The DOI matches its Crossref record; 46 of the 46 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Observational determinism for concurrent program security
Abstract
Noninterference is a property of sequential programs that is useful for expressing security policies for data confidentiality and integrity. However, extending noninterference to concurrent programs has proved problematic. In this paper we present a relatively expressive secure concurrent calculi, provides first-class channels, high-order functions, and an unbounded number of threads. Well-typed programs obey a generalization of noninterference that ensures immunity to internal timing attacks and to attacks that exploit information about the thread scheduler. Elimination of these refinement attacks is possible because the enforced security property extends noninterference with observational determinism. Although the security property is strong, it also avoids some of the restrictiveness imposed on previous security-typed concurrent languages.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
A calculus of mobile processes, I
Milner, R., Parrow, J., & Walker, D. (1992) · Information and Computation · doi:10.1016/0890-5401(92)90008-4 · Cited by 2,845
Security Policies and Security Models
Goguen, J. A., & Meseguer, J. (1982) · 1982 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.1982.10014 · Cited by 2,119
Language-based information-flow security
Sabelfeld, A., & Myers, A. C. (2003) · IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications · doi:10.1109/jsac.2002.806121 · Cited by 1,907
Self-citationA lattice model of secure information flow
Denning, D. E. (1976) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/360051.360056 · Cited by 1,907
A calculus of mobile processes, II
Milner, R., Parrow, J., & Walker, D. (1992) · Information and Computation · doi:10.1016/0890-5401(92)90009-5 · Cited by 1,696
A note on the confinement problem
Lampson, B. W. (1973) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/362375.362389 · Cited by 1,429
A calculus for cryptographic protocols: the spi calculus
Abadi, M., & Gordon, A. D. (1997) · Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/266420.266432 · Cited by 1,154
JFlow: practical mostly-static information flow control
Myers, A. C. (1999) · Proceedings of the 26th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages · doi:10.1145/292540.292561 · Cited by 1,034
Self-citationCertification of programs for secure information flow
Denning, D. E., & Denning, P. J. (1977) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/359636.359712 · Cited by 1,029
A sound type system for secure flow analysis
Volpano, D., Irvine, C., & Smith, G. (1996) · Journal of Computer Security · doi:10.3233/jcs-1996-42-304 · Cited by 969
Cited by
Temporal Logics for Hyperproperties
Clarkson, M. R., Finkbeiner, B., Koleini, M., Micinski, K. K., Rabe, M. N., & Sánchez, C. (2014) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-54792-8_15 · Cited by 270
Metadata
- Authors
- Zdancewic, S., & Myers, A. C.
- Venue
- 16th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2003. Proceedings.
- Publisher
- IEEE Comput. Soc
- Published
- 2004-01-24
- Pages
- 29-43
- ISSN
- 1063-6900 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2123858370
- Cited by
- 270
- References
- 46
- FWCI
- 7.37
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Observational determinism for concurrent program security. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/csfw.2003.1212703
- The paper
- Zdancewic, S., & Myers, A. C. (2004). Observational determinism for concurrent program security. 16th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2003. Proceedings. https://doi.org/10.1109/csfw.2003.1212703
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.