The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Probabilistic noninterference for multi-threaded programs
Abstract
We present a probability-sensitive confidentiality specification-a form of probabilistic noninterference-for a small multi-threaded programming language with dynamic thread creation. Probabilistic covert channels arise from a scheduler which is probabilistic. Since scheduling policy is typically outside the language specification for multi-threaded languages, we describe how to generalise the security condition in order to define how to generalise the security condition in order to define robust security with respect to a wide class of schedulers, not excluding the possibility of deterministic (e.g., round-robin) schedulers and program-controlled thread priorities. The formulation is based on an adaptation of Larsen and Skou's (1991) notion of probabilistic bisimulation. We show how the security condition satisfies compositionality properties which facilitate straightforward proofs of correctness for, e.g., security type systems. We illustrate this by defining a security type system which improves on previous multi-threaded systems, and by proving it correct with respect to our stronger scheduler-independent security condition.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Language-based information-flow security
Sabelfeld, A., & Myers, A. C. (2003) · IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications · doi:10.1109/jsac.2002.806121 · Cited by 1,907
Self-citationAn information-theoretic model for adaptive side-channel attacks
Köpf, B., & Basin, D. (2007) · Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/1315245.1315282 · Cited by 365
Agat, J. (2000) · Proceedings of the 27th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages · doi:10.1145/325694.325702 · Cited by 340
Observational determinism for concurrent program security
Zdancewic, S., & Myers, A. C. (2004) · 16th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2003. Proceedings. · doi:10.1109/csfw.2003.1212703 · Cited by 270
Dimensions and Principles of Declassification
Sabelfeld, A., & Sands, D. (2005) · 18th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW'05) · doi:10.1109/csfw.2005.15 · Cited by 263
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Sabelfeld, A., & Sands, D.
- Venue
- Proceedings 13th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop. CSFW-13
- Publisher
- IEEE Comput. Soc
- Published
- 2002-11-07
- Pages
- 200-214
- OpenAlex
- W2168686464
- Cited by
- 304
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 17.67
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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