Cited by 200Privacy-Preserving Technologies in DataAdversarial Robustness in Machine LearningNetwork Security and Intrusion Detection

Poisoning Attacks on Federated Learning-based IoT Intrusion Detection System

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Nguyen, Thien Duc, Rieger, Phillip, Miettinen, Markus, Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza·2020·Proceedings 2020 Workshop on Decentralized IoT Systems and Security

Abstract

Federated Learning (FL) is an appealing method for applying machine learning to large scale systems due to the privacy and efficiency advantages that its training mechanism provides.One important field for FL deployment is emerging IoT applications.In particular, FL has been recently used for IoT intrusion detection systems where clients, e.g., a home security gateway, monitors traffic data generated by IoT devices in its network, trains a local intrusion detection model, and send this model to a central entity, the aggregator, who then computes a global model (using the models of all gateways) that is distributed back to clients.This approach protects the privacy of users as it does not require local clients to share their potentially private IoT data with any other parties, and it is in general more efficient than a centralized system.However, FL schemes have been subject to poising attacks, in particular to backdoor attacks.In this paper, we show that FL-based IoT intrusion detection systems are vulnerable to backdoor attacks.We present a novel data poisoning attack that allows an adversary to implant a backdoor into the aggregated detection model to incorrectly classify malicious traffic as benign.We show that the adversary can gradually poison the detection model by only using compromised IoT devices (and not gateways/clients) to inject small amounts of malicious data into the training process and remain undetected.Our extensive evaluation on three real-world IoT datasets generated from 46 IoT devices shows the effectiveness of our attack in injecting backdoors and circumventing state of the art defenses against FL poisoning.Finally, we discuss shortly possible mitigation approaches.

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  1. S. Shen, S. Tople, and P. Saxena, "Auror: Defending against poisoning attacks in collaborative deep learning systems," in Proceedings of the 32Nd Annual Conference on Computer Security Applications, ser. ACSAC '16. ACM, 2016, pp. 508-519.

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Authors
Nguyen, T. D., Rieger, P., Miettinen, M., & Sadeghi, A.-R.
Affiliations
Technische Universität Darmstadt (DE)
Venue
Proceedings 2020 Workshop on Decentralized IoT Systems and Security
Published
2020
OpenAlex
W3030742901
Cited by
200
References
35
Citations by year
2026: 13 · 2025: 35 · 2024: 54 · 2023: 38 · 2022: 36 · 2021: 19 · 2020: 5
FWCI
9.36
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Workshop on Decentralized IoT Systems and Security (DISS) (publishedVersion)
  • TUbilio (Technical University of Darmstadt) (submittedVersion)
Funders
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (SFB 1119, 236615297)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
Keywords
federated learning, data poisoning, backdoor attacks, IoT intrusion detection, privacy-preserving machine learning, malicious traffic classification, attack mitigation

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