Adversarial Attacks Beyond the Image Space
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Generating adversarial examples is an intriguing problem and an important way of understanding the working mechanism of deep neural networks. Most existing approaches generated perturbations in the image space, i.e., each pixel can be modified independently. However, in this paper we pay special attention to the subset of adversarial examples that correspond to meaningful changes in 3D physical properties (like rotation and translation, illumination condition, etc.). These adversaries arguably pose a more serious concern, as they demonstrate the possibility of causing neural network failure by easy perturbations of real-world 3D objects and scenes. In the contexts of object classification and visual question answering, we augment state-of-the-art deep neural networks that receive 2D input images with a rendering module (either differentiable or not) in front, so that a 3D scene (in the physical space) is rendered into a 2D image (in the image space), and then mapped to a prediction (in the output space). The adversarial perturbations can now go beyond the image space, and have clear meanings in the 3D physical world. Though image-space adversaries can be interpreted as per-pixel albedo change, we verify that they cannot be well explained along these physically meaningful dimensions, which often have a non-local effect. But it is still possible to successfully attack beyond the image space on the physical space, though this is more difficult than image-space attacks, reflected in lower success rates and heavier perturbations required.
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Cites
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“rent and the target predictions was computed, and gradients back-propagated to the image layer. This idea was developed into a set of algorithms, including the Steepest Gradient Descent Method (SGDM) [26] and the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [11]. The difference lies in that SGDM computed accurate gradients, while…”
BackgroundMethodInfluential
Cited by
Threat of Adversarial Attacks on Deep Learning in Computer Vision: A Survey
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Advances in Adversarial Attacks and Defenses in Computer Vision: A Survey
Akhtar, N., Mian, A., Kardan, N., & Shah, M. (2021) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2021.3127960 · Cited by 302
A Faster and Robust Artificial Neural Network Based Image Encryption Technique With Improved SSIM
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Landmark Breaker: Obstructing DeepFake By Disturbing Landmark Extraction
Sun, P., Li, Y., Qi, H., & Lyu, S. (2020) · 2020 IEEE International Workshop on Information Forensics and Security (WIFS) · doi:10.1109/wifs49906.2020.9360910 · Cited by 27
“CNNs have been proven vulnerable against adversarial perturbations, which are intentionally crafted imperceptible noises aiming to mislead the CNN-based image classifiers [13], [14], [26], [27], [28], [29], [30], [31], [32], [33], object detectors [34], [35], and semantic segmentation [36], [37].”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Zeng, X., Liu, C., Wang, Y.-S., Qiu, W., Xie, L., Tai, Y.-W., Tang, C.-K., & Yuille, A. L.
- Venue
- 2019 IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2019-06
- Pages
- 4297-4306
- ISSN
- 1063-6919 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2963068442
- Cited by
- 135
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 9.02
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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