The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
WALNUT: Waging Doubt on the Integrity of MEMS Accelerometers with Acoustic Injection Attacks
Abstract
Cyber-physical systems depend on sensors to make automated decisions. Resonant acoustic injection attacks are already known to cause malfunctions by disabling MEMS-based gyroscopes. However, an open question remains on how to move beyond denial of service attacks to achieve full adversarial control of sensor outputs. Our work investigates how analog acoustic injection attacks can damage the digital integrity of a popular type of sensor: the capacitive MEMS accelerometer. Spoofing such sensors with intentional acoustic interference enables an out-of-spec pathway for attackers to deliver chosen digital values to microprocessors and embedded systems that blindly trust the unvalidated integrity of sensor outputs. Our contributions include (1) modeling the physics of malicious acoustic interference on MEMS accelerometers, (2) discovering the circuit-level security flaws that cause the vulnerabilities by measuring acoustic injection attacks on MEMS accelerometers as well as systems that employ on these sensors, and (3) two software-only defenses that mitigate many of the risks to the integrity of MEMS accelerometer outputs. We characterize two classes of acoustic injection attacks with increasing levels of adversarial control: output biasing and output control. We test these attacks against 20 models of capacitive MEMS accelerometers from 5 different manufacturers. Our experiments find that 75% are vulnerable to output biasing, and 65% are vulnerable to output control. To illustrate end-to-end implications, we show how to inject fake steps into a Fitbit with a $5 speaker. In our self-stimulating attack, we play a malicious music file from a smartphone's speaker to control the on-board MEMS accelerometer trusted by a local app to pilot a toy RC car. In addition to offering hardware design suggestions to eliminate the root causes of insecure amplification and filtering, we introduce two low-cost software defenses that mitigate output biasing attacks: randomized sampling and 180 degree out-of-phase sampling. These software-only approaches mitigate attacks by exploiting the periodic and predictable nature of the malicious acoustic interference signal. Our results call into question the wisdom of allowing microprocessors and embedded systems to blindly trust that hardware abstractions alone will ensure the integrity of sensor outputs.
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Cites
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Interference with Cardiac Pacemakers by Cellular Telephones
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Ghost Talk: Mitigating EMI Signal Injection Attacks against Analog Sensors
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Self-citationAccelPrint: Imperfections of Accelerometers Make Smartphones Trackable
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Cited by
Real-Time Sensor Anomaly Detection and Identification in Automated Vehicles
van Wyk, F., Wang, Y., Khojandi, A., & Masoud, N. (2020) · IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems · doi:10.1109/tits.2019.2906038 · Cited by 344
Continuous Authentication for Voice Assistants
Feng, H., Fawaz, K., & Shin, K. G. (2017) · Proceedings of the 23rd Annual International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking · doi:10.1145/3117811.3117823 · Cited by 293
Stealthy Attacks against Robotic Vehicles Protected by Control-based Intrusion Detection Techniques
Dash, P., Karimibiuki, M., & Pattabiraman, K. (2021) · Digital Threats: Research and Practice · doi:10.1145/3419474 · Cited by 40
(2020) · Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection · Cited by 34
Metadata
- Authors
- Trippel, T., Weisse, O., Xu, W., Honeyman, P., & Fu, K.
- Venue
- 2017 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2017-04
- Pages
- 3-18
- OpenAlex
- W2725499676
- Cited by
- 279
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 20.50
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Trippel, T., Weisse, O., Xu, W., Honeyman, P., & Fu, K. (2017). WALNUT: Waging Doubt on the Integrity of MEMS Accelerometers with Acoustic Injection Attacks. 2017 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P). https://doi.org/10.1109/eurosp.2017.42
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