (EHRs)
Bahga, A., & Madisetti, V. K. (2013) · IEEE Journal of Biomedical and Health Informatics · doi:10.1109/jbhi.2013.2257818 · Cited by 249 · cited 1×
“Further, the availability of complete EHRs on clouds also helps healthcare providers track patient health and offers proper medical services during diagnosis and treatment processes [9].”
BackgroundAn improved P2P file system scheme based on IPFS and Blockchain
Chen, Y., Li, H., Li, K., & Zhang, J. (2017) · 2017 IEEE International Conference on Big Data (Big Data) · doi:10.1109/bigdata.2017.8258226 · Cited by 238 · cited 1×
“To solve the problem of storing large data on blockchain, the works in [22]–[24] introduced models that integrated the IPFS system with smart contracts to provide data sharing in IoT scenarios.”
Methode-Health Cloud: Opportunities and Challenges
AbuKhousa, E., Mohamed, N., & Al-Jaroodi, J. (2012) · Future Internet · doi:10.3390/fi4030621 · Cited by 230 · cited 1×
“Besides all these great advantages, however, the trend of EHRs storage on clouds also poses security challenges which hinder the deployment of e-health applications on clouds [10], [11].”
BackgroundLearning-Based Privacy-Aware Offloading for Healthcare IoT With Energy Harvesting
Min, M., Wan, X., Xiao, L., Chen, Y., Xia, M., Wu, D., & Dai, H. (2019) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2018.2875926 · Cited by 213
Xu, R., Chen, Y., Blasch, E., & Chen, G. (2018) · Computers · doi:10.3390/computers7030039 · Cited by 200
IoT data privacy via blockchains and IPFS
Ali, M. S., Dolui, K., & Antonelli, F. (2017) · Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference on the Internet of Things · doi:10.1145/3131542.3131563 · Cited by 190
A Systematic Review of the Use of Blockchain in HealthcarePreprint
Hölbl, M., Kompara, M., Kamišalić, A., et al. (2018) · Preprints.org · doi:10.20944/preprints201809.0136.v1 · Cited by 188
Towards using blockchain technology for eHealth data access management
Rifi, N., Rachkidi, E., Agoulmine, N., & Taher, N. C. (2017) · 2017 Fourth International Conference on Advances in Biomedical Engineering (ICABME) · doi:10.1109/icabme.2017.8167555 · Cited by 160 · cited 1×
“Meanwhile, to ensure secure EHRs exchange among medial consumers, a data management concept based on blockchain was introduced in [18].”
MethodSecure and Efficient Data Accessibility in Blockchain Based Healthcare Systems
Ramani, V., Kumar, T., Braeken, A., Liyanage, M., & Ylianttila, M. (2018) · Globecom · doi:10.1109/glocom.2018.8647221 · Cited by 153 · cited 3×
“Blockchain was exploited in [17] to ensure reliable EHRs accessibility for medical users.”
BackgroundMethodSecure Sharing of Electronic Health Records in Clouds
Wu, R., Ahn, G.-J., & Hu, H. (2012) · Proceedings of the 8th IEEE International Conference on Collaborative Computing: Networking, Applications and Worksharing · doi:10.4108/icst.collaboratecom.2012.250497 · Cited by 113 · cited 3×
“The work [14] proposed a broker based access control scheme for selective EHRs sharing among various healthcare providers in cloud computing.”
BackgroundBads: blockchain-based architecture for data sharing with abs and cp-abe in IoT
Zhang, Y., He, D., & Choo, K.-K. R. (2018) · Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing · doi:10.1155/2018/2783658 · Cited by 102
Security Challenges and Success Factors of Electronic Healthcare System
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“Unauthorized entities may gain malicious access to EHRs without consent of patients, which has detrimental impacts on data integrity, privacy and security of cloud e-health systems [12].”
BackgroundAn Object Store Service for a Fog/Edge Computing Infrastructure Based on IPFS and a Scale-Out NAS
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“In the IPFS system, the role of central server is eliminated, and users can store data in a network of distributed storage nodes on the same file system with advantages over existing cloud storage such as no single point of failure, high storage throughput and data retrieval improvement [35].”
A Lightweight Policy Preserving EHR Sharing Scheme in the Cloud
Ying, Z., Wei, L., Li, Q., Liu, X., & Cui, J. (2018) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2018.2871170 · Cited by 64 · cited 3×
“Traditional access control approaches [14]–[16] for EHRs sharing assume that cloud servers are fully trusted by data owners and enable the servers to perform all access control and authentication rights on data usage.”
BackgroundA secure framework for sharing Electronic Health Records over Clouds
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“To maintain authentication for medical users and the EHRs sharing system, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) was employed on cloud to ensure security standards of e-health systems [15].”
Method
Research works printed but not linked: 12
- 0, Lightweight Java and Android Library for Integration With Ethereum Clients
- 0, Ethereum on Android
- 2018, Ethereum- blockchain app platform
- 0, Solidity 0 5 3 Documentation
- 0, Amazon Web Services (AWS)—Cloud Computing Services
- benet, 2014, IPFS - Content Addressed Versioned P2P File System
- 0, Setting Up IPFS on AWS
- 0, Android App for the InterPlanetary File System
- 0, Biokin
- 0, Decoder and Encoder for the Ethereum ABI
- 0, Big File and String RSA Encryption by Android
- ausanka-crues, 0, Methods for Access Control Advances and Limitations
Cited by
Federated Learning for Internet of Things: A Comprehensive Survey
Nguyen, D. C., Ding, M., Pathirana, P. N., Seneviratne, A., Li, J., & Vincent Poor, H. (2021) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2021.3075439 · Cited by 1,503
“Moreover, fine-grained data access policies on blockchain, such as smart contracts [71], can provide reliable authentication for federated health data processing.”
BackgroundMethodSelf-citation6G Internet of Things: A Comprehensive Survey
Nguyen, D. C., Ding, M., Pathirana, P. N., Seneviratne, A., Li, J., Niyato, D., Dobre, O., & Poor, H. V. (2022) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2021.3103320 · Cited by 1,452
“A synergetic optimization solution for UAV trajectory planning and subslot allocation is derived by portioning the downlink energy transfer subslot and uplink information transmission subslot.”
MethodSelf-citationFederated Learning for Internet of Things: A Comprehensive Survey
Nguyen, D., Ding, M., Pathirana, P. N., Seneviratne, A., Li, J., & Poor, H. (2021) · Deakin Research Online (Deakin University) · Cited by 889
Self-citationFederated learning meets blockchain in edge computing: Opportunities and challenges
Nguyen, D. C., Ding, M., Pham, Q.-V., Pathirana, P. N., Le, L. B., Seneviratne, A., Li, J., Niyato, D., & Poor, H. V. (2021) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2021.3072611 · Cited by 661
“In this context, differential privacy techniques can be employed so that model computation is considered to be differentially private if the output is independent to particular data points from input data.”
BackgroundSelf-citationA survey of blockchain consensus algorithms performance evaluation criteria
Bamakan, S. M. H., Motavali, A., & Babaei Bondarti, A. (2020) · Expert Systems with Applications · doi:10.1016/j.eswa.2020.113385 · Cited by 481
Metadata
- Authors
- Nguyen, D. C., Pathirana, P. N., Ding, M., & Seneviratne, A.
- Affiliations
- Deakin University (AU)
- Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (AU)
- UNSW Sydney (AU)
- Venue
- IEEE Access
- Published
- 2019
- Volume
- 7
- Pages
- 66792-66806
- ISSN
- 2169-3536 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2946008609
- Cited by
- 574
- References
- 36
- Citations by year
- 2026: 27 · 2025: 71 · 2024: 102 · 2023: 110 · 2022: 108 · 2021: 107 · 2020: 43 · 2019: 6
- FWCI
- 81.97
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Locations
- IEEE Access (publishedVersion)
- UNSWorks (UNSW Sydney) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
- Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- CSIRO Data61, Australia
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Cloud Data Security Solutions
- Health Sciences › Health Professions › Health Information Management › Electronic Health Records Systems
- Keywords
- electronic health records, blockchain, mobile cloud computing, e-health systems, data sharing, data privacy, access control, smart contracts, Ethereum, IPFS, decentralized storage, healthcare data security
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.