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Observational determinism for concurrent program security
Abstract
Noninterference is a property of sequential programs that is useful for expressing security policies for data confidentiality and integrity. However, extending noninterference to concurrent programs has proved problematic. In this paper we present a relatively expressive secure concurrent calculi, provides first-class channels, high-order functions, and an unbounded number of threads. Well-typed programs obey a generalization of noninterference that ensures immunity to internal timing attacks and to attacks that exploit information about the thread scheduler. Elimination of these refinement attacks is possible because the enforced security property extends noninterference with observational determinism. Although the security property is strong, it also avoids some of the restrictiveness imposed on previous security-typed concurrent languages.
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Cited by
Temporal Logics for Hyperproperties
Clarkson, M. R., Finkbeiner, B., Koleini, M., Micinski, K. K., Rabe, M. N., & Sánchez, C. (2014) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-54792-8_15 · Cited by 270
Metadata
- Authors
- Zdancewic, S., & Myers, A. C.
- Venue
- 16th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2003. Proceedings.
- Publisher
- IEEE Comput. Soc
- Published
- 2004-01-24
- Pages
- 29-43
- ISSN
- 1063-6900 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2123858370
- Cited by
- 270
- References
- 46
- FWCI
- 7.37
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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