Myth or reality — Does the Aurora vulnerability pose a risk to my generator?
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Abstract
There have been many reports of cyberintrusions, hacking, unauthorized operations, and malicious attacks on the electric power system. Many of these reports are uncorroborated and strengthen the skepticism of the very people in position to prevent these invasions. One vulnerability that has drawn substantial discussion is the Aurora vulnerability, which focuses on electric power generators. Since the dramatic video and interview on the television news in 2007 showing how to cause severe damage to a generator, many generation providers are concerned they could become a victim. This paper discusses the Aurora vulnerability, how it is implemented, what the risk factors are, who is vulnerable, and what steps will mitigate this risk. Standard generator protection is not sufficient to thwart a well-executed Aurora attack. This paper presents how the Aurora vulnerability works, what key indicators show a risk, what different methods can be used to initiate an attack, and what modifications can be made to control systems to minimize risk. Many of the recommendations from this paper are low-cost mitigation techniques that can readily be incorporated into standard practices at a generating facility. Comprehensive mitigation techniques include protection and control, electronic and physical security, monitoring, training, risk assessment, and information protection. Making positive changes in these areas can help to maintain control of generators and protect these critical assets.
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Citations
Cited by
Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey
Humayed, A., Lin, J., Li, F., & Luo, B. (2017) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2017.2703172 · Cited by 1,185
Stellios, I., Kotzanikolaou, P., Psarakis, M., Alcaraz, C., & Lopez, J. (2018) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2018.2855563 · Cited by 454
On the definition of cyber-physical resilience in power systems
Arghandeh, R., von Meier, A., Mehrmanesh, L., & Mili, L. (2016) · Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.rser.2015.12.193 · Cited by 404
The Cybersecurity Landscape in Industrial Control Systems
McLaughlin, S., Konstantinou, C., Wang, X., Davi, L., Sadeghi, A.-R., Maniatakos, M., & Karri, R. (2016) · Proceedings of the IEEE · doi:10.1109/jproc.2015.2512235 · Cited by 391
“, aurora generator test [53]) without causing damage to the real system; · hardware security: HIL testbed allows one to study the hardware security of an ICS which has become a major concern over the past decade 7 (e.”
BackgroundLimiting the Impact of Stealthy Attacks on Industrial Control Systems
Urbina, D. I., Giraldo, J. A., Cardenas, A. A., Tippenhauer, N. O., Valente, J., Faisal, M., Ruths, J., Candell, R., & Sandberg, H. (2016) · Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/2976749.2978388 · Cited by 343
IoT-Enabled Smart Energy Grid: Applications and Challenges
Abir, S. M. A. A., Anwar, A., Choi, J., & Kayes, A. S. M. (2021) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2021.3067331 · Cited by 302
Pan, S., Morris, T., & Adhikari, U. (2015) · IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics · doi:10.1109/tii.2015.2420951 · Cited by 180
“3) Aurora Attack: The Aurora vulnerability refers to potential harm caused to a generator by intentionally opening and closing a breaker near the generator in rapid succession [33].”
BackgroundModeling Cyber-Physical Vulnerability of the Smart Grid With Incomplete Information
Srivastava, A., Morris, T., Ernster, T., Vellaithurai, C., Pan, S., & Adhikari, U. (2013) · IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid · doi:10.1109/tsg.2012.2232318 · Cited by 169
Detection and Differentiation of Replay Attack and Equipment Faults in SCADA Systems
Li, D., Gebraeel, N., & Paynabar, K. (2021) · IEEE Transactions on Automation Science and Engineering · doi:10.1109/tase.2020.3013760 · Cited by 68
On The Efficacy of Physics-Informed Context-Based Anomaly Detection for Power Systems
Nafees, M. N., Saxena, N., & Burnap, P. (2022) · 2022 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids (SmartGridComm) · doi:10.1109/smartgridcomm52983.2022.9961034 · Cited by 4
Metadata
- Authors
- Zeller, M.
- Venue
- 2011 64th Annual Conference for Protective Relay Engineers
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2011-04
- Pages
- 130-136
- OpenAlex
- W2169915125
- Cited by
- 98
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 8.59
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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