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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 36 of the 36 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Evading Defenses to Transferable Adversarial Examples by Translation-Invariant Attacks

Open access
Dong, Yinpeng, Pang, Tianyu, Su, Hang, Zhu, Jun · 2019 · 2019 IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR)

Abstract

Deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples, which can mislead classifiers by adding imperceptible perturbations. An intriguing property of adversarial examples is their good transferability, making black-box attacks feasible in real-world applications. Due to the threat of adversarial attacks, many methods have been proposed to improve the robustness. Several state-of-the-art defenses are shown to be robust against transferable adversarial examples. In this paper, we propose a translation-invariant attack method to generate more transferable adversarial examples against the defense models. By optimizing a perturbation over an ensemble of translated images, the generated adversarial example is less sensitive to the white-box model being attacked and has better transferability. To improve the efficiency of attacks, we further show that our method can be implemented by convolving the gradient at the untranslated image with a pre-defined kernel. Our method is generally applicable to any gradient-based attack method. Extensive experiments on the ImageNet dataset validate the effectiveness of the proposed method. Our best attack fools eight state-of-the-art defenses at an 82% success rate on average based only on the transferability, demonstrating the insecurity of the current defense techniques.

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Metadata

Authors
Dong, Y., Pang, T., Su, H., & Zhu, J.
Venue
2019 IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR)
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2019-06
Pages
4307-4316
ISSN
1063-6919 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2969542116
Cited by
942
References
36
FWCI
29.15
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Evading Defenses to Transferable Adversarial Examples by Translation-Invariant Attacks. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/cvpr.2019.00444
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Dong, Y., Pang, T., Su, H., & Zhu, J. (2019). Evading Defenses to Transferable Adversarial Examples by Translation-Invariant Attacks. 2019 IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR). https://doi.org/10.1109/cvpr.2019.00444

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