Cited by 8Privacy-Preserving Technologies in DataAdversarial Robustness in Machine LearningIoT and Edge/Fog Computing

Exploring Adversarial Graph Autoencoders to Manipulate Federated Learning in The Internet of Things

Li, Kai, Yuan, Xin, Zheng, Jingjing, Ni, Wei, Guizani, Mohsen·2023·2023 International Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing (IWCMC)

Abstract

Mobile edge computing (MEC) enables the Internet of Things (IoT) with seamless integration of multiple application services. Federated learning is increasingly considered to improve training accuracy in MEC-IoT while circumventing the disclosure of private data, where the IoT nodes collaboratively train a machine learning model without disclosing their private data. In this paper, we propose a new cyber-epidemic attack that progressively manipulates federated learning and reduces the training accuracy of the benign MEC-IoT. The proposed cyber-epidemic attack explores adversarial graph autoencoders (GACE) to generate malicious local model updates that extract correlated features with the benign local and global models. The proposed GACE attack epidemically infects all the benign IoT nodes along with the training iterations in federated learning, while highly enhancing concealment of the attack.

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Crossref · 10.1109/iwcmc58020.2023.10183217

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25 of 25 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • With the broadcast nature of wireless interfaces, adversaries can potentially overhear local model updates from multiple or even all clients and create malicious local models to compromise WFL.

    “Moreover, with the broadcast nature of wireless interfaces, adversaries can potentially overhear local model updates from multiple or even all clients and accordingly create malicious local models to compromise WFL, e.g., using generative neural networks and machine learning technologies.”
  • A rogue client can collect local model updates that benign clients upload, take them as input to a graph adversarial encoder (GAE) to produce a malicious local model update, which can poison WFL and stop or slow down its convergence.

    “For example, in [35], [114], a new adversarial attack on WFL is studied by exploiting the broadcast nature of wireless channels, where a rogue client collects the local model updates that benign clients upload. The rogue client can take these overheard local model updates as input to a graph adversarial encoder (GAE) to produce a malicious local model update. The malicious local model update can”

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Authors
Li, K., Yuan, X., Zheng, J., Ni, W., & Guizani, M.
Affiliations
  • Centro de Investigação em Sistemas Computacionais Embebidos e de Tempo-Real (PT)
  • Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (AU)
  • Mohamed bin Zayed University of Artificial Intelligence (AE)
Venue
2023 International Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing (IWCMC)
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2023-06-19
Pages
898-903
OpenAlex
W4385079041
Cited by
8
References
25
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 5
FWCI
1.42
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • International Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing Conference (IWCMC) (publishedVersion)
  • OPUS - Open Publications of UTS Scholars (University of Technology Sydney) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › IoT and Edge/Fog Computing
Keywords
federated learning, Internet of Things, mobile edge computing, attack concealment, privacy-preserving machine learning

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