Cited by 7Information and Cyber SecurityNetwork Security and Intrusion DetectionSmart Grid Security and Resilience

ThreatGet: Ensuring the Implementation of Defense-in-Depth Strategy for IIoT Based on IEC 62443

Schmittner, Christoph, Shaaban, Abdelkader Magdy, Macher, Georg·2022·2022 IEEE 5th International Conference on Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems (ICPS)

Abstract

Security engineering is a major challenge in the distributed and heterogeneous nature of the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). While IEC 62443 is available as a security engineering standard for the industrial domain, the increased complexity and dynamic of combining IoT with industrial sys-tems challenges approaches without automation. Security analy-sis in the IIoT with a model-based engineering tool is essential to ensure the proper method is applied to protect the system model. This work follows the Defense-in-depth strategy presented by IEC 62443, then adapted for IIoT applications. We use ThreatGet threat modeling tool to show how this strategy could be implemented in the IIoT domain using threat modeling. The research findings demonstrate how the threat modeling approach ensures the implementation of a defense-in-depth strategy in the IIoT domain.

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Crossref · 10.1109/icps51978.2022.9816864

Cites

7 of 7 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • IIoT devices have limited power, memory, disk space, and processing capabilities.

    “They also note that IIoT devices have limited power, memory, disk space, and processing capabilities”

    From Mapping of Industrial IoT to IEC 62443 Standards (2025) · cites this paper as [39]

  • Schmittner et al. [39] do not address the applicability of the standards and do not provide suggestions on how to make the standards more applicable to the IIoT.

    “Again, this paper does not address the applicability of the standards and does not provide suggestions on how to make the standards more applicable to the IIoT.”

    From Mapping of Industrial IoT to IEC 62443 Standards (2025) · cites this paper as [39]

  • Physical security is an important factor in IIoT environments.

    “Also emphasized is the fact that physical security is an important factor in IIoT environments.”

    From Mapping of Industrial IoT to IEC 62443 Standards (2025) · cites this paper as [39]

  • Schmittner et al. [39] mainly focus on only two standards: IEC 62443-4-1 and IEC 62443-4-2.

    “Similarly to the previous paper, Schmittner et al. [39] mainly focus on only two standards: IEC 62443-4-1 and IEC 62443-4-2.”

    From Mapping of Industrial IoT to IEC 62443 Standards (2025) · cites this paper as [39]

  • The introduction of IIoT devices into a system increases the overall complexity of the system.

    “and that their introduction into the system increases the overall complexity of the system.”

    From Mapping of Industrial IoT to IEC 62443 Standards (2025) · cites this paper as [39]

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Authors
Schmittner, C., Shaaban, A. M., & Macher, G.
Affiliations
  • AIT Austrian Institute of Technology GmbH (AT)
  • Graz University of Technology (AT)
Venue
2022 IEEE 5th International Conference on Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems (ICPS)
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2022-05-24
Pages
1-6
OpenAlex
W4285814160
Cited by
7
References
7
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 1
FWCI
0.89
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
IEEE International Conference on Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems (ICPS) (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
Keywords
Industrial Internet of Things, IEC 62443, defense-in-depth, threat modeling, industrial cybersecurity, security engineering

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