Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
CoChat

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Detection and Differentiation of Replay Attack and Equipment Faults in SCADA Systems

Li, Dan, Gebraeel, Nagi, Paynabar, Kamran · 2021 · IEEE Transactions on Automation Science and Engineering

Abstract

Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems are widely used for industrial control of critical infrastructures, such as power plants and manufacturing systems. There is abundant evidence of SCADA systems being subject to cyberattacks. With increasing interest in industrial digitization, the cybersecurity of SCADA systems is poised to be even more important. Equipment faults and cyberattacks can manifest themselves in a similar fashion, i.e., they can exhibit similar signatures. This article focuses on methods that are capable of distinguishing equipment faults from bona fide cyberattacks. Especially, we consider a relatively sophisticated form of cyberattack known as the “replay attack” (RA). We derive mathematical formalisms that distinguish the RA from several classes of equipment faults and verify our methodology through an extensive numerical study.Note to Practitioners—This article is motivated by the problem of detecting replay cyberattacks in industrial control systems and differentiating it from equipment faults. Existing approaches mainly focus on the detection aspect but usually ignore the importance of differentiation. We an ensembled statistical process monitoring approach based on five statistical metrics. The statistical metrics are derived based on a theoretical analysis that shows the data characteristics under each system anomaly, including replay attack (RA), controller fault, and plant fault. We mathematically prove that the signatures generated by the derived metrics can be used to differentiate an RA from the equipment faults. We conduct a sensitivity analysis of the detection delay of our method regarding the magnitude of the cyberattack. Physical experiments on a rotating machinery setup show that the proposed approach applies to some simple real-world settings. In future research, we will address the scalability issue of our method as well as more generalized nonlinear system settings.

Overview

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1109/tase.2020.3013760

Cites

31 of 31 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

This paper’s full text isn’t openly available, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Citations

Cites

Show all 31 references

Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. Tsang, 2010, Cyberthreats, Vulnerabilities and Attacks on Scada Networks
  2. 2016, Analysis of the cyber attack on the Ukrainian power grid
  3. Anderson, 1979, Optimal Filtering, 21, 22

Cited by

See all 68

Metadata

Authors
Li, D., Gebraeel, N., & Paynabar, K.
Affiliations
Georgia Institute of Technology (US)
Venue
IEEE Transactions on Automation Science and Engineering
Published
2021-10
Volume
18
Issue
4
Pages
1626-1639
ISSN
  • 1545-5955 (ISSN-L)
  • 1558-3783
OpenAlex
W3082437751
Cited by
68
References
31
Citations by year
2026: 4 · 2025: 10 · 2024: 17 · 2023: 15 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 11
FWCI
4.58
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
IEEE Transactions on Automation Science and Engineering (publishedVersion)
Funders
U.S. National Science Foundation (CMMI-1536555)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Fault Detection and Control Systems
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
Keywords
replay attacks, SCADA systems, industrial control systems, cyberattack detection, equipment faults, statistical process monitoring, detection delay, rotating machinery

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Detection and Differentiation of Replay Attack and Equipment Faults in SCADA Systems. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/tase.2020.3013760
The paper
Li, D., Gebraeel, N., & Paynabar, K. (2021). Detection and Differentiation of Replay Attack and Equipment Faults in SCADA Systems. IEEE Transactions on Automation Science and Engineering. https://doi.org/10.1109/tase.2020.3013760

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.