The DOI matches its Crossref record; 36 of the 36 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Systematic Poisoning Attacks on and Defenses for Machine Learning in Healthcare
Abstract
Machine learning is being used in a wide range of application domains to discover patterns in large datasets. Increasingly, the results of machine learning drive critical decisions in applications related to healthcare and biomedicine. Such health-related applications are often sensitive, and thus, any security breach would be catastrophic. Naturally, the integrity of the results computed by machine learning is of great importance. Recent research has shown that some machine-learning algorithms can be compromised by augmenting their training datasets with malicious data, leading to a new class of attacks called poisoning attacks. Hindrance of a diagnosis may have life-threatening consequences and could cause distrust. On the other hand, not only may a false diagnosis prompt users to distrust the machine-learning algorithm and even abandon the entire system but also such a false positive classification may cause patient distress. In this paper, we present a systematic, algorithm-independent approach for mounting poisoning attacks across a wide range of machine-learning algorithms and healthcare datasets. The proposed attack procedure generates input data, which, when added to the training set, can either cause the results of machine learning to have targeted errors (e.g., increase the likelihood of classification into a specific class), or simply introduce arbitrary errors (incorrect classification). These attacks may be applied to both fixed and evolving datasets. They can be applied even when only statistics of the training dataset are available or, in some cases, even without access to the training dataset, although at a lower efficacy. We establish the effectiveness of the proposed attacks using a suite of six machine-learning algorithms and five healthcare datasets. Finally, we present countermeasures against the proposed generic attacks that are based on tracking and detecting deviations in various accuracy metrics, and benchmark their effectiveness.
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Cited by
Adversarial Examples: Attacks and Defenses for Deep Learning
Yuan, X., He, P., Zhu, Q., & Li, X. (2019) · IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks and Learning Systems · doi:10.1109/tnnls.2018.2886017 · Cited by 1,733
Neural Cleanse: Identifying and Mitigating Backdoor Attacks in Neural Networks
Wang, B., Yao, Y., Shan, S., Li, H., Viswanath, B., Zheng, H., & Zhao, B. Y. (2019) · 2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp.2019.00031 · Cited by 1,368
Data Poisoning Attacks Against Federated Learning Systems
Tolpegin, V., Truex, S., Gursoy, M. E., & Liu, L. (2020) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-58951-6_24 · Cited by 927
A Comprehensive Study of Security of Internet-of-Things
Mosenia, A., & Jha, N. K. (2017) · IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computing · doi:10.1109/tetc.2016.2606384 · Cited by 806
Self-citationManipulating Machine Learning: Poisoning Attacks and Countermeasures for Regression Learning
Jagielski, M., Oprea, A., Biggio, B., Liu, C., Nita-Rotaru, C., & Li, B. (2018) · 2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp.2018.00057 · Cited by 861
Metadata
- Authors
- Mozaffari-Kermani, M., Sur-Kolay, S., Raghunathan, A., & Jha, N. K.
- Venue
- IEEE Journal of Biomedical and Health Informatics
- Published
- 2015-11
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1893-1905
- ISSN
- 2168-2194 (ISSN-L)
- 2168-2208
- OpenAlex
- W1968411139
- Cited by
- 383
- References
- 36
- FWCI
- 4.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Mozaffari-Kermani, M., Sur-Kolay, S., Raghunathan, A., & Jha, N. K. (2015). Systematic Poisoning Attacks on and Defenses for Machine Learning in Healthcare. IEEE Journal of Biomedical and Health Informatics. https://doi.org/10.1109/jbhi.2014.2344095
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