Formal security assessment of Modbus protocol
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Critical infrastructures as water treatment, power distribution, or telecommunications, provide daily services essential to our lifestyle. Any service discontinuity can have a high impact into our society and even into our safety. Thus, security of these systems against intentional threats must be guaranteed. However, many of these systems are based on protocols initially designed to operate on closed, unroutable networks, making them an easy target for cybercriminals. In this regard, Modbus is a widely adopted protocol in control systems. Modbus protocol, however, lacks for security properties and is vulnerable to plenty of attacks (as spoofing, flooding, or replay, to name a few). In this paper, we propose a formal modeling of Modbus protocol using an extension of hierarchical state-machines that is automatically transformed to a Promela model. This model allows us to find counterexamples of security properties by model-checking. In particular, the original contribution of this paper is the formal demonstration of the existence of man-in-the-middle attacks in Modbus-based systems. Our approach also allows to formally evaluate security properties in future extensions of Modbus protocols.
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Citations
Cites
Accurate modeling of modbus/TCP for intrusion detection in SCADA systems
Goldenberg, N., & Wool, A. (2013) · International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection · doi:10.1016/j.ijcip.2013.05.001 · Cited by 323 · cited 1×
“Similarly, in [13] the Modbus/TCP communication channel between assets was modeled using deterministic finite automaton, later used to detect intrusions by network packet analysis.”
MethodAttack taxonomies for the Modbus protocols
Huitsing, P., Chandia, R., Papa, M., & Shenoi, S. (2008) · International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection · doi:10.1016/j.ijcip.2008.08.003 · Cited by 249
Design and Implementation of a Secure Modbus Protocol
Fovino, I. N., Carcano, A., Masera, M., & Trombetta, A. (2009) · IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-04798-5_6 · Cited by 138 · cited 1×
“[14] proposed an extension of Modbus protocol to support authentication, non-repudiation, and replay protection.”
Background
Research works printed but not linked: 16
- 10.1007/978-3-642-03552-4_18 · DOI
- bhatia, 2014, Practical Modbus Flooding Attack and Detection, Proceedings of the Twelfth Australasian Information Security Conference (AISC) ser AISC'14, 149, 57
- sheyner, 2004, Scenario graphs and attack graphs
- mikk, 1998, Implementing statecharts in PROMELA/SPIN, Proceedings. 2nd IEEE Workshop on Industrial Strength Formal Specification Techniques, 90
- holzmann, 2004, The SPIN Model Checker Primer and Reference Manual, 1003
- 10.1007/978-3-319-17581-2_7 · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-17581-2_7
- walters, 2014, Cyber Attacks on U.S. Companies in 2014, The Heritage Foundation-National Security and Defense, 1
- 10.1109/ICoIA.2013.6650236 · DOI
- sood, 2013, Targeted Cyberattacks: A Superset of Advanced Persistent Threats, IEEE Security & Privacy, 11, 54
- 10.1080/00396338.2011.555586 · DOI · Paper page
- 2012, MODBUS Application Protocol Specification v1.1b3, MODICON Inc Industrial Automation Systems Tech Rep
- 10.1109/MSPEC.2013.6676992 · doi:10.1109/mspec.2013.6676992
- 2013, Can we learn from SCADA security incidents?, Tech Rep
- 2016, Department of Homeland Security National Security Strategy The White House May 2010
- 10.1007/978-3-319-29510-7_7 · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-29510-7_7
- knapp, 2014, Industrial Network Security Securing critical infrastructure networks for smart grid SCADA and other Industrial Control Systems Syngress
Cited by
A Role-Based Access Control Model in Modbus SCADA Systems. A Centralized Model Approach
Figueroa-Lorenzo, S., Añorga, J., & Arrizabalaga, S. (2019) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s19204455 · Cited by 58
“On the offensive security side, the first works analyzed was the reference [13].”
BackgroundL, R., & Satyanarayana, P. (2021) · Security and Communication Networks · doi:10.1155/2021/8887666 · Cited by 28
Cryptographic Considerations for Automation and SCADA Systems Using Trusted Platform Modules
Tidrea, A., Korodi, A., & Silea, I. (2019) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s19194191 · Cited by 24
“From the protocol communication point of view in [18] it is stated that the Modbus is the most frequently used protocol in SCADA and automation systems, even though it was rated as being insecure [19].”
Method
Metadata
- Authors
- Nardone, R., Rodriguez, R. J., & Marrone, S.
- Venue
- 2016 11th International Conference for Internet Technology and Secured Transactions (ICITST)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2016-12
- Pages
- 142-147
- OpenAlex
- W2588230528
- Cited by
- 36
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 2.66
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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