Devising and Detecting Phishing Emails Using Large Language Models
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
AI programs, built using large language models, make it possible to automatically create phishing emails based on a few data points about a user. The V-Triad is a set of rules for manually designing phishing emails to exploit our cognitive heuristics and biases. In this study, we compare the performance of phishing emails created automatically by GPT-4 and manually using the V-Triad. We also combine GPT-4 with the V-Triad to assess their combined potential. A fourth group, exposed to generic phishing emails, was our control group. We sent emails to 112 participants recruited for the study. The control group emails received a click-through rate between 19-28%, the GPT-generated emails 30-44%, emails generated by the V-Triad 69-79%, and emails generated by GPT and the V-Triad 43-81%. Each participant was asked to explain why they pressed or did not press a link in the email. These answers often contradict each other, highlighting the importance of personal differences. Next, we used four popular large language models (GPT, Claude, PaLM, and LLaMA) to detect the intention of phishing emails and compare the results to human detection. The language models demonstrated a strong ability to detect malicious intent, even in non-obvious phishing emails. They sometimes surpassed human detection, although often being slightly less accurate than humans. Finally, we make an analysis of the economic aspects of AI-enabled phishing attacks, showing how large language models increase the incentives of phishing and spear phishing by reducing their costs.
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![FIGURE 13 Success rate of the intent detection for each email category, including the results of humans to detect phishing emails (not press a link) and other ML-based phishing detection techniques [13, 2, 9]. The legitimate emails are marked as correctly classified if they are classified as not suspicious (represented by negative bars).](https://figures.cochat.ai/paper-figures/feb23c6253f747859f4f709140dd46e9/devising-and-detecting-phishing-emails-using-large-language-models-figure-13.png)









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In the citing paper
“Among its versions, CERT 4.2 was chosen for this work as it contains data from 1000 users over 501 days, including 70 malicious actors and over 32 million possible activities with 7327 malicious actions [7] .”
From User Behavior Analytics for Insider Threat using Transformer Based Approach (2026) · cites this paper as [7]
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In the citing paper
“The CERT Insider Threat Dataset, developed by the CERT Division at Carnegie Mellon University, is a widely used synthetic dataset for insider threat research, offering realistic, privacy free data for benchmarking and model development [6] .”
From User Behavior Analytics for Insider Threat using Transformer Based Approach (2026) · cites this paper as [6]
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Cites
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“LLMs come in different versions (such as GPT [29] created by OpenAI, Anthropic’s LLM 3 , PaLM [1] and Gemini [34] created by Google, and LLaMA [36] from Meta).”
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Gemini: A Family of Highly Capable Multimodal Models
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“LLMs come in different versions (such as GPT [29] created by OpenAI, Anthropic’s LLM 3 , PaLM [1] and Gemini [34] created by Google, and LLaMA [36] from Meta).”
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A comprehensive survey of AI-enabled phishing attacks detection techniques
Basit, A., Zafar, M., Liu, X., Javed, A. R., Jalil, Z., & Kifayat, K. (2021) · Telecommunication Systems · doi:10.1007/s11235-020-00733-2 · Cited by 429 · cited 1×
“For comparison, we also included a bar representing other ML-based phishing detection techniques that often reach an accuracy well above 95% [13, 2, 9].”
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Hadnagy, C. (2018) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9781119433729 · Cited by 331
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Deep Learning for Phishing Detection: Taxonomy, Current Challenges and Future Directions
Do, N. Q., Selamat, A., Krejcar, O., Herrera-Viedma, E., & Fujita, H. (2022) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2022.3151903 · Cited by 221 · cited 1×
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Cited by
A survey on large language model (LLM) security and privacy: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly
Yao, Y., Duan, J., Xu, K., Cai, Y., Sun, Z., & Zhang, Y. (2024) · High-Confidence Computing · doi:10.1016/j.hcc.2024.100211 · Cited by 1,083
A survey on LLM-based multi-agent systems: Workflow, infrastructure, and challenges
Li, X., Wang, S., Zeng, S., Wu, Y., & Yang, Y. (2024) · Vicinagearth · doi:10.1007/s44336-024-00009-2 · Cited by 404
AI deception: A survey of examples, risks, and potential solutions
Park, P. S., Goldstein, S., O’Gara, A., Chen, M., & Hendrycks, D. (2024) · Patterns · doi:10.1016/j.patter.2024.100988 · Cited by 243
“44 These trends continue to increase the degree to which victims are vulnerable to scams, extortion, and other forms of fraud, and, in the words 27 illustratesthat,ineachgame played byanLLM-basedAIagent, thereisatext-based storythatisgeneratedadaptively as the agent observes the current text-based…”
Self-citationAI Deception: A Survey of Examples, Risks, and Potential Solutions
Park, P. S., Goldstein, S., O'Gara, A., Chen, M., & Hendrycks, D. (2023) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2308.14752 · Cited by 243
“44 These trends continue to increase the degree to which victims are vulnerable to scams, extortion, and other forms of fraud, and, in the words 27 illustratesthat,ineachgame played byanLLM-basedAIagent, thereisatext-based storythatisgeneratedadaptively as the agent observes the current text-based…”
Self-citationWhen LLMs meet cybersecurity: a systematic literature review
Zhang, J., Bu, H., Wen, H., Liu, Y., Fei, H., Xi, R., Li, L., Yang, Y., Zhu, H., & Meng, D. (2025) · Cybersecurity · doi:10.1186/s42400-025-00361-w · Cited by 383
Metadata
- Authors
- Heiding, F., Schneier, B., Vishwanath, A., Bernstein, J., & Park, P. S.
- Affiliations
- Harvard John A. Paulson School of Engineering And Applied Sciences, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA
- Harvard University (US)
- Avant Research Group, Buffalo, NY, USA
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology (US)
- Venue
- IEEE Access
- Published
- 2024
- Volume
- 12
- Pages
- 42131-42146
- ISSN
- 2169-3536 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4392667162
- Cited by
- 123
- References
- 29
- Citations by year
- 2026: 61 · 2025: 46 · 2024: 16
- FWCI
- 46.25
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- IEEE Access (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Spam and Phishing Detection
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
- Keywords
- phishing emails, large language models, GPT-4, phishing email detection, click-through rate, AI-generated phishing, spear phishing
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- Heiding, F., Schneier, B., Vishwanath, A., Bernstein, J., & Park, P. S. (2024). Devising and Detecting Phishing Emails Using Large Language Models. IEEE Access. https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2024.3375882
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