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Formal security assessment of Modbus protocol

Nardone, Roberto, Rodriguez, Ricardo J., Marrone, Stefano · 2016 · 2016 11th International Conference for Internet Technology and Secured Transactions (ICITST)
Cited by 36

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Critical infrastructures as water treatment, power distribution, or telecommunications, provide daily services essential to our lifestyle. Any service discontinuity can have a high impact into our society and even into our safety. Thus, security of these systems against intentional threats must be guaranteed. However, many of these systems are based on protocols initially designed to operate on closed, unroutable networks, making them an easy target for cybercriminals. In this regard, Modbus is a widely adopted protocol in control systems. Modbus protocol, however, lacks for security properties and is vulnerable to plenty of attacks (as spoofing, flooding, or replay, to name a few). In this paper, we propose a formal modeling of Modbus protocol using an extension of hierarchical state-machines that is automatically transformed to a Promela model. This model allows us to find counterexamples of security properties by model-checking. In particular, the original contribution of this paper is the formal demonstration of the existence of man-in-the-middle attacks in Modbus-based systems. Our approach also allows to formally evaluate security properties in future extensions of Modbus protocols.

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Crossref · 10.1109/icitst.2016.7856685

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Citations

Cites

Research works printed but not linked: 16

  1. 10.1007/978-3-642-03552-4_18 · DOI
  2. bhatia, 2014, Practical Modbus Flooding Attack and Detection, Proceedings of the Twelfth Australasian Information Security Conference (AISC) ser AISC'14, 149, 57
  3. sheyner, 2004, Scenario graphs and attack graphs
  4. mikk, 1998, Implementing statecharts in PROMELA/SPIN, Proceedings. 2nd IEEE Workshop on Industrial Strength Formal Specification Techniques, 90
  5. holzmann, 2004, The SPIN Model Checker Primer and Reference Manual, 1003
  6. 10.1007/978-3-319-17581-2_7 · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-17581-2_7
  7. walters, 2014, Cyber Attacks on U.S. Companies in 2014, The Heritage Foundation-National Security and Defense, 1
  8. 10.1109/ICoIA.2013.6650236 · DOI
  9. sood, 2013, Targeted Cyberattacks: A Superset of Advanced Persistent Threats, IEEE Security & Privacy, 11, 54
  10. 10.1080/00396338.2011.555586 · DOI · Paper page
  11. 2012, MODBUS Application Protocol Specification v1.1b3, MODICON Inc Industrial Automation Systems Tech Rep
  12. 10.1109/MSPEC.2013.6676992 · doi:10.1109/mspec.2013.6676992
  13. 2013, Can we learn from SCADA security incidents?, Tech Rep
  14. 2016, Department of Homeland Security National Security Strategy The White House May 2010
  15. 10.1007/978-3-319-29510-7_7 · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-29510-7_7
  16. knapp, 2014, Industrial Network Security Securing critical infrastructure networks for smart grid SCADA and other Industrial Control Systems Syngress

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Nardone, R., Rodriguez, R. J., & Marrone, S.
Venue
2016 11th International Conference for Internet Technology and Secured Transactions (ICITST)
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2016-12
Pages
142-147
OpenAlex
W2588230528
Cited by
36
References
3
FWCI
2.66
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
closed

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